The Political Settlements (PolSett) Dataset Codebook

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For data enquires: d.nicolai.schulz@gmail.com; t.kelsall@odi.org.uk
Structure of the Codebook

Content

1 Introduction

Provides a short introduction to the dataset, specifying its rationale and scope.

2 Explanatory Notes

Details the methodology behind the dataset, including the expert and case selection strategy, the survey design, aggregation of coder-level data, and the procedure behind constructing indices. Provides general information on variable versions and naming. Presents key identifier variables of the dataset, such as country names and codes, years, leader names, etc.

3 PolSett Indicators

Lists all indicators of the dataset divided by sections.

4 PolSett Indices

Lists all indices of the dataset divided by themes.

5 Appendix: Phase 2: Main Survey Questionnaire

Provides a copy of the main survey questionnaire as sent to country-experts.

6 References
CONTENTS

1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 13
2 Explanatory Notes ..................................................................................................... 14
   2.1 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 14
       2.1.1 Expert and Country Selection ................................................................. 14
       2.1.2 Survey Design ......................................................................................... 16
       2.1.3 Aggregation of Coder-Level Data ......................................................... 20
       2.1.4 Index Creation ......................................................................................... 20
       2.1.5 Cautionary Notes ..................................................................................... 21
2.2 Variable Information ............................................................................................. 22
       2.2.1 Variable Versions, Suffixes, and Prefixes ......................................... 22
       2.2.2 Variable Tags ............................................................................................ 23
       2.2.3 Variable Entry Clarifications ................................................................. 24
   2.3 Identifier Variables ............................................................................................... 25
       2.3.1 Country name as per Political Settlement Dataset (cname_psd) ........... 25
       2.3.2 Country name as per Quality of Government (cname_qog) .............. 25
       2.3.3 Country name as per VDEM (cname_vdem) ........................................... 25
       2.3.4 Historical country name as per VDEM (histname_vdem) ................. 25
       2.3.5 Country name as per World Development Indicators (cname_wdi) ..... 25
       2.3.6 Country abbreviation as per Penn World Tables (cabbrev_pwt) ......... 25
       2.3.7 Country codes as per Quality of Government (ccode_qog) ............... 25
       2.3.8 Country codes as per Correlates of War dataset (ccode_cow) .......... 25
       2.3.9 Year (year) ............................................................................................... 25
       2.3.10 Year range of political period (period) ................................................. 25
       2.3.11 First year of political period (periodstart) ............................................ 26
       2.3.12 Last year of political period (periodend) .............................................. 26
       2.3.13 Duration of political period in years (periodduration) ....................... 26
       2.3.14 Name of de facto leader numbered by political period (leadername_number) ........................................................................... 26
       2.3.15 Name of de facto leader, without numbering (leadername_nonumber) ........................................................................... 26
       2.3.16 Name of de facto leader as per Archigos (leadername_archigos) ....... 26
       2.3.17 Chronological political period number (periodnumber) .................... 26
       2.3.18 Period Type (periodtypebasic) ............................................................... 26
       2.3.19 Rationale for additional period breaks (breakrationale) ..................... 26
3 PolSett Indicators .................................................................................................... 27
3.1 Section I: The Settlement’s Configuration of Power

3.1.1 Population share (in %) of LB (q1_populationshare_lb) .............................................. 27
3.1.2 Population share (in %) of CLB (q1_populationshare_clb) ............................................. 27
3.1.3 Population share (in %) of OB (q1_populationshare_ob) .................................................. 27
3.1.4 Relative power of LB (q2_power_lb) ............................................................................... 27
3.1.5 Relative power of CLB (q2_power_clb) ............................................................................. 28
3.1.6 Relative power of OB (q2_power_ob) ................................................................................. 28
3.1.7 Likelihood CLB splits from government (q3_clbsplit) ....................................................... 28
3.1.8 Likelihood OB joins government (q4_objoin) ..................................................................... 29
3.1.9 Most powerful groups of LB (q5_powerfulgroups_lb) ....................................................... 30
3.1.10 Most powerful groups of CLB (q5_powerfulgroups_clb) ................................................. 30
3.1.11 Most powerful groups of OB (q5_powerfulgroups_ob) ..................................................... 30
3.1.12 Relatively powerless groups of LB (q6_powerlessgroups_lb) ......................................... 30
3.1.13 Relatively powerless groups of CLB (q6_powerlessgroups_clb) ...................................... 31
3.1.14 Relatively powerless groups of OB (q6_powerlessgroups_ob) ......................................... 31
3.1.15 Percentage of relatively powerless in LB (q7_powerlesspercentage_lb) ................. 31
3.1.16 Percentage of relatively powerless in CLB (q7_powerlesspercentage_clb) ............. 31
3.1.17 Percentage of relatively powerless in OB (q7_powerlesspercentage_ob) ............... 32
3.1.18 Hierarchical power concentration of LB (q8_hierarchy_lb) ...................................... 32
3.1.19 Hierarchical power concentration of CLB (q8_hierarchy_clb) ..................................... 32
3.1.20 Hierarchical power concentration of OB (q8_hierarchy_ob) ...................................... 32
3.1.21 Cohesiveness of LB (q9_cohesiveness_lb) ..................................................................... 33
3.1.22 Cohesiveness of CLB (q9_cohesiveness_clb) .................................................................... 33
3.1.23 Cohesiveness of OB (q9_cohesiveness_ob) ..................................................................... 33

3.2 Section II: Blocs’ Relationship to the Settlement

3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb) .................................. 33
3.2.2 Non-violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb) ................. 34
3.2.3 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb) ..... 35
3.2.4 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientnonmatlead_lb) ... 35
3.2.5 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_progmatlegitlead_lb) .......... 36
3.2.6 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_ideologlegitlead_lb) ...... 36
3.2.7 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_demlegitlead_lb) 37
3.2.8 Violent repression for leaders of CLB (q10_violrepresslead_clb) 38
3.2.9 Non-violent repression for leaders of CLB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_clb) 38
3.2.10 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_clb) 38
3.2.11 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q10_clientnonmatlead_clb) 38
3.2.12 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of CLB (q10_progmatlegitlead_clb) 38
3.2.13 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of CLB (q10_ideologlegitlead_clb) 38
3.2.14 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of CLB (q10_demlegitlead_clb) 38
3.2.15 Violent repression for leaders of OB (q10_violrepresslead_ob) 38
3.2.16 Non-violent repression for leaders of OB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_ob) 38
3.2.17 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of OB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_ob) 39
3.2.18 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of OB (q10_clientnonmatlead_ob) 39
3.2.19 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of OB (q10_progmatlegitlead_ob) 39
3.2.20 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of OB (q10_ideologlegitlead_ob) 39
3.2.21 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of OB (q10_demlegitlead_ob) 39
3.2.22 Violent repression for followers of LB (q11_violrepresslead_lb) 39
3.2.23 Non-violent repression for followers of LB (q11_nonviolrepresslead_lb) 39
3.2.24 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q11_clientmatcooptlead_lb) 39
3.2.25 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for followers of LB (q11_clientnonmatlead_lb) 39
3.2.26 Programmatic material legitimation for followers of LB (q11_progmatlegitlead_lb) 40
3.2.27 Universalistic ideological legitimation for followers of LB (q11_ideologlegitlead_lb) 40
3.2.28 Procedurally democratic legitimation for followers of LB (q11_demlegitlead_lb) 40
3.2.29 Violent repression for leaders of CLB (q11_violrepresslead_clb) 40
3.2.30 Non-violent repression for leaders of CLB (q11_nonviolrepresslead_clb) ...... 40
3.2.31 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q11_clientmatcooptlead_clb) ........................................................................................................................................ 40
3.2.32 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q11_clientnonmatlead_clb) ........................................................................................................................................ 40
3.2.33 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of CLB (q11_progammatlegitlead_clb) ........................................................................................................................................ 40
3.2.34 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of CLB (q11_ideologlegitlead_clb) ........................................................................................................................................ 41
3.2.35 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of CLB (q11_demlegitlead_clb) 41
3.2.36 Violent repression for followers of OB (q11_violrepresslead_ob) ............... 41
3.2.37 Non-violent repression for followers of OB (q11_nonviolrepresslead_ob) ...... 41
3.2.38 Clientelistic material cooptation for followers of OB (q11_clientmatcooptlead_ob) ........................................................................................................................................ 41
3.2.39 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for followers of OB (q11_clientnonmatlead_ob) ........................................................................................................................................ 41
3.2.40 Programmatic material legitimation for followers of OB (q11_progammatlegitlead_ob) ........................................................................................................................................ 41
3.2.41 Universalistic ideological legitimation for followers of OB (q11_ideologlegitlead_ob) ........................................................................................................................................ 41
3.2.42 Procedurally democratic legitimation for followers of OB (q11_demlegitlead_ob) 42
3.2.43 Relative material benefits received by LB (q12_crossblocdistri_lb) .............. 42
3.2.44 Relative material benefits received by CLB (q12_crossblocdistri_clb) ............ 42
3.2.45 Relative material benefits received by OB (q12_crossblocdistri_ob) .............. 42
3.2.46 Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of LB (q13_withinblocdistri_lb). 42
3.2.47 Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of CLB (q13_withinblocdistri_clb) 43
3.2.48 Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of OB (q13_withinblocdistri_ob)43
3.3 Section III: Decision-making and Implementing Power of the Leadership ........... 43
3.3.1 Concentration of policy-decision-making power in leader (q14_polmakingconcent) ........................................................................................................................................ 43
3.3.2 Concentration of policy-implementation power in leader (q15_polimplemconcent) ........................................................................................................................................ 44
3.4 Section IV: Foreign Influence and Internal and External Threats ..................... 45
3.4.1 Foreign military support importance (q16_formilsupport) ............................ 45
3.4.2 Foreign financial and technical support importance (q17_forfintechsupport) ... 45
3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub) .............. 45
3.4.4 Political threat by rural dominant classes (q18_polthreat_ruraldom) ............... 46
3.4.5 Political threat by urban subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_urbansub) ........... 46
3.4.6 Political threat by urban dominant classes (q18_polthreat_urbandom) ............. 46
3.4.7 Political threat by ethnic, regional or religious groups (q18_polthreat_ethnoregrel) .................................................................................................................................................................................. 46
3.4.8 Political threat by an opposition group in exile (q18_polthreat_exileoppos) .... 46
3.4.9 Political threat by the military (q18_polthreat_military) ..................................... 46
3.4.10 Political threat by neighboring country (q18_polthreat_neighbcntry) ............. 46
3.4.11 Political threat by a non-neighboring country (q18_polthreat_nonneighbcntry) 46
3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub) ........... 47
3.4.13 Physical threat by rural dominant classes (q19_phythreat_ruraldom) ............... 47
3.4.14 Physical threat by urban subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_urbansub) ........... 47
3.4.15 Physical threat by urban dominant classes (q19_phythreat_urbandom) ............ 47
3.4.16 Physical threat by ethnic, regional or religious groups (q19_phythreat_ethnoregrel) .................................................................................................................................................................................. 47
3.4.17 Physical threat by an opposition group in exile (q19_phythreat_exileoppos) ... 47
3.4.18 Physical threat by the military (q19_phythreat_military) ..................................... 47
3.4.19 Physical threat by neighboring country (q19_phythreat_neighbcntry) ............. 48
3.4.20 Physical threat by a non-neighboring country (q19_phythreat_nonneighbcntry) 48

3.5 Section VI: Economic Organizations ................................................................. 48
3.5.1 Manufacturing firms' capabilities (q20_firmcapabilities) .................................... 48
3.5.2 Manufacturing firms' political power (q21_firmpower) .................................... 48

3.6 Section VI: Economic and Social Policy ............................................................ 49
3.6.1 Industrialization strategy (q22_industrialpolicy) .............................................. 49
3.6.2 FDI strategy (q23_fdistrategy) ........................................................................... 49
3.6.3 Intervention of state in economy (q24_stateintervention) ............................... 49
3.6.4 Government's industry versus agriculture prioritization (q25_industryvsagric) 50
3.6.5 Government's prioritization of economic development (q26_econdevprio) ...... 50
3.6.6 Government's prioritization of social development (q27_socdevprio) .............. 50

4 PolSett Indices ........................................................................................................ 52
4.1 Power Concentration ......................................................................................... 52
4.1.1 Horizontal power (simple) (x_horizontalpower) ............................................ 52
4.1.2 Horizontal power (normalized) (x_horizontalpower_nor) ............................. 52
4.1.3 Horizontal Power Dummy (x_horizontalpowerdummy) ........................................52
4.1.4 LB vs CLB power ratio (x_lbvsclbpowerratio)..................................................52
4.1.5 Vertical Power Index (x_verticalpower).................................................................53
4.1.6 Vertical Power Dummy (x_verticalpowerdummy)..................................................53
4.1.7 Power Concentration Index (additive) (x_powerconcentration_add)..................53
4.1.8 Power Concentration Index (multiplicative) (x_powerconcentration_multi) ....53
4.1.9 Power Concentration Index (average of additive and multiplicative) (x_powerconcentration_mix).................................................................54
4.1.10 Power Concentration Index dummy (x_pcdummy) ...........................................54
4.1.11 Khanian four-category settlement types (x_khansettlementype) .......................54

4.2 Social Foundation and Cooptation .................................................................55
4.2.1 Governing Coalition Size (in %) (x_governingcoalitionsize).........................55
4.2.2 Share of powerful supporters of LB (x_lbpowerfulshare) ..............................55
4.2.3 Share of powerful supporters of CLB (x_clbpowerfulshare).............................55
4.2.4 Share of powerful supporters of OB (x_obpowerfulshare) ................................55
4.2.5 Share of powerful supporters of LB in total population (x_lbpowerfulsharetotpop)55
4.2.6 Share of powerful supporters of CLB in total population (x_clbpowerfulsharetotpop).................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................56
4.2.7 Share of powerful supporters of OB in total population (x_obpowerfulsharetotpop).................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................56
4.2.8 Share of powerful citizens in total population (x_totpowerfulpopshare)..........56
4.2.9 Dummy of Share of powerful citizens in total population (x_tppsdummy) .......56
4.2.10 Share of powerful citizens in total population (normalized) (x_totpowerfulpopshare_nor) .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................57
4.2.11 Highest cooptation score for LB leaders (x_lbcooptthighleaders) ...............57
4.2.12 Highest cooptation score for CLB leaders (x_clbcooptthighleaders) ............57
4.2.13 Highest cooptation score for OB leaders (x_obcooptthighleaders) ...............57
4.2.14 Highest cooptation score for LB followers (x_lbcoopthighfollowers) .........58
4.2.15 Highest cooptation score for CLB followers (x_clbcoopthighfollowers) .......58
4.2.16 Highest cooptation score for OB followers (x_obcoopthighfollowers) ........58
4.2.17 Average cooptation score for LB leaders (x_lbcooptaverageleaders) ..........58
4.2.18 Average cooptation score for CLB leaders (x_clbcooptaverageleaders) ........59
4.2.19 Average cooptation score for OB leaders (x_obcooptaverageleaders) ..........59
4.2.20 Average cooptation score for LB followers (x_lbcooptaveragefollowers) ....59
4.2.21 Average cooptation score for CLB followers (x_clbcooptaveragefollowers) ....60
4.2.22 Average cooptation score for OB followers (x_obcooptaveragefollowers)...... 60
4.2.23 Joined repression and cooptation score index for LB leaders (x_lbcooptjoinedleaders).............................................................................................. 60
4.2.24 Joined repression and cooptation score index for CLB leaders (x_clbcooptjoinedleaders)...................................................................................... 61
4.2.25 Joined repression and cooptation score index for OB leaders (x_obcooptjoinedleaders).............................................................................................. 61
4.2.26 Joined repression and cooptation score index for LB followers (x_lbcooptjoinedfollowers).......................................................................................... 61
4.2.27 Joined repression and cooptation score index for CLB followers (x_clbcooptjoinedfollowers).................................................................................. 62
4.2.28 Joined repression and cooptation score index for OB followers (x_obcooptjoinedfollowers).................................................................................. 62
4.2.29 Overall Cooptation Index for LB (x_lbgencooptindex)........................................ 62
4.2.30 Overall Cooptation Index for CLB (x_clbgencooptindex)....................................... 63
4.2.31 Overall Cooptation Index for OB (x_obgencooptindex)........................................ 63
4.2.32 Share of powerful LB members that are coopted (x_lbpowerfulsharecoopted) 63
4.2.33 Share of powerful CLB members that are coopted (x_clbpowerfulsharecoopted) 63
4.2.34 Share of powerful OB members that are coopted (x_obpowerfulsharecoopted) 64
4.2.35 Social Foundation Size Index (x_socialfoundationsize)................................. 64
4.2.36 Social Foundation Size Index (normalized) (x_socialfoundationsize_nor)....... 64
4.2.37 Social foundation size dummy (x_sfsdummy)................................................... 64
4.2.38 Share of any LB members that are coopted (x_lbanymsharecoopted)............... 65
4.2.39 Share of any CLB members that are coopted (x_clbanymsharecoopted)......... 65
4.2.40 Share of any OB members that are coopted (x_obanymsharecoopted).......... 65
4.2.41 Total coopted population (x_totalcooptedpopulation).................................... 65
4.2.42 General cooptation score (x_gencooptscore).................................................... 65
4.2.43 General violent repression score (x_genviorepscore)........................................... 66
4.2.44 General non-violent repression score (x_gennonviorepcooptscore).................. 66
4.2.45 General clientelistic material cooptation score (x_genclientmatcooptscore)..... 66
4.2.46 General clientelistic non-material cooptation score (x_genclientnonmatcooptscore).......................................................................................... 66
4.2.47 General programmatic material legitimation score (x_genprogmatcooptscore) 67
4.2.48 General universalistic ideological legitimation score (x_genuniideocooptscore) 67
4.2.49 General procedural democratic legitimation score (x_gendemocrcooptscore) 67
4.3 ESID Political Settlement Indices ................................................................. 68
   4.3.1 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_add')
(x_sfspc_add) ........................................................................................................ 68
   4.3.2 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_multi')
(x_sfspc_multi) ...................................................................................................... 68
   4.3.3 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_mix')
(x_sfspc_mix) .......................................................................................................... 69
   4.3.4 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_add')
(x_tppspc_add) ........................................................................................................ 69
   4.3.5 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_multi')
(x_tppspc_multi) .................................................................................................... 69
   4.3.6 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_mix')
(x_tppspc_mix) ........................................................................................................ 70
   4.3.7 ESID’s four-category settlement types (x_esidettlementtype) ..................... 70
   4.3.8 ESID’s four-category settlement types (using x_tppspc_add_nor)
(x_esidettlementtype_tpps) ...................................................................................... 71

4.4 Distributive (IN)equality .............................................................................. 71
   4.4.1 Horizontal distribution inequality (x_horizdistrinequality) ......................... 71
   4.4.2 Horizontal distribution inequality (normalized) (x_horizdistrinequality_nor) .. 72

4.5 Threats and Foreign Support ........................................................................ 72
   4.5.1 Joined foreign support importance index (x_joinforeignsuppimport) .......... 72
   4.5.2 Highest political threat level (x_highpolthreatlvl) ........................................ 72
   4.5.3 Highest physical threat level (x_highphysthreatlvl) ...................................... 73
   4.5.4 Highest domestic political threat level (x_highdompolthreatlvl) .................. 73
   4.5.5 Highest external political threat level (x_highextpolthreatlvl) ..................... 73
   4.5.6 Highest domestic physical threat level (x_highdomphysthreatlvl) ............... 74
   4.5.7 Highest external physical threat level (x_highextphysthreatlvl) ............... 74
   4.5.8 Highest domestic non-elite political threat level (x_highdompolnonelthreatlvl)
74
   4.5.9 Highest domestic non-elite physical threat level (x_highdomphynonelthreatlvl)
75
   4.5.10 Highest political threat from rural or urban subordinates
(x_highrurururbsubthreatlvl) ................................................................................... 75
   4.5.11 Highest political threat from rural or urban subordinates or ethno/religious/reg
(x_highrururbeththreatlvl) ..................................................................................... 75
   4.5.12 Highest external physical threat from exile opposition or neighbor
(x_highextphysthreatexileneigh) ............................................................................ 76
   4.5.13 Systemic threat (Crude and physical threat) (x_systthreat_physcrude) ........ 76
### 4.5.14 Systemic threat (Non-elite and physical threat) (x_systthreat_physnoelite)...... 76
### 4.5.15 Systemic threat (Polit.: Non-elite; Phys.: exile & neighbor) (x_systthreat_subpolextphys).............................................................................................................. 76
### 4.5.16 Systemic threat (Polit.: Non-elite & ethnic; Phys.: exile & neighbor) (x_systthreat_subethpolextphys)......................................................................................................................................... 77

### 4.6 Business Configuration.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 77
### 4.6.1 Business Configuration (Capability * Power) (x_businessconfig) ................. 77
### 4.6.2 Business Configuration (Capability * Power; normalized) (x_businessconfig_nor)........................................................................................................................................ 77

### 4.7 Development Policy ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 77
### 4.7.1 Expert opinion whether industrial policy exists (x_industrialpolicyyesno)...... 77
### 4.7.2 Expert opinion whether FDI policy exists (x_fdipolicyyesno)....................... 78
### 4.7.3 Industrial Policy Score (if coders said industrial policy exists) (x_industrialpolicyyes)............................................................................................................................................................................ 78
### 4.7.4 Industrial Policy Score (if coders said industrial policy exists; normalized) (x_industrialpolicyyes_nor)............................................................................................................................................................ 78
### 4.7.5 Mixed ISI-EOI dummy (x_mixedisieoi)............................................................ 79
### 4.7.6 Three-categorical industrial policy variable (x_industrialpolicy_cat1)......... 79
### 4.7.7 Three-categorical industrial policy variable (x_industrialpolicy_cat2)......... 79
### 4.7.8 FDI Policy Score (if coders said FDI policy exists) (x_fdistrategyyes)......... 80
### 4.7.9 Economic Policy Index (x_econpolicy) ......................................................... 80
### 4.7.10 Economic Policy Index dummy (x_economicpolicydummy)........................ 80
### 4.7.11 Multiplicative economic policy and power concentration index (x_powereconpolicy_multi).............................................................................................................................................................. 80
### 4.7.12 Multiplicative industrial policy and power concentration index (x_powerinduspolicy_multi)............................................................................................................................................................................. 81
### 4.7.13 Four-categorical economic policy and power concentration typology (x_powereconpolicy_cat)........................................................................................................................................................................... 81
### 4.7.14 Six-categorical industrial policy and power concentration typology (1.5, 2.5) (x_powerinduspolicy_cat1)................................................................................................................................................................................... 81
### 4.7.15 Six-categorical industrial policy and power concentration typology (1.66, 2.33) (x_powerinduspolicy_cat2)................................................................................................................................................................................... 82

5 Appendix: Phase 2: Main Survey Questionnaire ......................................................... 83
### 5.1 Section I: The Settlement’s Configuration of Power............................................. 83
### 5.2 Section II: Blocs’ Relationship to the Settlement................................................. 88
### 5.3 Section III: Decision-making and Implementing Power of the Leadership .......... 91
### 5.4 Section IV: Foreign Influence and Internal and External Threats ....................... 92
1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, few concepts have captured conflict and development specialists’ imagination as profoundly as the idea of a ‘political settlement’. Defined as “an ongoing agreement (or acquiescence) among a society’s most powerful groups to a set of political and economic institutions expected to generate for them a minimally acceptable level of benefits, and which thereby ends or prevents generalised civil war and/or political and economic disorder”, the concept most closely resembles that of political orders in political science (Kelsall et al. forthcoming). An increasing number of academics and development practitioners are beginning to view political settlements as crucial to political stability and important for future development trajectories (see also Routley 2012): political settlements analysis has been integrated into the diagnostic frameworks of several aid agencies and is being used to shape country development strategies.

However, there has been little attempt to date to code such political power configurations cross-nationally or cross-temporally. This makes it difficult to adjudicate between contending definitions of the term, evaluate hypotheses about political settlements’ effects or indeed to assess the validity of this and related approaches. The Political Settlements (PolSett) Dataset aims to fill this gap. Constructed over three years at the University of Manchester’s Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) research centre, this expert-survey-based dataset covers over 200 political economy variables coded for 44 countries in the Global South from 1946 or independence to 2018 (totalling 2,718 country-years). For each country, at least three experts in its political economy and/or political history were invited to participate in our survey. We asked them about the relative size, strength and social composition of contending political blocs in society, their internal cohesion, accountability relations, and benefit distribution. We also collected data on additional variables such as foreign relations, systemic threats, economic ideology, the strength of domestic capitalists, and the character of social and economic policy. We are convinced that the PolSett dataset will allow studying central questions of power, coalitions, threats, economic policy-making and development more directly and rigorously.

Two versions of the dataset are available. First, a country-year coder-level dataset. Second, the core dataset, that aggregates the respective country-coder responses to one observation per country-year-variable. All indices created from the data are only available in the core dataset.

The codebook is structured as follows. Section 2 details the methodology behind the dataset, including the expert and case selection strategy, the survey design, aggregation of coder-level data, and the procedure behind constructing indices. It further provides general information on variable versions and naming, and presents key identifier variables of the dataset, such as country names and codes, years, leader names, etc. Section 3 lists all indicators of the dataset whereas section 4 lists all indices. The Appendix (section 5) provides a copy of the main survey questionnaire as sent to country-experts.
2 EXPLANATORY NOTES

2.1 METHODOLOGY

2.1.1 Expert and Country Selection

To appreciate the composition and geometry of a society’s more and less powerful groups, in-depth knowledge of its political history is required. For this reason, we chose an expert survey as our approach to capturing data. For each country, the survey relies on the assessment of at least three experts in its political economy and/or political history, identified through personal networks or web searches. With data quality a function of the quality of the experts, we considered only scholars with a documented and widely reputed expertise on a country’s modern political history. In total, we identified 509 potential experts and employed 135 for the final survey.

Limited in the number of experts we could compensate, we restricted our survey population to 44 countries in the Global South (presented in Table 1 below). We selected only countries that in the 1960s had predominantly rural populations with more than five million inhabitants, an agricultural sector that contributed at least 10% of GDP, and a GDP per capita (in 2010 constant US$) of less than US$3,500. Furthermore, except for four landlocked countries that were critical to the ESID project – Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia – all selected countries are coastal. Hereby the dataset permits small- or medium-N focused researchers to minimize the number of several typical confounding variables that need to be held constant.

While the identity of ESID’s staff and core team members is publicized on the ESID’s website, we do not reveal the identity of our country experts for three main reasons:

- The participation in the survey and acknowledgement thereof might be dangerous for participants and their relatives in countries that are repressive or might become so in the future.
- The data might be used in evaluations and assessments internationally in ways that could affect a country’s status. Thus, there are incentives for certain countries and other actors to try to affect ratings;
- Following EU laws and regulations, it is prohibited to share Personal Identifying Information (PII).

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1 Given the considerable time invested in the survey, coders were recompensated with an honorarium of £500.
### Table 1. Country and Temporal Coverage of the PolSett Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>COW Country Code</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1975-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>1972-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>1953-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1960-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>1960-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R. of the Congo</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>1960-2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>1957-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>1958-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1945-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1947-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1945-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1963-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>1960-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>1957-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1956-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>1975-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>1948-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>1960-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1947-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>1948-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>1962-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>1960-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>1960-2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>1945-2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>1948-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>1956-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1964-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1946-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1956-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1962-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>1976-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>1990-2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (North)</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>1946-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen (South)</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>1967-1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>1964-2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1.2 Survey Design

The survey instrument itself was designed over the course of one year. Before being disseminated to all 135 experts, it was exposed to three rounds of piloting and subsequent feedback discussions and workshops with a dozen ESID scholars and ESID-external country experts respectively. The final survey then consisted of two distinct phases explained in more detail below.

2.1.2.1 Phase 1: Creation and Classification of Political Periods

In Phase 1 of the survey, we asked experts to corroborate or interrogate a list of political periods into which we had provisionally split countries’ political history (since 1946 or independence, whichever was later). The key goal of this exercise was to create a periodization that closely tracks variation in major de facto changes in the political and/or economic rules of the game, the configuration of power, and the degree of agreement around the settlement, serving as temporal units of coding in the second part of the survey. (Note that for the final dataset periods were disaggregated to the country-year level). This process included several iterations of back and forth discussions with and between coders, typically taking between one and three months.

As described in more detail in the following section, at a macro level we divide society into three main blocs. Specifically,

1. the leader’s bloc: that is, the segment of the population whose political loyalty the current de facto leader perceives s/he can be reasonably assured of, at least in the short-term;
2. the contingently loyal bloc: The segment of the population that is currently aligned with the de facto leader but whose political loyalty s/he cannot be assured of; and
3. the opposition bloc: the segment of the population that is not currently aligned with either of the above.

Based on this conceptualization, we decided to use leadership change as a good initial proxy for changes in the configuration of powerful groups. Using the Archigos data base of (de facto) political leaders (Goemans et al. 2009), each change in the leadership of a country was consequently identified as a basic break-point. Note that if multiple leaders ruled in a calendar year, only the one that ruled longest in that year is coded. Coders, however, were invited to challenge these break points if they felt that a leadership change did not connote a major change in the configuration of power, for example because the existing leader was replaced by someone from the same group with similar ideas and a similar degree of authority.³

Thereafter, we used additional data bases and web resources to identify other potential break points which might signify major change or evolution in the de facto rules of the game and/or the configuration of power, namely:

1. the composition and power of the governing coalition;⁴

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² The periods identified are in many cases identical to what we would term ‘political settlement periods’ – but not always, which is why we simply call them ‘periods’ or ‘political periods’;
³ Although this was rarely done in practice.
⁴ For example using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset Cederman (et al. 2010).
2. formal political institutions;\textsuperscript{5} 
3. the degree of violent contestation and/or the propensity of the government losing a war;\textsuperscript{6} 
4. the economic and social ideology of the head of government;\textsuperscript{7} and/or 
5. the degree to which the state can conduct domestic policy autonomously of foreign states or organizations.\textsuperscript{8} 

We then asked coders to question and suggest changes to our initial periodization. Doing so we encouraged them to think of other criteria that might be relevant for tracking changes in the configuration of power (e.g. changes in informal institutions, movements of very powerful subgroups from one bloc to another) and to overrule de jure changes we have suggested if they were not major de facto changes.

This process resulted in a fine-grained periodization system. The average country in our dataset is covered for 61.77 years, had 8.59 distinct leaders, 9.27 continuous leader periods,\textsuperscript{9} and 14.31 political periods (resulting in an average period length of 4.31 years). This shows that the periodization system is considerably more detailed than relying only on leader transitions as breaks. The Cameroonian case further exemplifies this. The nation only had two de facto leaders in its post-independence history – Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya – yet our methodology captures ten distinct political periods.

Finally, we asked coders to assess our database- and research-generated classification of whether a country-period was best described as one of the following types:\textsuperscript{10}

a. Unsettled: This category is intended to capture those periods in which civil war was so all-encompassing and the possibility of the government losing militarily so serious and tangible, that all it could really engage in was consolidating authority and securing its imminent military survival (rather than also engaging in economic or social policy, etc.). That is, a period similar to that in Syria from 2012-2017, or Libya in 2011. Such all-encompassing warfare is, by our definition, incompatible with there being a political settlement. This is indicated for us by two criteria: 1) a threshold of ‘substantial or prolonged warfare’ (i.e. \( \geq 5 \)) according to the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset (MEPV) (Marshall 2017);\textsuperscript{11} and 2) an intrastate war having caused 1,000 battle-related deaths per year according to the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset

\textsuperscript{5} Here, for example, we used the Polity IV dataset Marshall et al. 2019 to identify changes in political and economic institutions. The former would be signified by such things as transitions from autocracy to democracy, changes in the electoral system, changes to the separation of powers, transitions from unitary to federal constitutions, and so on, although in all cases we asked coders to concentrate on de facto institutional change. We also highlighted the importance of informal institutions, such as the nature of patron-client networks, major changes to which might also connote a change in the settlement.

\textsuperscript{6} Here primarily using the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset (Marshall 2018).

\textsuperscript{7} For economic institutions, we asked coders to think about major changes to economic policies or systems, such as might be proxied by a change in the leadership’s ideology and policy programme, with an emphasis, again, on de facto changes.

\textsuperscript{8} A foreign occupation or peacekeeping mission, for example, would signify, for us, a potential break in the settlement.

\textsuperscript{9} When a leader loses and returns to office the country will have more continuous leader periods than leaders. An example would be Bangladesh, where both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia have alternated in office several times.

\textsuperscript{10} If multiple periods occur in a calendar year, it is coded according to the one that occupies the greatest duration. For example, a calendar year controlled by the same leader, which was first settled for 3 months, then unsettled for 5 months, and finally settled again for the remaining 4 months would be classified as ‘unsettled’. If the ‘unsettled’ period had lasted only for three months, however, the calendar year would be coded as ‘settled’.

\textsuperscript{11} Please compare the MEPV codebook for more detail (particularly pages 9 to 11).
(i.e. deaths that were not the result of one-sided violence by the government or by a formally organized group against civilians). If both of these hold, we provisionally code a period as unsettled, subject to the caveats below;

b. **Challenged:** We use this category to capture periods where there are serious and prolonged violent or disorderly challenges to the regime but in which it is not under tangible threat of being militarily overthrown by oppositional groups. For us, this is indicated EITHER by a period in which there was substantial and prolonged warfare [see above] but in which the violence was geographically limited to a particular region with a relatively small population e.g. <25% of the country OR a period in which there was serious political violence or warfare but at a lower intensity than in the above case [i.e. MEPV 3-4 or MEPV ≥ 5, but with less than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year] OR alternatively, a period where there were very regular and very large protests or demonstrations against the ruling group or the political system itself;

c. **Settled:** We use this category to capture periods lasting at least two years where there appears to be a substantial agreement or truce among the most powerful groups around the basic rules of the political game, even though there may be extensive repression of less powerful groups, minor insurgencies or sporadic violence and disorder. Coding a period as 'settled' does not imply that it was peaceful, without repression, or democratic. It only means that we did not find the period to meet the 'challenged' or 'unsettled' thresholds set out above;

d. **Semi-Settled:** We use this category to capture short periods in which there is a lack of agreement among the most powerful groups over the basic rules of the political game and/or the general composition of the governing coalition, even if this is not manifested as substantial or prolonged warfare or disorder. For us, this is indicated by a situation in which there was no serious political violence (MEPV<3) but a significant change in leadership, power or institutions occurs after less than two years;

e. **Transitional:** We use this category to capture periods in which there is a planned transition from war to peace, autocracy to democracy, or to organize elections. This is indicated by a period in which there was no substantial or prolonged warfare [i.e. MEPV<5] and there was an officially designated transitional period.

### 2.1.2.2 Phase 2: Main Survey Questionnaire

Having established when countries had a political settlement, in Phase II of the survey we asked experts to characterize all 'settled', 'challenged', and 'transitional' periods that lasted at least two years in more detail via a set of 27 mostly close-ended ordinal-scaled questions resulting in a total of 101 raw variables. Implemented using the online survey tool Qualtrics, it took experts a full day on average to complete the survey, spanning six sections covering areas from the settlement’s configuration of power to a characterization of the government’s economic and social policy.

The reason we have significantly more variables than questions is primarily due to our approach to have experts answer half of our questions for three distinct political blocs. Political settlements’ major claim to date in making a distinctive contribution to politics and development studies rests on the way it dissects political groups in a way that goes beyond
conventional regime theory. It is not only interested in the power of the governing coalition vis-à-vis oppositional groups – Khan’s (2010) so-called horizontal dimension of power –, but also the degree of power that the country’s top leader has as compared to rival elites and lower-level factions within the governing coalition (subsumed under Khan’s vertical dimension of power). To capture these distinctions, we divided society into three distinct blocs:

- **the Leader’s Bloc (LB):** That is, the segment of the population whose political loyalty the current de facto leader can be reasonably assured of, at least in the short-term (by political loyalty, we mean a determination to defend the leader against challenges and/or to not defect from or make serious political trouble for him/her, where serious political trouble refers to deliberate actions that might directly or indirectly threaten the leader’s political survival);

- **the Contingently Loyal Bloc (CLB):** The segment of the population that is currently aligned with the de facto leader (and therefore has some representation in government) but whose political loyalty s/he cannot be assured of (in other words, there is a realistic possibility that it could defect from the leader and/or make serious political trouble for him/her); and

- **the Opposition Bloc (OB):** The segment of the population that is not currently aligned with the LB or the CLB and does not feel represented by government. Note that this will include both members of the official and outlawed political opposition, including those in exile. For convenience, it is also where we place individuals who have no political alignment, no interest in politics and no prospect of being mobilized into politics.

The governing coalition, then, would comprise those members of the LB and the CLB that control political authority and state power, but not the OB.

Using this distinction, we asked a range of questions on the character of these blocs and their relationship to the settlement at large. Specifically, which share of the population they represented; their level of political power; whether they were likely to join or leave the governing coalition; what their most and least powerful groups were; what share of their members were powerless; how powerful high-level leaders were vis-a-vis intermediate-level leaders and ordinary followers; whether the bloc was cohesive or fragmented; how important different methods of repression or incorporation were as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his/her and other blocs’ elites and followers into or under the settlement; and how equally material benefits generated by the settlement where distributed across and within the blocs.

Moreover, we asked experts questions on a range of other political economy factors. For example, threats to the political and physical survival of leaders by different domestic and foreign actors; the political power of business; and the development policy conducted in the country.

Overall, our approach was to disaggregate complex comprehensive concepts like political settlements or systemic vulnerabilities into several more observable and comparable indicators which could then later on be re-aggregated into indices.
2.1.3 Aggregation of Coder-Level Data

We employed three different methods to aggregate coder level data to one variable score per country year. First and most simply, we took a simple mean of all expert replies. These aggregated variables can be identified by the “_sm” suffix.

Second, we weighted expert answers prior to aggregation according to their levels of confidence. Specifically, for each question-period we asked experts to rank their level of confidence on a scale from 1 to 4 (from very unconfident to very confident).\(^\text{12}\) Whereas the highest level of confidence received a weight of 1, the three lower confidence levels received scores of 0.75, 0.5, and 0.25 respectively. These weights are then multiplied by their respective expert answer scores, and the average of these three weighted scores represents the final score. The confidence-weighted variables can be identified by the “_wm” suffix.

Third, we weighted expert answers prior to aggregation using both their levels of confidence as well as their distance to those of other coders. The risk of weighting answer scores exclusively by the confidence levels, is that when an expert very confidently makes a “wrong” assessment, this adds significant error to the overall estimate. To reduce this risk, we reduce the weight of expert answers the further they are away from the average answer score of all country experts. Specifically, we first subtract the coder-level score from the simple mean score for a country-period-indicator, generating the absolute distance between the two. Then to standardize this distance score across variables and make it comparable to the confidence-weighted score we min-max transform it per each variable to range from 0 to 1 (where 1 indicates no distance to the mean and 0 the highest observed distance across all observations for a variable in the dataset). We then add this distance-weight to our confidence-weight, creating a joined distance- and confidence-based weight. This weight is then multiplied with each respective coder’s country-period-indicator-answer. As we perceive this aggregation option to likely produce the most valid estimates we use it as our core specification (and no suffix is added). At the same time, it should be noted that the three aggregation methods produce very similar results. For example, the three versions of our first indicator – q1_populationshare_lb(*_sm, *_wm) – correlate at 0.99, 0.99 and 0.98 respectively.

To provide users of the data with the possibility to incorporate measures of reliability of the data, we added simple (“_sd”), confidence-weighted (“_wsd”), and relative standard deviations (“_rsd”) for each indicator in the dataset, described in more detail in section 2.2.1.

Lastly, we gave coders the opportunity to add comments after each survey section. These can be found in both datasets in variables named “section1comments”, “section2comments”, etc.

2.1.4 Index Creation

Using the indicators from the aggregated core dataset, we constructed 107 indices. Indices were calculated using different methods and formulas. In most cases we simply add (representing a family resemblance or substitutability logic) or multiply indicators (representing a necessary or weakest-link logic) or use a mix of both approaches to represent both logics.

\(^\text{12}\) Note that the scale for Question 1 (and the three related indicators) ranged from 1 to 3 and weights were assigned as 1, 0.75, and 0.25 respectively. Note also that in the final aggregated dataset the confidence scale of question 1 was re-scaled to 1 to 4 to match with those of the other 26 questions.
In some cases, principal component analysis was used to create indices. The idea of PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of a set of variables into underlying components, which represent a common source to the variation in the original variables. The standard procedure is then to use the respective variables' factor loadings to the first component (which represents the greatest source of common variation) as weights for the indicator. This procedure ensures that the theoretically chosen subcomponents are combined in a mathematical way that reflects a coherent concept that can be empirically distinguished from other concepts of interest.

Several indices were further min-max normalized to range from a scale from 0 to 1. This facilitates further aggregation and interpretation in regression outputs. The specific formula for min-max-transformed variables throughout the dataset is:

\[
= \frac{(\text{country period specific variable score} - \text{lowest variable score in full sample})}{(\text{highest variable score in full sample} - \text{lowest variable score in full sample})}
\]

Where both a normalized and non-normalized version is available, the normalized version is suffixed with "_nor".

Two indices stand out in particular. First, the Power Concentration Index. This index aims to have a unified measure of the degree to which de facto power is concentrated in a country’s LB. Put simply, we argue that power is more concentrated in the leader the weaker the OB, the greater the power of the LB vis-a-vis the CLB, the smaller the likelihood that the CLB would leave the governing coalition, the greater the power of the leader vis-a-vis his/her own bloc’s followers, and the more cohesive the leader’s bloc (see also section 4.1.7 for more detail).

The second key index is the Social Foundation Size Index. The aim of this index is a measurement that captures what percentage of the population is both potentially disruptive and co-opted by the country’s leadership. The underlying assumption is that in settlements with a larger social foundation, leaders might feel a greater pressure to deliver widespread development. To operationalize this index, we multiplied for each bloc the share of the total population it accounts for with the share of its powerful members. This bloc-level powerful population share was further multiplied by an estimate ranging from 0 to 1 of whether the bloc’s followers and leaders were primarily repressed or co-opted. Aggregating all blocs’ score resulted in the final index score. As such, both indices combine several sub-indices in one meta-index.

All indices are prefixed with a “x_”.

2.1.5 Cautionary Notes
We do want to highlight three data limitations and potential strategies to deal with them. First, we recognized that the ineffable nature of power and related variables means that many of our codings are based on expert coders’ educated guesstimates or ‘judgement calls’; and that it is perhaps a tall order to expect coders to have detailed knowledge of all of the granular and sometimes difficult to discern phenomena across all the political periods we asked about. Consequently, as described above, for each question-period coders were asked to record their degree of confidence in their answer. While not a fail-safe method for eliminating error and bias, we feel this provides some indication of where the evidence is stronger or weaker and a safeguard against making exaggerated claims for our data. Moreover, as detailed in section
2.1.3, we employed these confidence ratings as weights during the aggregation of country-coder-period scores to single country-period scores.

Second, achieving cross-country intercoder equivalence is often difficult in expert surveys given the lack of a benchmark common to all coders (Knutsen et al. 2019, pp. 444–445). One attempt to address this is the use of vignettes in the questionnaire as well as employing the same coder for several countries (Coppedge et al. 2020; King and Wand 2007). Given the length of the questionnaire and constrained financial resources, adding vignettes to all questions and finding lateral coders proved unfeasible. Therefore, extra care was given to formulating questions, giving detailed notes and providing empirical examples where helpful. Also, as described above, the validity of cross-country patterns was rigorously reviewed by ESID-affiliated scholars. Nevertheless, comparisons through time are apt to be more accurate than comparisons across cases. Where appropriate PolSett users might want to include country fixed-effects in their models to generate more reliable estimates.

Finally, in very rare cases, country-period-variable scores are based on less than three replies. As this renders the intercoder-distance based aggregation method described above ineffective, we encourage users of the data set to exclude these data points from their analyses. This is facilitated by a variable depicting the number of replies for each variable and country-year (named identical to the variable name, but with an “_nr” suffix).

2.2 VARIABLE INFORMATION

2.2.1 Variable Versions, Suffixes, and Prefixes

As touched upon in previous sections, the PolSett dataset contains several versions of our indicator and index variables.

- **Distance- and confidence-weighted means (no suffix):**
  This version has no special suffix (e.g. q1_populationshare_lb). This version of the variables provides country–year point estimates from the distance and confidence weight-based aggregation model specified in section 2.1.3. It also forms the basis for all indices available in the dataset. For most purposes, these are the preferred versions of the variables for time series regression and other estimation strategies.

- **Confidence-weighted means (*_wm)**
  This version of the variables provides country–year point estimates from the confidence weight-based aggregation model specified in section 2.1.3. Only calculated for indicators and not for indices.

- **Simple means (*_sm)**
  This version of the variables provides country–year point estimates using simple means to aggregate coder-level replies as specified in section 2.1.3. Only calculated for indicators and not for indices.

- **Simple standard deviation (*_sd)**
This measures the simple standard deviation between the different replies of experts for one country-year-indicator. Only calculated for indicators and not for indices.

- **Weighted standard deviation (*_wsd)*
  This measures standard deviation between the different replies of experts for one country-year-indicator, though weighting each score as per the experts confidence with their reply. This way standard deviations are not excessively enlarged by outlier assessments of experts who stated they were unsure with their reply. Only calculated for indicators and not for indices.

- **Relative standard deviation (*_rsd)*
  This variable results from dividing the weighted standard deviation by the confidence-weighted mean score and ranges from 0 to 2 (where higher values indicate higher variation). It is created so as to have a more comparable measure of variation across variables, which is not the case for the previous two standard deviation measures given different scales used across variables. Only calculated for indicators and not for indices.

- **Number of coders per country, variable and year (*_nr)*
  Represents the number of country experts who provided data on a country-year-variable score. Also compare section 2.1.5 on cautionary notes. The variable is available for all indicators and indices. Note that for indices the number represents the lowest number of experts in any of its sub-indicators (i.e. represents the “weakest link”).

In addition, there are a range of “pre-suffixes” limited to certain indicators and indices (and independent of these previously discussed suffixes). For example all indicators that are asked for the LB, CLB, and OB have respective (pre-)suffixes (“_lb”, “_clb”, “_ob”). And if the same index was calculated with distinct aggregation methods – i.e. additive, multiplicative, or a mix thereof – this was indicated as well, using the (pre-)suffixes “_add”, “_multi”, and “_mix”. Note that in these cases the variable entry classifications in the codebook will just refer to the first related instance of the variable.

Where a variable was min-max normalized to range from 0 to 1, the “_nor” (pre-)suffix was used. Note that for the rare instances of using a principal component analysis to generate an index no particular suffix is used. Neither when only one arithmetic method of aggregation was employed.

Lastly, we provide the coder-level or aggregated confidence ratings (depending on the dataset) for each country, year and question (thus, in many cases, applying to several indicators). The variables are named “q[number of question in original survey]_confidence” in the dataset.

### 2.2.2 Variable Tags

All indicators and indices have a label and a tag. The tag consists of two to four parts and has the following structure:

```
Prefix + Abbreviated title + Pre-suffix + Suffix
```
Whereas the potential suffixes and pre-suffixes are described in section 2.2.1 above, the prefix varies only by indicator and index. Indicators are prefixed by “q” and the number of the question in the original survey questionnaire (i.e. “q1_” to “q27_”). All indices are prefixed by “x_”.

In addition, all indicators and indices are sorted and organized by topical section here in the codebook.

2.2.3 Variable Entry Clarifications

The following information is available per indicator and index variable (if applicable):

- **Question/Request:**
  The question or coder-assessment that the variable attempts to measure as per the survey questionnaire.

- **Clarification:**
  Definition of key terms, clarification of scope-conditions, contexts, and any other features needed to understand the question (if any).

- **Response options:**
  Ordinal multiple-choice, percentage, or text.

- **Scale (only applicable to indices):**
  Dichotomous, Nominal, Ordinal, or Interval

- **Scale inversion:**
  Whether the scale of a variable was inverted (vis-à-vis the original questionnaire scale) for easier interpretation and aggregation. Note that the response options here relate to the final (potentially inverted) scale used in the dataset, thus, not necessarily the scale direction originally employed in the questionnaire.

- **Construction (only applicable to indices):**
  Explanation of how an index is constructed.

- **Additional versions:**
  Indicates if the variable is also available in the following versions; *_sm, *_wm, *_sd, *_wdsd, *_rsd (all only applicable to indicators), or *_nr (also applicable to indices). Detailed information about the different versions can be found in section 2.2.1.

- **Note:**
  Additional information about the variable.
2.3 IDENTIFIER VARIABLES
The dataset contains a range of identifier variables, several of them intended to facilitate merging the dataset with other major political economy datasets.

2.3.1 Country name as per Political Settlement Dataset (cname_psd)
Country names as per Political Settlement dataset.

2.3.2 Country name as per Quality of Government (cname_qog)
Country names used in the Quality of Government datasets.

2.3.3 Country name as per VDEM (cname_vdem)
Country names used in the VDEM datasets.

2.3.4 Historical country name as per VDEM (histname_vdem)
Historical country names used in the VDEM datasets.

2.3.5 Country name as per World Development Indicators (cname_wdi)
Country names used in the World Development Indicator dataset.

2.3.6 Country abbreviation as per Penn World Tables (cabbrev_pwt)
Three letter country abbreviations used in the Penn World Tables.

2.3.7 Country codes as per Quality of Government (ccode_qog)
Numerical country codes as per Quality of Government datasets (which is identical to the country codes employed in the World Development Indicators dataset).

2.3.8 Country codes as per Correlates of War dataset (ccode_cow)
Numerical country codes as per Correlates of War datasets.

2.3.9 Year (year)
Year of observation (ranging from 1946 to 2019).

2.3.10 Year range of political period (period)
Year range of the political periods identified in Phase I of the survey. Importantly, the period starts in the year it covered the majority of a year and also ends in a year in which it still covered the majority of a year. For example, if a leader entered office in November of 2016 and exited
in February of 2019 (and assuming no further period breaks as per section 2.1.2.1 occurred), the coded period would range from 2017 to 2018.

2.3.11 First year of political period (periodstart)
First year of a political period (in which the period lasted for the majority of the year).

2.3.12 Last year of political period (periodend)
Last year of a political period (in which the period lasted for the majority of the year).

2.3.13 Duration of political period in years (periodduration)
Duration of the political period in years (as per the start and end years defined in variable 2.3.10).

2.3.14 Name of de facto leader numbered by political period (leadername_number)
Name of the de facto leader during a political period, numbered by political period. E.g. a de facto leader having witnessed a period break during his/her rule would be labeled “[leader name] 1” and “[leader name] 2” respectively for the two political periods. Note that our names can differ from those used in Archigos when our country experts suggested to amend a leader’s name. Nevertheless we also have a variable using Archigos’ name (see variable 2.3.16 below).

2.3.15 Name of de facto leader, without numbering (leadername_nonumber)
Name of the de facto leader without the political period based numbering.

2.3.16 Name of de facto leader as per Archigos (leadername_archigos)
Name of the de facto leader as per Archigos.

2.3.17 Chronological political period number (periodnumber)
Number of the political period from 1 to whatever number of periods a country’s history consisted of as per our deliberations in section 2.1.2.1.

2.3.18 Period Type (periodtypebasic)
Classification of a period as unsettled, settled, challenged, semi-settled, or transitional. See also section 2.1.2.1.

2.3.19 Rationale for additional period breaks (breakrationale)
Rationale as to why a leader period was split into more political periods. Compare also section 2.1.2.1.
3 POLSETT INDICATORS

3.1 SECTION I: THE SETTLEMENT’S CONFIGURATION OF POWER

3.1.1 Population share (in %) of LB (q1_populationshare_lb)

Question/Request: For each political period please estimate roughly which percentage of the total adult-aged population each bloc represented (Please ensure that the percentages should add up to 100% and that there are no empty cells, unless you provide an explanation in the comment box to Section I below and/or via email).

Clarification: Obviously, this requires some educated guesswork on the part of coders. Firstly, because affiliations are not entirely transparent and secondly because allegiances shift over time. On the first problem, we ask coders to make rough guesstimates based on such evidence as internal party, leadership and general elections; putsches, coups and attempted coups; reports of purges, political factionalism and infighting; the breadth and depth of political repression, etc. On the second problem, and because it would be too cumbersome to ask for data month by month or year by year, we ask coders to make a judgement about the average or ‘typical’ alignment of the population with these blocs for each period. For example, if the leader was tremendously popular in his first year in office, but then extremely unpopular for the remainder of a ten-year period, we would expect coders to enter a low percentage for the LB.

Response options: Percentage.

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.1.2 Population share (in %) of CLB (q1_populationshare_clb)

Identical to “3.1.1 Population share (in %) of LB (q1_populationshare_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.1.3 Population share (in %) of OB (q1_populationshare_ob)

Identical to “3.1.1 Population share (in %) of LB (q1_populationshare_lb)”, but for OB.

3.1.4 Relative power of LB (q2_power_lb)

Question/Request: Given the repressive capabilities of the Leader’s Bloc, please estimate how powerful each bloc would likely have appeared to the Leader to be.

Clarification: Note we ask about perceptions because one of the things we will test is the relationship between leadership perceptions and policy commitment. As such, power that was not perceptible to the Leader or that was only perceived ex
post is not of interest to us. Granted, this creates some methodological
difficulties as the perceptions of the Leader are not entirely transparent.
However, we ask you to consider as evidence speeches, statements or policy
documents by the Leader/governing coalition; commentaries by contemporary
observers identifying the relative size and strength of the blocs; convincing
historical accounts of the Leader/governing coalition’s mindset; etc.

Response options:

1. Powerless: it would likely make virtually no difference in struggles over the
settlement.
2. Somewhat powerless: it would likely make only a small difference in
struggles over the settlement.
3. Somewhat powerful: it could not single-handedly change the settlement or
prevent it from being changed, but would likely make a significant difference
in struggles over the settlement.
4. Quite powerful: it could not single-handedly change the settlement or
prevent it from being changed, but would likely make a big difference in
struggles over the settlement.
5. Extremely powerful: it could single-handedly change the settlement or
prevent it from being changed by others.

Scale inversion: Yes.

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.1.5 Relative power of CLB (q2_power_clb)
Identical to “3.1.4 Relative power of LB (q2_power_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.1.6 Relative power of OB (q2_power_ob)
Identical to “3.1.4 Relative power of LB (q2_power_lb)”, but for OB.

3.1.7 Likelihood CLB splits from government (q3_clbsplit)

Question/Request: How high was the (perceptible) likelihood that the CLB (or a
majority of it) would split or withdraw support from the LB?

Clarification: Where withdrawing support could, for example, play out as the CLB not
backing the Leader in an internal party election, or not defending the Leader in
the event of a violent or other challenge from the OB.

Response options:

1. High: there was a high likelihood that the CLB would split or withdraw
support from the LB.
2. Medium: there was a moderate likelihood that the CLB would split or
withdraw support from the LB;
3. Low: there was a possibility that the CLB would split or withdraw support from the LB but only a low one;

*Scale inversion:* Yes.

*Additional versions:* _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.1.8 Likelihood OB joins government (q4_objoin)

*Question/Request:* How high was the (perceptible) likelihood that the OB (or a majority of it) would join the LB in the governing coalition?

*Response options:*

1. None: there was virtually no possibility that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition;
2. Low: there was a possibility that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition, but a low one;
3. Medium: there was a moderate likelihood that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition;
4. High: there was a high likelihood that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition.

*Additional versions:* _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.1.9 Most powerful groups of LB (q5_powerfulgroups_lb)

*Question/Request:* For each period, please list each bloc’s most powerful political sub-groups and indicate whether they were ‘extremely powerful’, ‘quite powerful’, or only ‘somewhat powerful’ (as per the options in Question 2 above and detailed in the notes). Please make sure not to leave any cell empty, unless you explicitly write ‘No groups’ in the cell and provide an explanation for this (in the comments, cell, or email). Apart from indicating the power of each sub-group, please also indicate how power within the sub-group was balanced between genders, choosing from M (male dominated), F (female dominated), and N (power was balanced between the genders). For example, if trade unions were an ‘extremely powerful’ sub-group with power balanced between the two genders, you would write ‘trade unions (EP N)’. If traditional leaders, for example, were ‘quite powerful’ and male-dominated, you would write ‘traditional leaders (QP M). And if teachers, for example, were ‘somewhat powerful’ and female-dominated, you would write ‘teachers (SP F)’.

*Clarification:* By a politically powerful sub-group we mean an organisationally distinct, somewhat politically self-conscious group within the bloc – it could be a political party (which may act as an umbrella), an ideological, personalistic or ethnic faction, a pressure group, an economic, class, or occupational group, a section of the military, a militia or terrorist group, a foreign backer, a demographic category, or fractions of any of the above. The threshold for inclusion is whether it could, without too big a stretch of the imagination, make a significant
difference to power struggles either within or between blocs (where by ‘too big a stretch of the imagination’ means this could only be imagined as the outcome of a highly improbable sequence of events, and by ‘political struggles’ we mean struggles over the key issues that determine the cohesion of the bloc and or relations between blocs). Here, we ask coders to make educated guesstimates based on such phenomena as ideological or sociological affinities between the blocs and different groups in society, the blocs’ political messaging, evidence of voting behavior (where it exists), evidence of direct or indirect political action on the part of certain groups, evidence of internal party, leadership and general elections, putsches, coups and attempted coups, reports of purges, political factionalism and infighting, etc. On this definition the number of groups that could be included is potentially very large, so we ask coders to list a maximum of twenty per bloc, thus perhaps aggregating certain groups where necessary and sensible. Again, we are looking for the ‘typical’ affiliation for the period – so if ethnic group A was aligned with the Leader’s Bloc for six of the seven years of a period before drifting away from it, it should be coded with the Leader. Alternatively, if a group’s loyalty was genuinely split and it seems inappropriate to code it one way or another, coders can make a note of this. And as before, we expect these power attributes to have been perceptible or foreseeable to the Leader. To be more specific, sometimes leaders are brought down by unexpected and uncoordinated acts of individual passive resistance or the unexpected emergence of a social or political movement that appears out of nowhere. We are not interested in such phenomena in this question.

Response options: Text

Additional versions: _nr.

3.1.10 Most powerful groups of CLB (q5_powerfulgroups_clb)

Identical to “3.1.10 Most powerful groups of CLB (q5_powerfulgroups_clb)”, but for CLB.

3.1.11 Most powerful groups of OB (q5_powerfulgroups_ob)

Identical to “3.1.10 Most powerful groups of CLB (q5_powerfulgroups_clb)”, but for OB.

3.1.12 Relatively powerless groups of LB (q6_powerlessgroups_lb)

Question/Request: For each period and bloc, please list any relatively powerless groups and code these sub-groups according to gender. Please make sure not to leave any cell empty, unless you explicitly write ‘No groups’ in the cell and provide an explanation for this (in the comments, cell, or email). As in the previous question, please code these sub-groups according to gender, e.g. ‘Poor Women (F)’.
Clarification: Examples of such groups might be women, youth, poor people, specific ethnic minorities, or other political, economic or sociological categories which may be noteworthy on account of their marginalization; such groups need not be either organised or self-conscious. The threshold for inclusion is that it would require a big stretch to imagine the group making a significant difference in political struggles both within or between blocs. To provide an example, coders may feel that under the LB are a certain percentage of poor women, but that, without the benefit of hindsight, it would be hard to imagine this group making a significant difference in struggles both within the bloc or between the bloc and others. As such, ‘poor women’ should be listed as a group under ‘LB’. Again, we ask coders to list a maximum of twenty groups per bloc. And as before, we expect these power attributes to have been perceptible to bloc leaders.

Response options: Text
Additional versions: _nr.

3.1.13 Relatively powerless groups of CLB (q6_powerlessgroups_clb)
Identical to “3.1.12 Relatively powerless groups of LB (q6_powerlessgroups_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.1.14 Relatively powerless groups of OB (q6_powerlessgroups_ob)
Identical to “3.1.12 Relatively powerless groups of LB (q6_powerlessgroups_lb)”, but for OB.

3.1.15 Percentage of relatively powerless in LB (q7_powerlesspercentage_lb)
Question/Request: For each period and bloc, please estimate what percentage of the bloc falls into this ‘relatively powerless’ category. If there are really bloc-periods (cells) without powerless groups, indicate this by writing ‘0’. Also make sure this is consistent with your answer to Q6.

Clarification: Following the example above, poor women, when added to other relatively powerless groups in the bloc, might constitute 50% of the LB. As such, coders should enter ‘50’ under ‘LB’. Unlike Q1, rows should not add up to 100. They are independent from each other.

Response options: Percentage.
Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.1.16 Percentage of relatively powerless in CLB (q7_powerlesspercentage_clb)
Identical to “3.1.15 Percentage of relatively powerless in LB (q7_powerlesspercentage_lb)”, but for CLB.
3.1.17 **Percentage of relatively powerless in OB (q7_powerlesspercentage_ob)**

Identical to “3.1.15 Percentage of relatively powerless in LB (q7_powerlesspercentage_lb)”, but for OB.

3.1.18 **Hierarchical power concentration of LB (q8_hierarchy_lb)**

*Question/Request:* For each period and bloc, please state, on average, how powerful high-level leaders were vis à vis intermediate-level leaders and ordinary members/followers.

*Clarification:* Note, to be powerful here implies an ability to dictate terms to other actors, thanks to the unlikelihood of being removed, abandoned, or otherwise sanctioned by other actors. Note further that high level leaders are likely, as individuals, to have a national, or in federal states, state-level sphere of influence by virtue of their official or unofficial positions in the bloc’s most powerful sub-groups. Intermediate level leaders are likely as individuals, to have a regional or sub-regional sphere of influence by virtue of their official or unofficial positions in the bloc’s most powerful sub-groups, or perhaps a national sphere of influence but only in the bloc’s less powerful sub-groups. Ordinary members or followers do not occupy disproportionately influential official or unofficial positions in the bloc’s sub-groups and are not disproportionately influential as individuals.

*Response options:*

1. De facto power rested with ordinary members/followers
2. De facto power was shared relatively equally across leaders and ordinary members/followers.
3. De facto power rested with intermediate level leaders and ordinary members/followers
4. De facto power rested with intermediate level leaders
5. De facto power was shared by high-level leaders and intermediate level leaders
6. De facto power rested with high-level leaders

*Scale inversion:* Yes.

*Additional versions:* _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.1.19 **Hierarchical power concentration of CLB (q8_hierarchy_clb)**

Identical to “3.1.18 Hierarchical power concentration of LB (q8_hierarchy_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.1.20 **Hierarchical power concentration of OB (q8_hierarchy_ob)**

Identical to “3.1.18 Hierarchical power concentration of LB (q8_hierarchy_lb)”, but for OB.
3.1.21 Cohesiveness of LB (q9_cohesiveness_lb)

*Question/Request:* For each period and bloc, please state how cohesive/fragmented the bloc was.

*Response options:*

1. The bloc was **very incohesive**, with extreme competition among different factions or fractions.
2. The bloc was **fairly incohesive**: it had different factions or fractions, which were very competitive.
3. The bloc was **fairly cohesive**: it had different factions or fractions, which were moderately competitive.
4. The bloc was **very cohesive** and had no major competing factions.

*Scale inversion:* Yes.

*Additional versions:* _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.1.22 Cohesiveness of CLB (q9_cohesiveness_clb)

Identical to “3.1.21 Cohesiveness of LB (q9_cohesiveness_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.1.23 Cohesiveness of OB (q9_cohesiveness_ob)

Identical to “3.1.21 Cohesiveness of LB (q9_cohesiveness_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2 SECTION II: BLOCS’ RELATIONSHIP TO THE SETTLEMENT

3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)

*Question/Request:* For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important violent repression was as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

*Clarification:*

*Violent repression:* This refers to the containment of challenges to the settlement by means such as: murders, disappearances, political arrests, public intimidation and incarceration, deliberate impoverishment, destruction of property, forced relocation, violent dispersion of public events and demonstrations, etc.;

*General note on question 10 and 11 (related variables):* In our understanding, for there to be a political settlement, powerful groups (which for analytical purposes we assemble under blocs) must be incorporated into it (via some form of legitimation or co-optation strategy) or under it (via some form of coercion or repression strategy), or by some mix of the two. The principal architect or avatar
of these strategies is likely to be the country’s de facto leader, who is also the leader of the LB, and to whom Qs 10 and 11 refer. Note that we are aware this simplifies a complex situation (the de facto leader may take advice or instruction from others or merely be following tradition, there may not be a complete consensus even among the governing coalition, s/he will depend on others to implement the strategies, etc). Given this, we refer to the country’s de facto leader as a kind of shorthand for the key decision-makers in the settlement, and we ask for general estimates of the relative importance of the different strategies used by him/them to incorporate blocs.

The country’s de facto leader is likely to apply different strategies to different blocs, and perhaps to leaders and followers within those blocs. The country’s de facto leader herself must also have some reason for trying to uphold the settlement, that is, s/he must also be incorporated or self-incorporated. Qs10 and 11 attempt to capture this.

Logically, if the strategies are successful, the settlement will persist. If not, it will experience a serious challenge, and either change or collapse. Please note, however, that for these questions, we are interested in what the country de facto leader tried to do, rather than in how successful s/he was.

Finally, in some countries, there may be a distinction between strategies designed to uphold the settlement itself and strategies designed merely to ensure the political survival of the governing coalition. However, for the purposes of this survey, we regard these differences as immaterial. Please just focus on the key strategies that governed the country’s de facto leader’s relationship to his own and other blocs.

Response options:
1. not important
2. slightly important
3. fairly important
4. very important

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.2.2 Non-violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb)

Question/Request: For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important non-violent repression was as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

Clarification:

Nonviolent repression: This refers to the containment of challenges to the settlement by means such as: legal confinement, surveillance, infiltration, tax audits, interference in the ability to gain employment or business, restrictions on
fund raising, negative propaganda or scapegoating, censorship, restrictions on access to the media, outlawing assembly, etc.;

**General note on question 10 and 11 (related variables):** See “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”.

**Response options:**

1. not important
2. slightly important
3. fairly important
4. very important

**Additional versions:** _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.2.3 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb)

**Question/Request:** For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important clientelistic material cooptation was as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

**Clarification:**

**Clientelistic material cooptation:** This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the targeted provision of private (e.g., money, jobs, rents) or club (e.g., schools, roads) goods to individuals or communities as a conditional exchange for political support or loyalty;

**General note on question 10 and 11 (related variables):** See “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”.

**Response options:**

1. not important
2. slightly important
3. fairly important
4. very important

**Additional versions:** _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.2.4 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientnonmatlead_lb)

**Question/Request:** For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important clientelistic non-material cooptation was as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

**Clarification:**

**Clientelistic non-material cooptation:** This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the targeted provision of political or
status goods such as leadership positions (in either higher or lower level political organs) or symbolic benefits (e.g., language recognition, special group status) to individuals or communities, as a conditional exchange for political support or loyalty. Note that in situations where leadership positions are valued solely for the access to income/rents they provide, we would expect you, other things being equal, to code a higher value for c. clientelistic material cooptation than d. clientelistic non-material cooptation;

**General note on question 10 and 11 (related variables):** See “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”.

**Response options:**

1. not important
2. slightly important
3. fairly important
4. very important

**Additional versions:** _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.2.5 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_promatlegitlead_lb)

**Question/Request:** For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important programmatic material legitimation was as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

**Clarification:**

*Programmatic material legitimation:* This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the provision of club or public goods (e.g., universal health care, a sound investment climate) to individuals or communities, irrespective of their political loyalty or support;

**General note on question 10 and 11 (related variables):** See “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”.

**Response options:**

1. not important
2. slightly important
3. fairly important
4. very important

**Additional versions:** _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.2.6 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_ideologlegitlead_lb)

**Question/Request:** For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important universalistic ideological legitimation was as a strategy by the country’s de facto
leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

Clarification:

*Universalistic ideological legitimation:* This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the inculcation or articulation of ideological beliefs such as socialism, liberalism, nationalism, or national or world religions, in or for individuals or communities, irrespective of political loyalty or support;

*General note on question 10 and 11 (related variables):* See “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)’’.

**Response options:**

1. not important
2. slightly important
3. fairly important
4. very important

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.2.7 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_demlegitlead_lb)

**Question/Request:** For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important procedurally democratic legitimation was as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

Clarification:

*Procedurally democratic legitimation:* This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the provision of opportunities to individuals or communities to vote and/or stand in formally free elections to form a government;

*General note on question 10 and 11 (related variables):* See “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)’’.

**Response options:**

1. not important
2. slightly important
3. fairly important
4. very important

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.
3.2.8 Violent repression for leaders of CLB (q10_violrepresslead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.9 Non-violent repression for leaders of CLB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.2 Non-violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.10 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.3 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.11 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q10_clientnonmatlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.4 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientnonmatlead_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.12 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of CLB (q10_progmatlegitlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.5 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_progmatlegitlead_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.13 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of CLB (q10_ideologlegitlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.6 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_ideologlegitlead_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.14 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of CLB (q10_demlegitlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.7 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_demlegitlead_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.15 Violent repression for leaders of OB (q10_violrepresslead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2.16 Non-violent repression for leaders of OB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.2 Non-violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb)”, but for OB.
3.2.17 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of OB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.3 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2.18 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of OB (q10_clientnonmatlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.4 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientnonmatlead_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2.19 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of OB (q10_progmatlegitlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.5 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_progmatlegitlead_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2.20 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of OB (q10_ideologlegitlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.6 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_ideologlegitlead_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2.21 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of OB (q10_demlegitlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.7 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_demlegitlead_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2.22 Violent repression for followers of LB (q11_violrepresslead_lb)
Identical to “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”, but for followers.

3.2.23 Non-violent repression for followers of LB (q11_nonviolrepresslead_lb)
Identical to “3.2.2 Non-violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb)”, but for followers.

3.2.24 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q11_clientmatcooptlead_lb)
Identical to “3.2.3 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb)”, but for followers.

3.2.25 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for followers of LB (q11_clientnonmatlead_lb)
Identical to “3.2.4 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientnonmatlead_lb)”, but for followers.
3.2.26 Programmatic material legitimation for followers of LB (q11_progmatlegitlead_lb)
Identical to “3.2.5 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_progmatlegitlead_lb)” but for followers.

3.2.27 Universalistic ideological legitimation for followers of LB (q11_ideologlegitlead_lb)
Identical to “3.2.6 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_ideologlegitlead_lb)” but for followers.

3.2.28 Procedurally democratic legitimation for followers of LB (q11_demlegitlead_lb)
Identical to “3.2.7 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_demlegitlead_lb)” but for followers.

3.2.29 Violent repression for leaders of CLB (q11_violrepresslead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)” but for the CLB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.30 Non-violent repression for leaders of CLB (q11_nonviolrepresslead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.2 Non-violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb)” but for the CLB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.31 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q11_clientmatcooptlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.3 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb)” but for the CLB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.32 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of CLB (q11_clientnonmatlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.4 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientnonmatlead_lb)” but for the CLB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.33 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of CLB (q11_progmatlegitlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.5 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_progmatlegitlead_lb)” but for the CLB and its followers (not leaders).
3.2.34 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of CLB (q11_ideologlegitlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.6 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_ideologlegitlead_lb)”, but for the CLB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.35 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of CLB (q11_demlegitlead_clb)
Identical to “3.2.7 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_demlegitlead_lb)”, but for the CLB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.36 Violent repression for followers of OB (q11_violrepresslead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.1 Violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_violrepresslead_lb)”, but for the OB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.37 Non-violent repression for followers of OB (q11_nonviolrepresslead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.2 Non-violent repression for leaders of LB (q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb)”, but for the OB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.38 Clientelistic material cooptation for followers of OB (q11_clientmatcooptlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.3 Clientelistic material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb)”, but for the OB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.39 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for followers of OB (q11_clientnonmatlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.4 Clientelistic non-material cooptation for leaders of LB (q10_clientnonmatlead_lb)”, but for the OB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.40 Programmatic material legitimation for followers of OB (q11_progmatlegitlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.5 Programmatic material legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_progmatlegitlead_lb)”, but for the OB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.41 Universalistic ideological legitimation for followers of OB (q11_ideologlegitlead_ob)
Identical to “3.2.6 Universalistic ideological legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_ideologlegitlead_lb)”, but for the OB and its followers (not leaders).
3.2.42 Procedurally democratic legitimation for followers of OB (q11_demlegitlead_ob)

Identical to “3.2.7 Procedurally democratic legitimation for leaders of LB (q10_demlegitlead_lb)”, but for the OB and its followers (not leaders).

3.2.43 Relative material benefits received by LB (q12_crossblocdistri_lb)

*Question/Request:* For each bloc, please provide an opinion on the scale, on average, of any settlement-generated material benefits (e.g., salaries, rents, public spending) it received relative to its size:

*Response options:*

1. **Very High:** It received a level of material benefits very disproportionately high relative to its size;
2. **High:** It received a level of material benefits disproportionately high relative to its size;
3. **Proportionate:** It received a level of material benefits about proportionate to its size;
4. **Low:** It received a level of material benefits disproportionately low relative to its size.
5. **Very Low:** It received a level of material benefits very disproportionately low relative to its size.

*Additional versions:* _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.2.44 Relative material benefits received by CLB (q12_crossblocdistri_clb)

Identical to “3.2.43 Relative material benefits received by LB (q12_crossblocdistri_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.45 Relative material benefits received by OB (q12_crossblocdistri_ob)

Identical to “3.2.43 Relative material benefits received by LB (q12_crossblocdistri_lb)”, but for OB.

3.2.46 Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of LB (q13_withinblocdistri_lb)

*Question/Request:* For each bloc, please provide an opinion on how any settlement-generated material benefits (e.g., salaries, rents, public spending) enjoyed by this bloc were, on average, distributed between leaders and followers (where Mobutu’s Zaire might be an example of a ‘massively inegalitarian distribution’ and contemporary Denmark an ‘egalitarian’ distribution):

*Response options:*

a. Massively inegalitarian: Leaders captured a massively disproportionate share of material benefits.
b. Highly inegalitarian: Leaders captured a highly disproportionate share of material benefits.
c. Moderately inegalitarian: Leaders captured a moderately disproportionate share of material benefits.
d. Slightly inegalitarian: Leaders captured a slightly disproportionate share of material benefits.
e. Egalitarian: Leaders and followers received a more or less proportionate share of material benefits.

*Additional versions: *_sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.*

3.2.47 **Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of CLB (q13_withinblocdistri_clb)**

Identical to “3.2.46 Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of LB (q13_withinblocdistri_lb)”, but for CLB.

3.2.48 **Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of OB (q13_withinblocdistri_ob)**

Identical to “3.2.46 Within-bloc egalitarian material distribution of LB (q13_withinblocdistri_lb)”, but for OB.

### 3.3 **SECTION III: DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING POWER OF THE LEADERSHIP**

#### 3.3.1 **Concentration of policy-decision-making power in leader (q14_polmakingconcent)**

*Question/Request:* To what extent was power concentrated in the de facto Leader of the country, in the sense that s/he could make major policy decisions, e.g. on economic policy, fiscal policy, social policy, national security?

*Clarification:* By ‘make’ a policy decision, we mean formulate an authoritative course of policy action and present it to lower level political organs, if appropriate, for successful ratification. Thus, a settlement with a Prime Minister who was able, after consultation with Cabinet, to formulate major bills which were then passed smoothly into legislation by Parliament with minimal dilution of the bills’ original intentions, would have a moderate degree of decision-making power concentration. By contrast, a settlement which had a Prime Minister whose major bills were routinely pulled apart and changed very significantly by Parliament, would have moderately dispersed power.

*Response options:*

1. Power was **highly dispersed**, in the sense that the Leader struggled to make major policy decisions, even after extensive consultation or bargaining;
2. Power was **moderately dispersed**, in the sense that the Leader could make major policy decisions but only after extensive consultation or bargaining with other powerful actors;

3. Power was **moderately concentrated** in the Leader, in the sense that s/he could make major policy decisions but only after meaningful consultation or bargaining with other powerful actors;

4. Power was **highly concentrated** in the Leader, in the sense that s/he could make major policy decisions with minimal consultation or bargaining with other powerful actors.

*Scale inversion*: Yes.

*Additional versions*: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

### 3.3.2 Concentration of policy-implementation power in leader (q15_polimplemconcent)

**Question/Request**: To what extent was implementing power concentrated in the political leadership, in the sense that its major de facto policy decisions were implemented without intentional resistance or dilution?

**Clarification**: For this question, political leadership refers to the political individual, group or organ that has ratified a policy decision and passed it to the bureaucracy or non-governmental partner for implementation. Note that with this question we are interested in implementation problems that stem from political resistance or subversion; we are not interested in implementation problems that may stem from shortages in financial or human resources, nor in the ultimate wisdom or success of policy decisions.

**Response options**:

1. Implementing power was **highly dispersed**, in the sense that the political leadership’s policy decisions were subject to extensive resistance or dilution;

2. Implementing power was **moderately dispersed**, in the sense that the leadership’s policy decisions were implemented, but only with significant resistance or dilution;

3. Implementing power was **moderately concentrated** in the political leadership, in the sense that its major policy decisions were implemented but with some resistance or dilution;

4. Implementing power was **highly concentrated** in the political leadership, in the sense that its major policy decisions were implemented with minimal resistance or dilution.

*Scale inversion*: Yes.

*Additional versions*: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.
3.4 SECTION IV: FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS

3.4.1 Foreign military support importance (q16_formilsupport)

*Question/Request:* For each period, how important to the maintenance of the settlement was military support by a foreign power?

*Response options:*

1. Not important: The government could maintain the settlement wholly through its own military means.
2. Marginally important: The government received some foreign military support which was helpful; however, the government would probably have managed to maintain the settlement without it.
3. Important: Without foreign military support, the settlement would probably have collapsed sooner.
4. Very important: Without foreign military support, the settlement would almost certainly have collapsed much sooner.

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.4.2 Foreign financial and technical support importance (q17_forfintechsupport)

*Question/Request:* For each period, how important to the maintenance of the settlement was financial or technical assistance by a foreign power?

*Response options:*

1. Not important: The government could maintain the settlement wholly through its own financial and technical means.
2. Marginally important: The government received some foreign financial and technical support which was helpful; however, the government would probably have managed to maintain the settlement without it.
3. Important: Without foreign financial and technical support, the settlement would probably have collapsed sooner.
4. Very important: Without foreign financial and technical support, the settlement would almost certainly have collapsed much sooner.

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)

*Question/Request:* For each period, was there a (perceptible) threat to the political survival of high level LB leaders from rural subordinate classes?

*Clarification:* Political survival refers to the ability to stay in office, and ‘perceptible threat’ means ‘perceptible to those leaders’.

*Response options:*
1. No threat;
2. Low threat;
3. Moderate threat;
4. High threat.

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.4.4 Political threat by rural dominant classes (q18_polthreat_ruraldom)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to rural dominant classes.

3.4.5 Political threat by urban subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_urbansub)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to subordinate.

3.4.6 Political threat by urban dominant classes (q18_polthreat_urbandom)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to urban dominant classes.

3.4.7 Political threat by ethnic, regional or religious groups (q18_polthreat_ethnoregrel)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to ethnic, regional or religious groups.

3.4.8 Political threat by an opposition group in exile (q18_polthreat_exileoppos)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to opposition group(s) in exile.

3.4.9 Political threat by the military (q18_polthreat_military)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to military.

3.4.10 Political threat by neighboring country (q18_polthreat_neighbcntry)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to neighboring country.

3.4.11 Political threat by a non-neighboring country (q18_polthreat_nonneighbcntry)
Identical to “3.4.3 Political threat by rural subordinate classes (q18_polthreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to non-neighboring country.
3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)

*Question/Request:* For each period, was there a (perceptible) threat to the physical survival of high or intermediate-level LB leaders from rural subordinate classes?

*Clarification:* Physical survival refers to the ability to live without fear of being killed, imprisoned or driven into exile.

*Response options:*

5. No threat;
6. Low threat;
7. Moderate threat;
8. High threat.

*Additional versions:* _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.4.13 Physical threat by rural dominant classes (q19_phythreat_ruraldom)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to rural dominant classes.

3.4.14 Physical threat by urban subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_urbansub)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to subordinate.

3.4.15 Physical threat by urban dominant classes (q19_phythreat_urbandom)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to urban dominant classes.

3.4.16 Physical threat by ethnic, regional or religious groups (q19_phythreat_ethnoregrel)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to ethnic, regional or religious groups.

3.4.17 Physical threat by an opposition group in exile (q19_phythreat_exileoppos)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to opposition group(s) in exile.

3.4.18 Physical threat by the military (q19_phythreat_military)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to military.
3.4.19 Physical threat by neighboring country (q19_phythreat_neighbrcntry)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to neighboring country.

3.4.20 Physical threat by a non-neighboring country (q19_phythreat_nonneighbrcntry)

Identical to “3.4.12 Physical threat by rural subordinate classes (q19_phythreat_ruralsub)” but threat assessment relates to non-neighboring country.

3.5 SECTION VI: ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

3.5.1 Manufacturing firms' capabilities (q20_firmcapapilities)

*Question/Request:* By developing country standards and for each period, please specify the average level of technological and entrepreneurial capabilities of domestically owned firms in the formal manufacturing sector.

*Response options:*

1. Low: On average, firms could successfully adopt only simple technologies.
3. High: On average, firms could successfully adopt complex technologies.

*Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.*

*Notes:* The cross-country comparability of this variable appeared to be fairly weak in our validation exercise, with the benchmark provided in the question (by developing country standards) often apparently not sufficient. We would strongly suggest to only use fixed-effect models when using this variable and generally taking it with a large grain of salt.

3.5.2 Manufacturing firms' political power (q21_firmpower)

*Question/Request:* Please specify the average level of political power of domestically owned firms in the formal manufacturing sector.

*Response options:*

1. Low: The government found it easy to dictate terms to firms.
2. Medium: The government found it neither easy nor hard to dictate terms to firms.
3. High: The government found it hard to dictate terms to firms.

*Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.*
3.6 SECTION VI: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

3.6.1 Industrialization strategy (q22_industrialpolicy)

*Question/Request:* Please describe the government’s industrialization strategy for each period. Choose from the options below.

*Response options:*

1. A strong emphasis on import-substituting industrialization.
2. A similar emphasis on import-substituting and export-oriented industrialization.
3. A strong emphasis on export-oriented industrialization.
4. The state had no industrialization strategy.

*Additional versions: * _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

*Note:* While meaningful in the coder-level dataset, the nominal (non-ordinal) nature of the variable makes it nonsensical for use in the aggregated dataset. Therefore, please refer to “4.7.3 Industrial Policy Score (if coders said industrial policy exists) (x_industrialpolicyyes)” as an alternative.

3.6.2 FDI strategy (q23_fdistrategy)

*Question/Request:* Please specify how the government treated Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

*Response options:*

1. The government discouraged the inflow of FDI;
2. The government permitted FDI, but placed strong conditions on it and/or provided little support;
3. The government encouraged FDI, placing moderate conditions on it and/or providing moderate support;
4. The government strongly encouraged FDI, placing few conditions on it and/or providing a high level of support;
5. The government did not have an FDI strategy.

*Additional versions: * _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

*Note:* While meaningful in the coder-level dataset, the nominal (non-ordinal) nature of the variable makes it nonsensical for use in the aggregated dataset. Therefore, please refer to “4.7.34.7.8 FDI Policy Score (if coders said FDI policy exists) (x_fdistrategyyes)” as an alternative.

3.6.3 Intervention of state in economy (q24_stateintervention)

*Question/Request:* Please specify how vigorously the state intervened in the economy.

*Response options:
1. Strong: The state controlled most industries and heavily regulated and coordinated private companies, or at least it attempted to.
2. Medium: The state controlled only a few key industries, yet strongly regulated and coordinated private companies, or at least it attempted to.
3. Light: The state controlled only a few key industries if any, and otherwise did not intervene strongly in the business of private enterprises.

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.6.4 Government's industry versus agriculture prioritization (q25_industryvsagric)

Question/Request: Please specify whether de facto state policy prioritized the agricultural over the industrial sector.

Response options:

1. Agriculture was strongly prioritized over the industrial sector.
2. Agriculture was prioritized over the industrial sector.
3. Agriculture and industry were treated equally.
4. Industry was prioritized over agriculture.
5. Industry was strongly prioritized over agriculture.

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.6.5 Government's prioritization of economic development (q26_econdevprio)

Question/Request: Was economic development a priority for the top leadership, beyond their statements?

Response options:

1. Very low priority
2. Low priority
3. Medium priority
4. High priority
5. Very high priority

Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.

3.6.6 Government's prioritization of social development (q27_socdevprio)

Question/Request: Was social development, for example spending on education, health, potable water, social insurance, etc, a priority for the top leadership, beyond their statements?

Response options:

1. Very low priority
2. Low priority
3. Medium priority
4. High priority
5. Very high priority

*Additional versions: _sm, _wm, _sd, _wsd, _rsd, _nr.*
4 POLSETT INDICES

4.1 POWER CONCENTRATION

4.1.1 Horizontal power (simple) (x_horizontalpower)

Question: To what extent is power concentrated in the governing coalition vis-à-vis the OB?

Construction: Scale inversion of “3.1.6 Relative power of OB (q2_power_ob)”. This way, the weaker the OB, the stronger the governing coalition.

Scale: Ordinal, where higher values indicate greater governing coalition (=horizontal) power, 1-5.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.1.2 Horizontal power (normalized) (x_horizontalpower_nor)

Question: To what extent is power concentrated in the governing coalition vis-à-vis the OB?

Construction: Min-max normalization of “4.1.1 Horizontal power (simple) (x_horizontalpower)” to scale 0-1.

Scale: Interval, where higher values indicate greater governing coalition (=horizontal) power, 0-1.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.1.3 Horizontal Power Dummy (x_horizontalpowerdummy)

Question: To what extent is power concentrated in the governing coalition vis-à-vis the OB?

Construction: Dummy of “x_horizontalpower” using mean (=3.28) as cut-off point.

Scale: Dichotomous, where 1 indicates above-mean governing coalition (=horizontal) power.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.1.4 LB vs CLB power ratio (x_lbvsclbpowerratio)

Question: How powerful is the LB vis-à-vis the CLB?

Construction: \( = \frac{q2\_power\_lb}{q2\_power\_clb} \)

Scale: Ordinal, where higher values indicate greater relative LB power, 0.2-5.
4.1.5 **Vertical Power Index (x_verticalpower)**

*Question:* To what degree is power within the governing coalition concentrated in the leader of the LB (i.e. the country’s de facto leader)?

*Construction:* Principal component analysis based weighted index of four variables:

- LB vs CLB power ratio (x_lbvsclbpowerratio) – Weight: 0.52
- Likelihood CLB splits from government (q3_clbsplit) – Weight: 0.50
- Hierarchical power concentration of LB (q8_hierarchy_lb) – Weight: 0.43
- Cohesiveness of LB (q9_cohesiveness_lb) – Weight: 0.54

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

*Scale:* Interval, where higher values indicate greater vertical power concentration, 0-1.

*Additional versions: _nr.*

4.1.6 **Vertical Power Dummy (x_verticalpowerdummy)**

*Question:* To what degree is power within the governing coalition concentrated in the leader of the LB (i.e. the country’s de facto leader)?

*Construction:* Dummy of “x_verticalpower” using mean (=0.44) as cut-off point.

*Scale:* Dichotomous, where 1 indicates above-mean vertical power concentration.

*Additional versions: _nr.*

4.1.7 **Power Concentration Index (additive) (x_powerconcentration_add)**

*Question:* To what degree is a country’s de facto power concentrated in a country’s de facto leader’s bloc (LB)?

*Construction:* 

\[ = 0.5 \times x_{horizontalpower\_nor} + 0.5 \times x_{verticalpower} \]

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

*Scale:* Interval, where higher values indicate greater general power concentration, 0-1.

*Additional versions: _nr.*

4.1.8 **Power Concentration Index (multiplicative) (x_powerconcentration_multi)**

*Question:* To what degree is a country’s de facto power concentrated in a country’s de facto leader’s bloc (LB)?

*Construction:* 

\[ = x_{horizontalpower\_nor} \times x_{verticalpower} \]
Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

*Scale:* Interval, where higher values indicate greater general power concentration, 0-1.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

### 4.1.9 Power Concentration Index (average of additive and multiplicative) (**x_powerconcentration_mix**)  
*Question:* To what degree is a country’s de facto power concentrated in a country’s de facto leader’s bloc (LB)?

*Construction:* 
\[
0.25 \times x_{\text{horizontalpower\_nor}} + 0.25 \times x_{\text{verticalpower}} + 0.5 \times x_{\text{horizontalpower\_nor}} \times x_{\text{verticalpower}}
\]

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.  
*Scale:* Interval, where higher values indicate greater general power concentration, 0-1.  
*Additional versions:* _nr.

### 4.1.10 Power Concentration Index dummy (**x_pcdummy**)  
*Question:* To what degree is a country’s de facto power concentrated in a country’s de facto leader’s bloc (LB)?

*Construction:* Dummy of “x_powerconcentration_add” using mean (=0.56) as cut-off point.  
*Scale:* Dichotomous, where 1 indicates above-mean power concentration.  
*Additional versions:* _nr.

### 4.1.11 Khanian four-category settlement types (**x_khansettlementype**)  
*Question:* To what degree is a country’s de facto power concentrated in a country’s de facto leader’s bloc (LB)? Re-creating Mushtaq Khan’s two-dimensional political power concentration typology.

*Construction:* Combination of “x_horizontalpowerdummy” and “x_verticalpowerdummy” into four categories, illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x_horizontalpowerdummy</th>
<th>x_verticalpowerdummy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1. Strong-Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2. Vulnerable-Authoritarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>4. Weak-Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3. Competitive-Clientelism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Scale:* Nominal, 1-4.  
*Additional versions:* _nr.
4.2 SOCIAL FOUNDATION AND COOPTATION

4.2.1 Governing Coalition Size (in %) (x_governingcoalitionsiz) 

Question: Roughly which percentage of the total adult-aged population is represented by the governing coalition?

Construction: = q1_populationsahre_lb + q1_populationsahre_clb

Scale: Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.2 Share of powerful supporters of LB (x_lbpowerfulshare) 

Question: Which share of the LB’s supporters are relatively powerful?

Construction: = 100 – q7_powerlesspercentage_lb

Scale: Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.3 Share of powerful supporters of CLB (x_clbpowerfulshare) 

Question: Which share of the CLB’s supporters are relatively powerful?

Construction: = 100 – q7_powerlesspercentage_clb

Scale: Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.4 Share of powerful supporters of OB (x_obpowerfulshare) 

Question: Which share of the OB’s supporters are relatively powerful?

Construction: = 100 – q7_powerlesspercentage_ob

Scale: Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.5 Share of powerful supporters of LB in total population (x_lbpowerfulsharetotpop) 

Question: What share of the population are both relatively powerful and supporters of the LB?

Construction: = (x_lbpowerfulshare * q1_populationsahre_lb) / 100

Scale: Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

Additional versions: _nr.
4.2.6 Share of powerful supporters of CLB in total population
(x_clbpowerfulsharetotpop)

*Question:* What share of the population are both relatively powerful and supporters of
the CLB?

*Construction:* = (x_clbpowerfulshare * q1_populationshare_clb) / 100

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.7 Share of powerful supporters of OB in total population
(x_obpowerfulsharetotpop)

*Question:* What share of the population are both relatively powerful and supporters of
the OB?

*Construction:* = (x_obpowerfulshare * q1_populationshare_ob) / 100

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.8 Share of powerful citizens in total population (x_totpowerfulpopshare)

*Question:* What share of the population are relatively powerful (irrespective of the bloc
they belong to)?

*Construction:* = x_lbpowerfulsharetotpop + x_clbpowerfulsharetotpop +
                   x_obpowerfulsharetotpop

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high, 0-100.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.9 Dummy of Share of powerful citizens in total population (x_tppsdummy)

*Question:* What share of the population are relatively powerful (irrespective of the bloc
they belong to)?

*Construction:* Dummy of “x_totpowerfulpopshare” using mean (=0.48) as cut-off point.

*Scale:* Dichotomous, where 1 indicates above-mean share of powerful people in the total
population.

*Additional versions:* _nr.
4.2.10 Share of powerful citizens in total population (normalized) 
(x_totpowerfulpopshare_nor)

*Question:* What share of the population are relatively powerful (irrespective of the bloc they belong to)?

*Construction:* Min-max normalization of “x_totpowerfulpopshare”.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high, 0-1.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.11 Highest cooptation score for LB leaders (x_lbcoopthighleaders)

*Question:* What is the highest cooptation score for LB leaders (out of the “q10_*_lb” cooptation options)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q10_clientmatcooptlead_lb
- q10_clientnonmatlead_lb
- q10_progmatlegitlead_lb
- q10.ideologlegitlead_lb
- q10_demlegitlead_lb

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” cooptation score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.12 Highest cooptation score for CLB leaders (x_clbcoopthighleaders)

*Question:* What is the highest cooptation score for CLB leaders (out of the “q10_*_clb” cooptation options)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q10_clientmatcooptlead_clb
- q10_clientnonmatlead_clb
- q10_progmatlegitlead_clb
- q10.ideologlegitlead_clb
- q10_demlegitlead_clb

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” cooptation score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.13 Highest cooptation score for OB leaders (x_obcoopthighleaders)

*Question:* What is the highest cooptation score for OB leaders (out of the “q10_*_ob” cooptation options)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:
4.2.14 Highest cooptation score for LB followers (x_lbcoopthighfollowers)

*Question:* What is the highest cooptation score for LB followers (out of the “q11_*_lb” cooptation options)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q11_clientmatcooptfoll_lb
- q11_clientnonmatfoll_lb
- q11_promatlegitfoll_lb
- q11_ideologlegitfoll_lb
- q11_demlegitfoll_lb

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” cooptation score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.15 Highest cooptation score for CLB followers (x_clbcoopthighfollowers)

*Question:* What is the highest cooptation score for CLB followers (out of the “q11_*_clb” cooptation options)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q11_clientmatcooptfoll_clb
- q11_clientnonmatfoll_clb
- q11_promatlegitfoll_clb
- q11_ideologlegitfoll_clb
- q11_demlegitfoll_clb

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” cooptation score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.2.16 Highest cooptation score for OB followers (x_obcoopthighfollowers)

*Question:* What is the highest cooptation score for OB followers (out of the “q11_*_ob” cooptation options)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q11_clientmatcooptfoll_ob
- q11_clientnonmatfoll_ob
4.2.17 Average cooptation score for LB leaders (x_lbcooptaverageleaders)

Question: What is the average cooptation score for LB leaders (out of the “q10_*_lb” cooptation options)?

Construction: \[
x_{lbcooptaverageleaders} = \frac{q10\_clientmatcooptlead\_lb + q10\_clientnonmatlead\_lb + q10\_progrmatlegitlead\_lb + q10\_ideologlegitlead\_lb + q10\_demlegitlead\_lb}{5}
\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher average cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.18 Average cooptation score for CLB leaders (x_clbcooptaverageleaders)

Question: What is the average cooptation score for CLB leaders (out of the “q10_*_clb” cooptation options)?

Construction: \[
x_{clbcooptaverageleaders} = \frac{q10\_clientmatcooptlead\_clb + q10\_clientnonmatlead\_clb + q10\_progrmatlegitlead\_clb + q10\_ideologlegitlead\_clb + q10\_demlegitlead\_clb}{5}
\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher average cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.19 Average cooptation score for OB leaders (x_obcooptaverageleaders)

Question: What is the average cooptation score for OB leaders (out of the “q10_*_ob” cooptation options)?

Construction: \[
x_{obcooptaverageleaders} = \frac{q10\_clientmatcooptlead\_ob + q10\_clientnonmatlead\_ob + q10\_progrmatlegitlead\_ob + q10\_ideologlegitlead\_ob + q10\_demlegitlead\_ob}{5}
\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher average cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.20 Average cooptation score for LB followers (x_lbcooptaveragefollowers)

Question: What is the average cooptation score for LB followers (out of the “q11_*_lb” cooptation options)?
Construction:  = (q11_clientmatcooptfoll_lb + q11_clientnonmatfoll_lb + q11_progmatlegitfoll_lb + q11_ideologlegitfoll_lb + q11_demlegitfoll_lb) / 5

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher average cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.21 Average cooptation score for CLB followers (x_clbcooptaveragefollowers)

Question: What is the average cooptation score for CLB followers (out of the “q11_*_clb” cooptation options)?

Construction:  = (q11_clientmatcooptfoll_clb + q11_clientnonmatfoll_clb + q11_progmatlegitfoll_clb + q11_ideologlegitfoll_clb + q11_demlegitfoll_clb) / 5

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher average cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.22 Average cooptation score for OB followers (x_obcooptaveragefollowers)

Question: What is the average cooptation score for OB followers (out of the “q11_*_ob” cooptation options)?

Construction:  = (q11_clientmatcooptfoll_ob + q11_clientnonmatfoll_ob + q11_progmatlegitfoll_ob + q11_ideologlegitfoll_ob + q11_demlegitfoll_ob) / 5

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher average cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.23 Joined repression and cooptation score index for LB leaders (x_lbcooptjoinedleaders)

Question: What is the general cooptation level (including both repression and positive cooptation) for LB leaders?

Construction:  = 0.3* [inverted]q10_violrepresslead_lb + 0.2 * [inverted]q10_nonviolrepresslead_lb + 0.25 * x_lbcoopthighleaders + 0.25 * x_lbcooptaverageleaders

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: To have a lower cooptation score when repression is high, we inverted both the violent and non-violent repression score scales. We also weighted violent repression greater than non-violent repression as we perceive it as harsher or more detrimental to cooptation.
4.2.24 Joined repression and cooption score index for CLB leaders (x_clbcoopjoinedleaders)

*Question:* What is the general cooption level (including both repression and positive cooption) for CLB leaders?

*Construction:*  
\[ = 0.3 \times [\text{inverted}]q10\text{\_violrepresslead}\text{\_clb} + 0.2 \times [\text{inverted}]q10\text{\_nonviolrepresslead}\text{\_clb} + 0.25 \times x\text{\_clbcoopthighleaders} + 0.25 \times x\text{\_clbcooptaverageleaders} \]

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooption score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

*Notes:* To have a lower cooption score when repression is high, we inverted both the violent and non-violent repression score scales. We also weighted violent repression greater than non-violent repression as we perceive it as harsher or more detrimental to cooption.

4.2.25 Joined repression and cooption score index for OB leaders (x_obcoopjoinedleaders)

*Question:* What is the general cooption level (including both repression and positive cooption) for OB leaders?

*Construction:*  
\[ = 0.3 \times [\text{inverted}]q10\text{\_violrepresslead}\text{\_ob} + 0.2 \times [\text{inverted}]q10\text{\_nonviolrepresslead}\text{\_ob} + 0.25 \times x\text{\_obcoopthighleaders} + 0.25 \times x\text{\_obcooptaverageleaders} \]

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooption score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

*Notes:* To have a lower cooption score when repression is high, we inverted both the violent and non-violent repression score scales. We also weighted violent repression greater than non-violent repression as we perceive it as harsher or more detrimental to cooption.

4.2.26 Joined repression and cooption score index for LB followers (x_lbboxpjoinedfollowers)

*Question:* What is the general cooption level (including both repression and positive cooption) for LB followers?

*Construction:*  
\[ = 0.3 \times [\text{inverted}]q11\text{\_violrepressfoll}\text{\_lb} + 0.2 \times [\text{inverted}]q11\text{\_nonviolrepressfoll}\text{\_lb} + 0.25 \times x\text{\_lbcoopthighfollowers} + 0.25 \times x\text{\_lbcooptaveragefollowers} \]

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooption score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.
Notes: To have a lower cooptation score when repression is high, we inverted both the violent and non-violent repression score scales. We also weighted violent repression greater than non-violent repression as we perceive it as harsher or more detrimental to cooptation.

4.2.27 Joined repression and cooptation score index for CLB followers (x_clbcooptjoinedfollowers)

Question: What is the general cooptation level (including both repression and positive cooptation) for CLB followers?

Construction:  
\[ = 0.3 \times [\text{inverted}q11\text{-violrepressfoll}\_clb] + 0.2 \times [\text{inverted}q11\text{-nonviolrepressfoll}\_clb] + 0.25 \times x\_clbcoophighfollowers + 0.25 \times x\_clbcooptaveragefollowers \]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: To have a lower cooptation score when repression is high, we inverted both the violent and non-violent repression score scales. We also weighted violent repression greater than non-violent repression as we perceive it as harsher or more detrimental to cooptation.

4.2.28 Joined repression and cooptation score index for OB followers (x_obcooptjoinedfollowers)

Question: What is the general cooptation level (including both repression and positive cooptation) for OB followers?

Construction:  
\[ = 0.3 \times [\text{inverted}q11\text{-violrepressfoll}\_ob] + 0.2 \times [\text{inverted}q11\text{-nonviolrepressfoll}\_ob] + 0.25 \times x\_obcoophighfollowers + 0.25 \times x\_obcooptaveragefollowers \]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooptation score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: To have a lower cooptation score when repression is high, we inverted both the violent and non-violent repression score scales. We also weighted violent repression greater than non-violent repression as we perceive it as harsher or more detrimental to cooptation.

4.2.29 Overall Cooptation Index for LB (x_lbgencooptindex)

Question: What is the general cooptation level (including both repression and positive cooptation) for the LB at large (i.e. for both leaders and followers jointly)?

Construction:  
\[ = 0.5 \times x\_lbcooptjoinedleaders + 0.5 \times x\_lbcooptjoinedfollowers \]
The score is then min-max-normalized to range from 0 to 1 using the respective lowest and highest theoretical (rather than empirical) score (being 1 and 4).

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooptation score, 0-1

4.2.30 Overall Cooptation Index for CLB (x_clbgencooptindex)

*Question:* What is the general cooptation level (including both repression and positive cooptation) for the CLB at large (i.e. for both leaders and followers jointly)?

*Construction:* 

\[
0.5 \times x_{clbcooptjoinedleaders} + 0.5 \times x_{clbcooptjoinedfollowers}
\]

The score is then min-max-normalized to range from 0 to 1 using the respective lowest and highest theoretical (rather than empirical) score (being 1 and 4).

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooptation score, 0-1

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.31 Overall Cooptation Index for OB (x_obgencooptindex)

*Question:* What is the general cooptation level (including both repression and positive cooptation) for the OB at large (i.e. for both leaders and followers jointly)?

*Construction:* 

\[
0.5 \times x_{obcooptjoinedleaders} + 0.5 \times x_{obcooptjoinedfollowers}
\]

The score is then min-max-normalized to range from 0 to 1 using the respective lowest and highest theoretical (rather than empirical) score (being 1 and 4).

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a higher cooptation score, 0-1

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.32 Share of powerful LB members that are coopted (x_lbpowerfulsharecoopted)

*Question:* What share of powerful LB members are coopted under the settlement?

*Construction:* 

\[
x_{lbcooptjoinedindex} \times x_{lbpowerfulsharetotpop}
\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a powerful coopted member share, 0-100

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.33 Share of powerful CLB members that are coopted (x_clbpowerfulsharecoopted)

*Question:* What share of powerful CLB members are coopted under the settlement?

*Construction:* 

\[
x_{clbgencooptindex} \times x_{clbpowerfulsharetotpop}
\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a powerful coopted member share, 0-100
4.2.34 Share of powerful OB members that are coopted (x_obpowerfulsharecoopted)

Question: What share of powerful OB members are coopted under the settlement?

Construction: \( = x_{\text{obgencooptindex}} \times x_{\text{obpowerfulsharetotpop}} \)

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a powerful coopted member share, 0-100

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.35 Social Foundation Size Index (x_socialfoundationsize)

Question: What percentage of of the population is both potentially disruptive/powerful and co-opted by the country’s leadership.

Construction: \( = x_{\text{lbpowerfulsharecoopted}} + x_{\text{clbpowerfulsharecoopted}} + x_{\text{obpowerfulsharecoopted}} \)

Summary of the construction of this meta-index in simple words: To operationalize this index, we multiplied for each bloc the share of the total population it accounts for with the share of its powerful members. This bloc-level powerful population share was further multiplied by an estimate ranging from 0 to 1 of whether the bloc’s followers and leaders were primarily repressed or co-opted. Aggregating all blocs’ score resulted in the final index score.

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a powerful coopted member share, 0-100

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.36 Social Foundation Size Index (normalized) (x_socialfoundationsize_nor)

Question: What share of of the population is both potentially disruptive/powerful and co-opted by the country’s leadership.

Construction: Min-max normalization of x_socialfoundationsize.

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a large powerful coopted member share, 0-1

Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.37 Social foundation size dummy (x_sfsdummy)

Question: What share of of the population is both potentially disruptive/powerful and co-opted by the country’s leadership.

Construction: Dummy of “x_socialfoundationsize” using mean (=0.41) as cut-off point.

Scale: Dichotomous, where 1 indicates an above-mean social foundation size.

Additional versions: _nr.
4.2.38 Share of any LB members that are coopted (x_lbanysharecoopted)

* Question: What percentage of the LB members (irrespective of whether they are powerful) is coopted under the settlement?

* Construction: \( x_{\text{lbgencooptindex}} \times q1\_\text{populationsahre}\_\text{lb} \)

* Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger coopted member share, 0-100

* Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.39 Share of any CLB members that are coopted (x_clbanysharecoopted)

* Question: What percentage of the CLB members (irrespective of whether they are powerful) is coopted under the settlement?

* Construction: \( x_{\text{clbgencooptindex}} \times q1\_\text{populationsahre}\_\text{clb} \)

* Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger coopted member share, 0-100

* Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.40 Share of any OB members that are coopted (x_obanysharecoopted)

* Question: What percentage of the OB members (irrespective of whether they are powerful) is coopted under the settlement?

* Construction: \( x_{\text{obgencooptindex}} \times q1\_\text{populationsahre}\_\text{ob} \)

* Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger coopted member share, 0-100

* Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.41 Total coopted population (x_totalcooptedpopulation)

* Question: What percentage of the population (irrespective of power) is coopted under the settlement?

* Construction: \( x_{\text{lbanysharecoopted}} + x_{\text{clbanysharecoopted}} + x_{\text{obanysharecoopted}} \)

* Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger coopted member share, 0-100

* Additional versions: _nr.

4.2.42 General cooptation score (x_gencooptscore)

* Question: What is the general level of cooptation throughout society?

* Construction: \( 0.25 \times x_{\text{lbgencooptindex}} + 0.25 \times x_{\text{clbgencooptindex}} + 0.5 \times x_{\text{obgencooptindex}} \)

* Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 0-1
Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally.

4.2.43 General violent repression score (x_genviorepscore)

Question: What is the general level of violent repression throughout society?

Construction: \[= 0.25 \times q_{11_{\text{violrepressfoll_lb}}} + 0.25 \times q_{11_{\text{violrepressfoll_clb}}} + 0.5 \times q_{11_{\text{violrepressfoll_ob}}}\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 1-4

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally. Also, we are only taking followers into account here.

4.2.44 General non-violent repression score (x_gennonviorepcooptscore)

Question: What is the general level of non-violent repression throughout society?

Construction: \[= 0.25 \times q_{11_{\text{nonviolrepressfoll_clb}}} + 0.25 \times q_{11_{\text{nonviolrepressfoll_clb}}} + 0.5 \times q_{11_{\text{nonviolrepressfoll_ob}}}\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 1-4

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally. Also, we are only taking followers into account here.

4.2.45 General clientelistic material cooptation score (x_genclientmatcooptscore)

Question: What is the general level of clientelistic material cooptation throughout society?

Construction: \[= 0.25 \times q_{11_{\text{clientmatcooptfoll_lb}}} + 0.25 \times q_{11_{\text{clientmatcooptfoll_clb}}} + 0.5 \times q_{11_{\text{clientmatcooptfoll_ob}}}\]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 1-4

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally. Also, we are only taking followers into account here.

4.2.46 General clientelistic non-material cooptation score (x_genclientnonmatcooptscore)

Question: What is the general level of clientelistic non-material cooptation throughout society?
Construction: \[ = 0.25 * q11\_clientnonmatfoll\_lb + 0.25 * q11\_clientnonmatfoll\_clb + 0.5 * q11\_clientnonmatfoll\_ob \]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 1-4

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally. Also, we are only taking followers into account here.

4.2.47 General programmatic material legitimation score (x\_genprogmatcooptscore)

Question: What is the general level of programmatic material legitimation throughout society?

Construction: \[ = 0.25 * q11\_progmatlegitlead\_lb + 0.25 * q11\_progmatlegitlead\_clb + 0.5 * q11\_progmatlegitlead\_ob \]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 1-4

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally. Also, we are only taking followers into account here.

4.2.48 General universalistic ideological legitimation score (x\_genuniideocooptscore)

Question: What is the general level of universalistic ideological legitimation throughout society?

Construction: \[ = 0.25 * q11\_ideologlegitfoll\_lb + 0.25 * q11\_ideologlegitfoll\_clb + 0.5 * q11\_ideologlegitfoll\_ob \]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 1-4

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally. Also, we are only taking followers into account here.

4.2.49 General procedural democratic legitimation score (x\_gendemocrcooptscore)

Question: What is the general level of procedural democratic legitimation throughout society?

Construction: \[ = 0.25 * q11\_demlegitfoll\_lb + 0.25 * q11\_demlegitfoll\_clb + 0.5 * q11\_demlegitfoll\_ob \]

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cooptation, 1-4

Additional versions: _nr.
Notes: The weights assure that the governing coalition (LB + CLB) and the OB are weighted equally. Also, we are only taking followers into account here.

4.3 ESID Political Settlement Indices

4.3.1 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_add')
(x_sfpsc_add)

Question: To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and the social foundation relatively large?

Construction: = x_powerconcentration_add * x_socialfoundationsize_nor

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger joint concentration of power and social foundation size, 0-1

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The key difference to the two other ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x_socialfoundationsize_nor” is that this index uses an additive (i.e. compensatory) version of the x_powerconcentration index.

4.3.2 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_multi')
(x_sfpsc_multi)

Question: To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and the social foundation relatively large?

Construction: = x_powerconcentration_multi * x_socialfoundationsize_nor

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger joint concentration of power and social foundation size, 0-1

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The key difference to the two other ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x_socialfoundationsize_nor” is that this index uses a multiplicative (i.e. weakest link) version of the x_powerconcentration index.
4.3.3 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_mix')
(x_sfspc_mix)

Question: To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and the social foundation relatively large?

Construction: $= x_{\text{powerconcentration\_mix}} \times x_{\text{socialfoundationsize\_nor}}$

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger joint concentration of power and social foundation size, 0-1

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The key difference to the two other ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x\_{socialfoundationsize\_nor}” is that this index uses a mixed (i.e. combining compensation and weakest link logics) version of the x\_{powerconcentration} index.

4.3.4 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_add')
(x_tppspc_add)

Question: To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and a relatively large share of the population powerful?

Construction: $= x_{\text{powerconcentration\_add}} \times x_{\text{totpowerfulpopshare\_nor}}$

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger joint concentration of power and a large share of the population being powerful, 0-1

Additional versions: _nr.

Notes: The key difference to the two other ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x\_{totpowerfulpopshare\_nor}” is that this index uses an additive (i.e. compensatory) version of the x\_{powerconcentration} index. The difference to the ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x\_{socialfoundationsize\_nor}” is that this more direct and simple measure might face a lower risk of circularity when used against development outcomes, specifically the degree of material distribution in society (which is partly used as an indicator in “x\_{socialfoundationsize\_nor}”).

4.3.5 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_multi')
(x_tppspc_multi)

Question: To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and a relatively large share of the population powerful?

Construction: $= x_{\text{powerconcentration\_multi}} \times x_{\text{totpowerfulpopshare\_nor}}$
Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

**Scale:** Interval, higher scores indicating a larger joint concentration of power and a large share of the population being powerful, 0-1

**Additional versions:** _nr.

**Notes:** The key difference to the two other ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x_totpowerfulpopshare_nor” is that this index uses a multiplicative (i.e. weakest link) version of the x_powerconcentration index. The difference to the ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x_socialfoundationsize_nor” is that this more direct and simple measure might face a lower risk of circularity when used against development outcomes, specifically the degree of material distribution in society (which is partly used as an indicator in “x_socialfoundationsize_nor”).

### 4.3.6 ESID Political Settlement Index (using 'x_powerconcentration_mix') (x_tppspc_mix)

**Question:** To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and a relatively large share of the population powerful?

**Construction:** = x_powerconcentration_mix * x_totpowerfulpopshare_nor

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

**Scale:** Interval, higher scores indicating a larger joint concentration of power and a large share of the population being powerful, 0-1

**Additional versions:** _nr.

**Notes:** The key difference to the two other ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x_totpowerfulpopshare_nor” is that this index uses a mixed (i.e. combining compensation and weakest link logics) version of the x_powerconcentration index. The difference to the ESID Political Settlement Indices using “x_socialfoundationsize_nor” is that this more direct and simple measure might face a lower risk of circularity when used against development outcomes, specifically the degree of material distribution in society (which is partly used as an indicator in “x_socialfoundationsize_nor”).

### 4.3.7 ESID's four-category settlement types (x_esidsettlementtype)

**Question:** To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and the social foundation relatively large? Re-creating Kelsall et al.’s (forthcoming) two-dimensional political settlement typology.

**Construction:** Combination of “x_sfsdummy” and “x_pcdummy” into four categories, illustrated as follows:
4.3.8 ESID’s four-category settlement types (using x_tppspc_add_nor) (x_esidettlementtype_tpps)

**Question:** To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and a relatively large share of the population powerful? Generating Kelsall et al.’s (forthcoming) alternative two-dimensional political settlement typology.

**Construction:** Combination of “x_tppspdummy” and “x_pcddummy” into four categories, illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x_sfsdummy</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>3. Narrow-Disp.</td>
<td>4. Narrow-Conc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scale:** Nominal, 1-4.

**Additional versions:** _nr.

**Notes:** The key difference to the ESID Political Settlement typology using “x_sfsdummy” is that x_tppspdummy faces a lower risk of circularity when used against development outcomes, specifically the degree of material distribution in society (which is partly used as an indicator in “x_sfsdummy”).

### 4.4 DISTRIBUTIVE (IN)EQUALITY

#### 4.4.1 Horizontal distribution inequality (x_horizdistrinequality)

**Question:** To what extent are material benefits unequally distributed in society to the benefit of the LB and the loss of the OB?

**Construction:**

\[
\text{Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cross-bloc distribution inequality (in favor of the LB), 0.25-5.}
\]

**Additional versions:** _nr.
Note: We inverted the scales of the indicators so that higher values equal higher disproportionate material benefits. The CLB was excluded from the measure based on the assumption that the divergence between the LB and OB is likely harshest and most meaningful in society.

4.4.2 Horizontal distribution inequality (normalized) (x_horizdistrinequality_nor)

**Question:** To what extent are material benefits unequally distributed in society to the benefit of the LB and the loss of the OB?

**Construction:**
\[ \text{[inverted scale]q12\_crossblocdistri\_lb} / \text{[inverted scale]q12\_crossblocdistri\_ob} \]

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

**Scale:** Interval, higher scores indicating a larger cross-bloc distribution inequality (in favor of the LB), 0-1.

**Additional versions:** _nr.

*Note:* We inverted the scales of the indicators so that higher values equal higher disproportionate material benefits.

4.5 Threats and Foreign Support

4.5.1 Joined foreign support importance index (x_joinforeignsuppimport)

**Question:** How important to the maintenance of the settlement was financial, technical, and/or military assistance by a foreign power?

**Construction:**
\[ = 0.6 \times q16\_formilsupport + 0.4 \times q17\_forfintechsupport \]

**Scale:** Interval, higher scores indicating greater importance, 1-4

**Additional versions:** _nr.

4.5.2 Highest political threat level (x_highpolthreatlvl)

**Question:** What is the highest political threat score (out of the “q18_*” variables)?

**Construction:** Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q18\_polthreat\_ruralsub
- q18\_polthreat\_ruraldom
- q18\_polthreat\_urbansub
- q18\_polthreat\_urbandom
- q18\_polthreat\_ethnoregrel
- q18\_polthreat\_exileoppos
- q18\_polthreat\_military
4.5.3 Highest physical threat level (x_highphysthreatlvl)

*Question:* What is the highest physical threat score (out of the “q19_*” variables)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q19_phythreat_ruralsub
- q19_phythreat_ruraldom
- q19_phythreat_urbansub
- q19_phythreat_urbandom
- q19_phythreat_ethnoregrel
- q19_phythreat_exileoppos
- q19_phythreat_military
- q19_phythreat_neighbcntry
- q19_phythreat_nonneighbcntry

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” physical threat score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.5.4 Highest domestic political threat level (x_higdompolthreatlvl)

*Question:* What is the highest domestic political threat score (out of the “q18_*” variables)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q18_polthreat_ruralsub
- q18_polthreat_ruraldom
- q18_polthreat_urbansub
- q18_polthreat_urbandom
- q18_polthreat_ethnoregrel
- q18_polthreat_exileoppos
- q18_polthreat_military

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” political threat score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.5.5 Highest external political threat level (x_highextpolthreatlvl)

*Question:* What is the highest external political threat score (out of the “q18_*” variables)?
Construction: Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q18_polthreat_neighbcentry
- q18_polthreat_nonneighbcentry

Scale: Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” political threat score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.5.6 Highest domestic physical threat level (x_highdomphysthreatlvl)

Question: What is the highest domestic physical threat score (out of the “q19_*” variables)?

Construction: Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q19_phythreat_ruralsub
- q19_phythreat_ruraldom
- q19_phythreat_urbansub
- q19_phythreat_urbandom
- q19_phythreat_ethnoregrel
- q19_phythreat_exileoppos
- q19_phythreat_military

Scale: Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” physical threat score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.5.7 Highest external physical threat level (x_highextphysthreatlvl)

Question: What is the highest external physical threat score (out of the “q19_*” variables)?

Construction: Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q19_phythreat_neighbcentry
- q19_phythreat_nonneighbcentry

Scale: Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” physical threat score, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.5.8 Highest domestic non-elite political threat level (x_highdompolnonelthreatlvl)

Question: What is the highest domestic non-elite-based political threat score (out of the “q18_*” variables)?

Construction: Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q18_polthreat_ruralsub
- q18_polthreat_urbansub
- q18_polthreat_ethnoregrel
4.5.9 Highest domestic non-elite physical threat level (x_highdomphysnonelthreatlvl)

*Question:* What is the highest domestic non-elite-based physical threat score (out of the “q19_*” variables)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q19_phythreat_ruralsub
- q19_phythreat_urbansub
- q19_phythreat_ethnoregrel
- q19_phythreat_exileoppos

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” physical threat score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.5.10 Highest political threat from rural or urban subordinates (x_highrururbsubthreatlvl)

*Question:* What is the highest domestic rural and/or urban subordinate-based political threat score (out of the “q18_*” variables)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q18_polthreat_ruralsub
- q18_polthreat_urbansub

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” political threat score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.5.11 Highest political threat from rural or urban subordinates or ethno/religious/reg (x_highrururbsubeththreatlvl)

*Question:* What is the highest domestic rural and/or urban subordinate- or ethno-regio-religious-based political threat score (out of the “q18_*” variables)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:

- q18_polthreat_ruralsub
- q18_polthreat_urbansub
- q18_polthreat_ethnoregrel

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” political threat score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.
4.5.12 Highest external physical threat from exile opposition or neighbor (x_highextphysthreatexileneigh)

*Question:* What is the highest external physical threat score coming from a neighboring country and/or an opposition group in exile (out of the “q19_*” variables)?

*Construction:* Equals the maximum score out of the following variables:
- q19_phythreat_neighbcntry
- q19_phythreat_exileoppos

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher “highest” political threat score, 1-4.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.5.13 Systemic threat (Crude and physical threat) (x_systthreat_physcrude)

*Question:* Is there a simultaneous physical threat both from inside and outside the country?

*Construction:* = x_highdomphysthreatlvl * x_highextphysthreatlvl

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher systemic threat, 1-16.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.5.14 Systemic threat (Non-elite and physical threat) (x_systthreat_physnoelite)

*Question:* Is there a simultaneous physical threat from a foreign nation and domestic non-elite groups?

*Construction:* = x_highdomphysnonelthreatlvl * x_highextphysthreatlvl

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher systemic threat, 1-16.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

4.5.15 Systemic threat (Polit.: Non-elite; Phys.: exile & neighbor) (x_systthreat_subpolextphys)

*Question:* Is there a simultaneous physical threat from a neighboring country and/or exiled opposition group and a political threat from domestic non-elite groups?

*Construction:* = x_highrururbsubthreatlvl * x_highextphysthreatexileneigh

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher systemic threat, 1-16.

*Additional versions:* _nr.
4.5.16 Systemic threat (Polit.: Non-elite & ethnic; Phys.: exile & neighbor) (x_systthreat_subethpolextphys)

*Question:* Is there a simultaneous physical threat from a neighboring country and/or exiled opposition group and a political threat domestic non-elite groups (including ethno-regional-religious groups)?

*Construction:* = x_highhrururubeththreatlvl * x_highextphysthreatexileneigh

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher systemic threat, 1-16.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

## 4.6 BUSINESS CONFIGURATION

### 4.6.1 Business Configuration (Capability * Power) (x_businessconfig)

*Question:* To what extent are manufacturing firms in the country both economically capable and politically powerful?

*Construction:* = q20_firmcapapilities * [inverted scale]q21_firmpower

*Scale:* Ordinal, higher scores indicating a higher capability and power mix, 1-9.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

### 4.6.2 Business Configuration (Capability * Power; normalized) (x_businessconfig_nor)

*Question:* To what extent are manufacturing firms in the country both economically capable and politically powerful?

*Construction:* Min-max-normalization of x_businessconfig to range from 0-1.

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicating a higher capability and power mix, 0-1.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

## 4.7 DEVELOPMENT POLICY

### 4.7.1 Expert opinion whether industrial policy exists (x_industrialpolicyyesno)

*Question:* Did the country-year have an industrial policy or not?

*Construction:* Confidence-weighted mean (see also 2.1.3) of expert code’s whether a country-year experienced an industrial policy (i.e. chosing options 1-3) or not (i.e. chosing option 4) in variable “3.6.1 Industrialization strategy
(q22_industrialpolicy)”. This way, if one expert very confidently states there was an industrial policy strategy despite two experts non-confidently stating they do not think one existed, the country-year might still have been coded to have had an industrial policy.

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicate greater agreement that policy existed, 0-1.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

**4.7.2 Expert opinion whether FDI policy exists (x_fdipolicyyesno)**

*Question:* Did the country-year have an FDI policy or not?

*Construction:* Confidence-weighted mean (see also 2.1.3) of expert code’s whether a country-year experienced an FDI policy (i.e. chosing options 1-3) or not (i.e. chosing option 4) in variable “3.6.2 FDI strategy (q23_fdistrategy)”. This way, if one expert very confidently states there was an FDI policy strategy despite two experts non-confidently stating they do not think one existed, the country-year might still have been coded to have had an FDI policy.

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicate greater agreement that policy existed, 0-1.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

**4.7.3 Industrial Policy Score (if coders said industrial policy exists) (x_industrialpolicyyes)**

*Question:* Was industrial policy more geared towards import-substituting (ISI) or export-oriented (EOI) industrialization, or a mix of the two?

*Construction:* The confidence- and distance-weighted mean of those experts that chose one of the three industrial policy (existed) options. The variable is coded as missing for country-years where a (confidence-weighted) majority of experts argued that no industrial policy strategy existed (i.e. variable “4.7.1 Expert opinion whether industrial policy exists (x_industrialpolicyyesno)” is smaller than 0.5).

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicating a move towards a more export-oriented industrialization strategy, 1-3.

*Additional versions:* _nr.

**4.7.4 Industrial Policy Score (if coders said industrial policy exists; normalized) (x_industrialpolicyyes_nor)**

*Question:* Was industrial policy more geared towards import-substituting or export-oriented industrialization, or a mix of the two?

*Construction:* Min-max-normalization of “x_industrialpolicyyes” to range from 0-1.
Scale: Interval, higher scores indicating a move towards a more export-oriented industrialization strategy, 0-1.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.7.5  Mixed ISI-EOI dummy (x_mixedisieoi)

Question: To what extent is industrial policy geared towards a mix of ISI and EOI rather than either of the two?

Construction: Coded “1” if x_industrialpolicyyes >= 1.5 and x_industrialpolicyyes <= 2.5. Coded “0” otherwise.

Scale: Dichotomous, where 1 indicates a mix of the two and 0 stands for either of the two.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.7.6  Three-categorical industrial policy variable (x_industrialpolicy_cat1)

Question: Was industrial policy more geared towards import-substituting or export-oriented industrialization, or a mix of the two?

Construction:

0. = (ISI) x_industrialpolicyyes < 1.5
1. = (MIX) x_industrialpolicyyes >= 1.5 & < 2.5
2. = (EOI) x_industrialpolicyyes >= 2.5

Scale: Ordinal, higher scores indicating a move towards a more export-oriented industrialization strategy, 0-3.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.7.7  Three-categorical industrial policy variable (x_industrialpolicy_cat2)

Question: Was industrial policy more geared towards import-substituting or export-oriented industrialization, or a mix of the two?

Construction:

0. = (ISI) x_industrialpolicyyes < 1.66
1. = (MIX) x_industrialpolicyyes >= 1.66 & < 2.33
2. = (EOI) x_industrialpolicyyes >= 2.33

Scale: Ordinal, higher scores indicating a move towards a more export-oriented industrialization strategy, 0-2.

Additional versions: _nr.
4.7.8 FDI Policy Score (if coders said FDI policy exists) (x_fdistrategyyes)

*Question:* Did the government have a more restrictive or supportive strategy towards FDI?

*Construction:* The confidence- and distance-weighted mean of those experts that chose one of the three FDI policy (existed) options. The variable is coded as missing for country-years where a (confidence-weighted) majority of experts argued that no FDI policy strategy existed (i.e. variable “4.7.2 Expert opinion whether FDI policy exists (x_fdipolicyyesno)” is smaller than 0.5).

*Scale:* Interval, higher scores indicating a move towards a strategy more encouraging for FDI, 1-4.

*Additional versions:_ nr.

4.7.9 Economic Policy Index (x_econpolicy)

*Question:* How “open” and “unrestrictive” is the economic policy of the country?

*Construction:* Principal component analysis based weighted index of three variables:

- $x_{industrialpolicyscore}$ – Weight: 0.57
- $x_{fdistrategyscore}$ – Weight: 0.59
- $q24\_stateintervention$ – Weight: 0.57

Thereafter, min-max-normalized to range from 0-1.

*Scale:* Interval, where higher values indicate greater economic policy openness, 0-1.

*Additional versions:_ nr.

4.7.10 Economic Policy Index dummy (x_economicpolicydummy)

*Question:* How “open” and “unrestrictive” is the economic policy of the country?

*Construction:* Dummy of “x_econpolicy” using mean (=0.575) as cut-off point.

*Scale:* Dichotomous, where 1 indicates an above-mean open economic policy.

*Additional versions:_ nr.

4.7.11 Multiplicative economic policy and power concentration index (x_powereconpolicy_multi)

*Question:* To what extent is power both concentrated in the leadership of the country and economic policy relatively open?

*Construction:* $= x_{econpolicy} * x_{powerconcentration\_add}$

*Scale:* Interval, where higher values indicate a greater joint political concentration and economic openness, 0-1.
4.7.12 Multiplicative industrial policy and power concentration index
(x_powerinduspolicy_multi)

Question: To what extent is power concentrated in the leadership of the country and export-oriented industrial policy simultaneously?

Construction: $x_{\text{industrialpolicyyes_nor}} * x_{\text{powerconcentration_add}}$

Scale: Interval, where higher values indicate a greater joint political concentration and export-orientated industrial strategy, 0-1.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.7.13 Four-categorical economic policy and power concentration typology
(x_powereconpolicy_cat)

Question: To what extent is power concentrated in the leadership of the country and economic policy relatively open simultaneously?

Construction: Combination of “$x_{\text{economicpolicydummy}}” and “$x_{\text{pcdummy}}” into four categories, illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x_pcdummy</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x_economicpolicydummy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1. Open-Conc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2. Open-Disp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3. Closed-Disp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4. Closed-Conc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: Nominal, 1-4.

Additional versions: _nr.

4.7.14 Six-categorical industrial policy and power concentration typology (1.5, 2.5)
(x_powerinduspolicy_cat1)

Question: To what extent is power concentrated in the leadership of the country and economic policy geared to ISI (0), EOI (2), or a mix thereof (1) simultaneously?

Construction: Combination of “$x_{\text{industrialpolicy_cat1}}” and “$x_{\text{pcdummy}}” into six categories, illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x_pcdummy</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>x_industrialpolicy_cat1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ISI-Disp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mix-Disp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISI-Conc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mix-Conc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>EOI-Conc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: Nominal, 1-6.
4.7.15 Six-categorical industrial policy and power concentration typology (1.66, 2.33) (x_powerinduspolicy_cat2)

Question: To what extent is power concentrated in the leadership of the country and economic policy geared to ISI (0), EOI (2), or a mix thereof (1) simultaneously?

Construction: Combination of “x_industrialpolicy_cat2” and “x_pcdummy” into six categories, illustrated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>x_industrialpolicy_cat2</th>
<th>x_pcdummy</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>ISI-Disp.</td>
<td>ISI-Conc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mix-Disp.</td>
<td>Mix-Conc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>ISI-Conc.</td>
<td>EOI-Conc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: Nominal, 1-6.

Additional versions: _nr.
5 Appendix: Phase 2: Main Survey Questionnaire

5.1 Section I: The Settlement’s Configuration of Power

Notes: Political settlements analysis is based on the idea that peace reigns when there is a basic agreement or equilibrium among the most powerful groups in society around political institutions and the distribution of benefits they are expected to yield. Thus, our survey attempts to capture those powerful groups, their internal relations, and their relations with each other. We do so by dividing society into three basic political groups or population blocs:

(A) The Leader’s bloc (LB). That is, the segment of the population whose political loyalty the current de facto leader is likely to believe s/he can count on, at least in the short-term. In other words, the Leader is likely to feel that this segment will continue to support him/her, even in the event of a moderate or temporary fall in his/her repressive or distributional capabilities. (By political loyalty, we mean a determination to defend the Leader against challenges and/or to not defect from or make serious political trouble for him/her, where serious political trouble refers to deliberate actions that might directly or indirectly threaten the Leader’s political survival);

(B) The contingently loyal bloc (CLB). The segment of the population that is currently aligned with the de facto leader (evidenced by either some meaningful representation in the highest levels of government or a formal or informal agreement/pact to conditionally support the Leader’s Bloc) but whose political loyalty s/he cannot be assured of (in other words, the Leader is likely to believe there is a realistic possibility that it could defect and/or make serious political trouble for him/her should the opportunity arise – e.g. a temporary or moderate fall in the Leader’s repressive or distributional capabilities, an election, etc.);

(C) The opposition bloc (OB). The segment of the population that is not currently aligned with the LB or the CLB and does not feel represented by government. Note that this will include both members of the official and outlawed political opposition, including those in exile. For convenience, it is also where we place individuals who have no political alignment, no interest in politics and no prospect of being mobilized into national politics.

1. For each political period please estimate roughly which percentage of the total adult-aged population each bloc represented (Please ensure that the percentages should add up to 100% and that there are no empty cells, unless you provide an explanation in the comment box to Section I below and/or via email).
Obviously, this requires some educated guesswork on the part of coders. Firstly, because affiliations are not entirely transparent and secondly because allegiances shift over time. On the first problem, we ask coders to make rough guesses based on such evidence as internal party, leadership and general elections; putsches, coups and attempted coups; reports of purges, political factionalism and infighting; the breadth and depth of political repression, etc. On the second problem, and because it would be too cumbersome to ask for data month by month or year by year, we ask coders to make a judgement about the average or ‘typical’ alignment of the population with these blocs for each period. For example, if the leader was tremendously popular in his first year in office, but then extremely unpopular for the remainder of a ten-year period, we would expect coders to enter a low percentage for the LB.

2. Given the repressive capabilities of the Leader’s Bloc, please estimate how powerful each bloc would likely have appeared to the Leader to be. Note we ask about perceptions because one of the things we will test is the relationship between leadership perceptions and policy commitment. As such, power that was not perceptible to the Leader or that was only perceived ex post is not of interest to us. Granted, this creates some methodological difficulties as the perceptions of the Leader are not entirely transparent. However, we ask you to consider as evidence speeches, statements or policy documents by the Leader/governing coalition; commentaries by contemporary observers identifying the relative size and strength of the blocs; convincing historical accounts of the Leader/governing coalition’s mindset; etc.
   a. **Extremely powerful**: it could single-handedly change the settlement or prevent it from being changed by others.
   b. **Quite powerful**: it could not single-handedly change the settlement or prevent it from being changed, but would likely make a big difference in struggles over the settlement.
   c. **Somewhat powerful**: it could not single-handedly change the settlement or prevent it from being changed, but would likely make a significant difference in struggles over the settlement.
   d. **Somewhat powerless**: it would likely make only a small difference in struggles over the settlement.
   e. **Powerless**: it would likely make virtually no difference in struggles over the settlement.

3. How high was the (perceptible) likelihood that the CLB (or a majority of it) would split or withdraw support from the LB?
   Where withdrawing support could, for example, play out as the CLB not backing the Leader in an internal party election, or not defending the Leader in the event of a violent or other challenge from the OB.
   a. **Low**: there was a possibility that the CLB would split or withdraw support from the LB but only a low one;
b. **Medium:** there was a moderate likelihood that the CLB would split or withdraw support from the LB;

c. **High:** there was a high likelihood that the CLB would split or withdraw support from the LB.

4. **How high was the (perceptible) likelihood that the OB (or a majority of it) would join the LB in the governing coalition?**
   a. **None:** there was virtually no possibility that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition;
   b. **Low:** there was a possibility that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition, but a low one;
   c. **Medium:** there was a moderate likelihood that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition;
   d. **High:** there was a high likelihood that the OB would join the LB in the governing coalition.

5. **For each period, please list each bloc’s most powerful political sub-groups and indicate whether they were ‘extremely powerful’, ‘quite powerful’, or only ‘somewhat powerful’ (as per the options in Question 2 above and detailed in the notes). Please make sure not to leave any cell empty, unless you explicitly write ‘No groups’ in the cell and provide an explanation for this (in the comments, cell, or email).**

   By a politically powerful sub-group we mean an organisationally distinct, somewhat politically self-conscious group within the bloc – it could be a political party (which may act as an umbrella), an ideological, personalistic or ethnic faction, a pressure group, an economic, class, or occupational group, a section of the military, a militia or terrorist group, a foreign backer, a demographic category, or fractions of any of the above. The threshold for inclusion is whether it could, without too big a stretch of the imagination, make a significant difference to power struggles either within or between blocs (where by ‘too big a stretch of the imagination’ means this could only be imagined as the outcome of a highly improbable sequence of events, and by ‘political struggles’ we mean struggles over the key issues that determine the cohesion of the bloc and or relations between blocs). Here, we ask coders to make educated guesses based on such phenomena as ideological or sociological affinities between the blocs and different groups in society, the blocs’ political messaging, evidence of voting behavior (where it exists), evidence of direct or indirect political action on the part of certain groups, evidence of internal party, leadership and general elections, putsches, coups and attempted coups, reports of purges, political factionalism and infighting, etc. On this definition the number of groups that could be included is potentially very large, so we ask coders to list a maximum of twenty per bloc, thus perhaps aggregating certain groups where necessary and sensible. Again, we are looking for the ‘typical’ affiliation for the period – so if ethnic group A was aligned with the Leader’s Bloc for six of the seven years of a period before drifting away from it, it should be coded with the Leader. Alternatively, if a group’s loyalty was genuinely split and it seems inappropriate to code it one way or another, coders can make a note of this. And as before, we expect
these power attributes to have been perceptible or foreseeable to the Leader. To be more specific, sometimes leaders are brought down by unexpected and uncoordinated acts of individual passive resistance or the unexpected emergence of a social or political movement that appears out of nowhere. We are not interested in such phenomena in this question.

Apart from indicating the power of each sub-group, please also indicate how power within the sub-group was balanced between genders, choosing from M (male dominated), F (female dominated), and N (power was balanced between the genders). For example, if trade unions were an ‘extremely powerful’ sub-group with power balanced between the two genders, you would write ‘trade unions (EP N)’. If traditional leaders, for example, were ‘quite powerful’ and male-dominated, you would write ‘traditional leaders (QP M). And if teachers, for example, were ‘somewhat powerful’ and female-dominated, you would write ‘teachers (SP F)’.

6. For each period and bloc, please list any relatively powerless groups and code these sub-groups according to gender. Please make sure not to leave any cell empty, unless you explicitly write ‘No groups’ in the cell and provide an explanation for this (in the comments, cell, or email).
Examples of such groups might be women, youth, poor people, specific ethnic minorities, or other political, economic or sociological categories which may be noteworthy on account of their marginalization; such groups need not be either organised or self-conscious. The threshold for inclusion is that it would require a big stretch to imagine the group making a significant difference in political struggles both within or between blocs. To provide an example, coders may feel that under the LB are a certain percentage of poor women, but that, without the benefit of hindsight, it would be hard to imagine this group making a significant difference in struggles both within the bloc or between the bloc and others. As such, ‘poor women’ should be listed as a group under ‘LB’. Again, we ask coders to list a maximum of twenty groups per bloc. And as before, we expect these power attributes to have been perceptible to bloc leaders.
As in the previous question, please code these sub-groups according to gender, e.g. ‘Poor Women (F)’.

7. For each period and bloc, please estimate what percentage of the bloc falls into this ‘relatively powerless’ category. If there are really bloc-periods (cells) without powerless groups, indicate this by writing ‘0’. Also make sure this is consistent with your answer to Q6.
Following the example above, poor women, when added to other relatively powerless groups in the bloc, might constitute 50% of the LB. As such, coders should enter ‘50’ under ‘LB’. Unlike Q1, rows should not add up to 100. They are independent from each other.
8. For each period and bloc, please state, on average, how powerful high-level leaders were vis a vis intermediate-level leaders and ordinary members/followers.

*Note,* to be *powerful* here implies an ability to dictate terms to other actors, thanks to the likelihood of being removed, abandoned, or otherwise sanctioned by other actors. *Note further that high level leaders* are likely, as individuals, to have a national, or in federal states, state-level sphere of influence by virtue of their official or unofficial positions in the bloc’s most powerful sub-groups. *Intermediate level leaders* are likely as individuals, to have a regional or sub-regional sphere of influence by virtue of their official or unofficial positions in the bloc’s most powerful sub-groups, or perhaps a national sphere of influence but only in the bloc’s less powerful sub-groups. *Ordinary members or followers* do not occupy disproportionately influential official or unofficial positions in the bloc’s sub-groups and are not disproportionately influential as individuals.

a. De facto power rested with **high-level leaders**

b. De facto power was shared by **high-level leaders and intermediate level leaders**

c. De facto power rested with **intermediate level leaders**

d. De facto power rested with **intermediate level leaders and ordinary members/followers**

e. De facto power was shared relatively equally across **leaders and ordinary members/followers.**

f. De facto power rested with **ordinary members/followers**

9. For each period and bloc, please state how cohesive/fragmented the bloc was.

a. The bloc was **very cohesive** and had no major competing factions.

b. The bloc was **fairly cohesive:** it had different factions or fractions, which were moderately competitive.

c. The bloc was **fairly incohesive:** it had different factions or fractions, which were very competitive.

d. The bloc was **very incohesive,** with extreme competition among different factions or fractions.
5.2 Section II: Blocs’ Relationship to the Settlement

10. For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important the following methods were as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ leaders into or under the settlement, on a scale of 1-4, where 1 = not important, 2 = slightly important, 3 = fairly important, and 4 = very important (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

In our understanding, for there to be a political settlement, powerful groups (which for analytical purposes we assemble under blocs) must be incorporated into it (via some form of legitimation or co-optation strategy) or under it (via some form of coercion or repression strategy), or by some mix of the two. The principal architect or avatar of these strategies is likely to be the country’s de facto leader, who is also the leader of the LB, and to whom Qs 10 and 11 refer. Note that we are aware this simplifies a complex situation (the de facto leader may take advice or instruction from others or merely be following tradition, there may not be a complete consensus even among the governing coalition, s/he will depend on others to implement the strategies, etc). Given this, we refer to the country’s de facto leader as a kind of shorthand for the key decision-makers in the settlement, and we ask for general estimates of the relative importance of the different strategies used by him/them to incorporate blocs.

The country’s de facto leader is likely to apply different strategies to different blocs, and perhaps to leaders and followers within those blocs. The country’s de facto leader herself must also have some reason for trying to uphold the settlement, that is, s/he must also be incorporated or self-incorporated. Qs10 and 11 attempt to capture this.

Logically, if the strategies are successful, the settlement will persist. If not, it will experience a serious challenge, and either change or collapse. Please note, however, that for these questions, we are interested in what the country de facto leader tried to do, rather than in how successful s/he was.

Finally, in some countries, there may be a distinction between strategies designed to uphold the settlement itself and strategies designed merely to ensure the political survival of the governing coalition. However, for the purposes of this survey, we regard these differences as immaterial. Please just focus on the key strategies that governed the country’s de facto leader’s relationship to his own and other blocs.

a. Violent repression: This refers to the containment of challenges to the settlement by means such as: murders, disappearances, political arrests, public intimidation and incarceration, deliberate impoverishment, destruction of property, forced relocation, violent dispersion of public events and demonstrations, etc.;

b. Non-violent repression: This refers to the containment of challenges to the settlement by means such as: legal confinement, surveillance, infiltration, tax audits, interference in the ability to gain employment or business,
restrictions on fund raising, negative propaganda or scapegoating, censorship, restrictions on access to the media, outlawing assembly, etc.;

c. **Clientelistic material cooptation:** This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the targeted provision of private (e.g. money, jobs, rents) or club (eg schools, roads) goods to individuals or communities as a *conditional exchange for* political support or loyalty;

d. **Clientelistic non-material cooptation:** This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the targeted provision of political or status goods such as leadership positions (in either higher or lower level political organs) or symbolic benefits (eg language recognition, special group status) to individuals or communities, as a *conditional exchange for* political support or loyalty; *Note that in situations where leadership positions are valued solely for the access to income/rents they provide, we would expect you, other things being equal, to code a higher value for* c. clientelistic material cooptation *than d. clientelistic non-material cooptation;*

e. **Programmatic material legitimation:** This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the provision of club or public goods (e.g. universal health care, a sound investment climate) to individuals or communities, irrespective of their political loyalty or support;

f. **Universalistic ideological legitimation:** This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the inculcation or articulation of ideological beliefs such as socialism, liberalism, nationalism, or national or world religions, in or for individuals or communities, irrespective of political loyalty or support;

g. **Procedurally democratic legitimation:** This refers to the creation of support for or acquiescence to the settlement through the provision of opportunities to individuals or communities to vote and/or stand in formally free elections to form a government.

11. For each period and bloc, please estimate, on average, how important the following methods were as a strategy by the country’s de facto leader to incorporate his and other blocs’ followers into or under the settlement, on a scale of 1-4, where 1 = not important, 2 = slightly important, 3 = fairly important, and 4 = very important (irrespective of whether the strategy was ultimately successful).

   a. Violent repression  
   b. Non-violent repression  
   c. Clientelistic material cooptation  
   d. Clientelistic non-material cooptation  
   e. Programmatic material legitimation  
   f. Universalistic ideological legitimation  
   g. Procedurally democratic legitimation
12. For each bloc, please provide an opinion on the scale, on average, of any settlement-generated material benefits (eg salaries, rents, public spending) it received relative to its size:
   a. Very High: It received a level of material benefits very disproportionately high relative to its size;
   b. High: It received a level of material benefits disproportionately high relative to its size;
   c. Proportionate: It received a level of material benefits about proportionate to its size;
   d. Low: It received a level of material benefits disproportionately low relative to its size.
   e. Very Low: It received a level of material benefits very disproportionately low relative to its size.

13. For each bloc, please provide an opinion on how any settlement-generated material benefits (eg salaries, rents, public spending) enjoyed by this bloc were, on average, distributed between leaders and followers (where Mobutu’s Zaire might be an example of a ‘massively inegalitarian distribution’ and contemporary Denmark an ‘egalitarian’ distribution):
   a. Massively inegalitarian: Leaders captured a massively disproportionate share of material benefits.
   b. Highly inegalitarian: Leaders captured a highly disproportionate share of material benefits.
   c. Moderately inegalitarian: Leaders captured a moderately disproportionate share of material benefits.
   d. Slightly inegalitarian: Leaders captured a slightly disproportionate share of material benefits.
   e. Egalitarian: Leaders and followers received a more or less proportionate share of material benefits.
5.3 **SECTION III: DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING POWER OF THE LEADERSHIP**

Note: Extant political settlements theory has hypothesized certain relationships between the balance or configuration of power in society and the capabilities of the political leadership, and these questions are intended to help us explore these.

14. To what extent was power concentrated in the de facto Leader of the country, in the sense that s/he could *make* major policy decisions, e.g. on economic policy, fiscal policy, social policy, national security?

   By ‘make’ a policy decision, we mean formulate an authoritative course of policy action and present it to lower level political organs, if appropriate, for successful ratification. Thus, a settlement with a Prime Minister who was able, after consultation with Cabinet, to formulate major bills which were then passed smoothly into legislation by Parliament with minimal dilution of the bills’ original intentions, would have a moderate degree of decision-making power concentration. By contrast, a settlement which had a Prime Minister whose major bills were routinely pulled apart and changed very significantly by Parliament, would have moderately dispersed power.

   a. Power was **highly concentrated** in the Leader, in the sense that s/he could make major policy decisions with minimal consultation or bargaining with other powerful actors;

   b. Power was **moderately concentrated** in the Leader, in the sense that s/he could make major policy decisions but only after meaningful consultation or bargaining with other powerful actors;

   c. Power was **moderately dispersed**, in the sense that the Leader could make major policy decisions but only after extensive consultation or bargaining with other powerful actors;

   d. Power was **highly dispersed**, in the sense that the Leader struggled to make major policy decisions, even after extensive consultation or bargaining.

15. To what extent was *implementing power* concentrated in the political leadership, in the sense that its major de facto policy decisions were *implemented* without intentional resistance or dilution?

   For this question, political leadership refers to the political individual, group or organ that has ratified a policy decision and passed it to the bureaucracy or non-governmental partner for implementation. Note that with this question we are interested in implementation problems that stem from political resistance or subversion; we are not interested in implementation problems that may stem from shortages in financial or human resources, nor in the ultimate wisdom or success of policy decisions.

   a. Implementing power was **highly concentrated** in the political leadership, in the sense that its major policy decisions were implemented with minimal resistance or dilution;

   b. Implementing power was **moderately concentrated** in the political leadership, in the sense that its major policy decisions were implemented but with some resistance or dilution;
c. Implementing power was **moderately dispersed**, in the sense that the leadership’s policy decisions were implemented, but only with significant resistance or dilution;
d. Implementing power was **highly dispersed**, in the sense that the political leadership’s policy decisions were subject to extensive resistance or dilution.

### 5.4 Section IV: Foreign Influence and Internal and External Threats

16. For each period, how important to the maintenance of the settlement was military support by a foreign power?
   a. **Not important**: The government could maintain the settlement wholly through its own military means.
   b. **Marginally important**: The government received some foreign military support which was helpful; however, the government would probably have managed to maintain the settlement without it.
   c. **Important**: Without foreign military support, the settlement would probably have collapsed sooner.
   d. **Very important**: Without foreign military support, the settlement would almost certainly have collapsed much sooner.

17. For each period, how important to the maintenance of the settlement was financial or technical assistance by a foreign power?
   a. **Not important**: The government could maintain the settlement wholly through its own financial and technical means.
   b. **Marginally important**: The government received some foreign financial and technical support which was helpful; however, the government would probably have managed to maintain the settlement without it.
   c. **Important**: Without foreign financial and technical support, the settlement would probably have collapsed sooner.
   d. **Very important**: Without foreign financial and technical support, the settlement would almost certainly have collapsed much sooner.

18. For each period, was there a (perceptible) threat to the political survival of high level LB leaders from one or more of the following domestic or international groups, where political survival refers to the ability to stay in office, and ‘perceptible threat’ means ‘perceptible to those leaders? For each group code from 1-4 where “1” = No threat; “2” = Low threat; “3” = Moderate threat; and “4” = High threat.
   a. Rural subordinate classes
   b. Rural dominant classes
   c. Urban subordinate classes
   d. Urban dominant classes
   e. Ethnic, regional or religious groups
   f. An opposition group in exile
   g. The military
   h. A neighboring country
   i. A non-neighboring country
19. For each period, was there a (perceptible) threat to the physical survival of high or intermediate-level LB leaders from one or more of the following domestic or international groups, where physical survival refers to the ability to live without fear of being killed, imprisoned or driven into exile? For each group code from 1-4 where “1” = No threat; “2” = Low threat; “3” = Moderate threat; and “4” = High threat.

a. Rural subordinate classes
b. Rural dominant classes
c. Urban subordinate classes
d. Urban dominant classes
e. Ethnic, regional or religious groups
f. An opposition group in exile
g. The military
h. A neighboring country
i. A non-neighboring country
5.5 SECTION V: ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Notes: In addition to the configuration of the political settlement, a prominent strand of political settlements theory treats manufacturing firms’ economic capabilities and political power as an important additional variable in explaining state capacity and development outcomes. Our aim is to generate data that will allow us to test hypotheses associated with this position.

20. By developing country standards and for each period, please specify the average level of technological and entrepreneurial capabilities of domestically owned firms in the formal manufacturing sector.
   a. Low: On average, firms could successfully adopt only simple technologies.
   b. Medium: On average, firms could successfully adopt moderately-complex technologies.
   c. High: On average, firms could successfully adopt complex technologies.

21. Please specify the average level of political power of domestically owned firms in the formal manufacturing sector.
   a. Low: The government found it easy to dictate terms to firms.
   b. Medium: The government found it neither easy nor hard to dictate terms to firms.
   c. High: The government found it hard to dictate terms to firms.
5.6 SECTION VI: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

Notes: In this section we ask experts to describe the character of key economic policies in the country. We do so with a view to exploring relationships between political settlements, policies, and development outcomes.

22. Please describe the government’s industrialization strategy for each period. Choose from the options below.
   a. A strong emphasis on import-substituting industrialization.
   b. A similar emphasis on import-substituting and export-oriented industrialization.
   c. A strong emphasis on export-oriented industrialization.
   d. The state had no industrialization strategy.

23. Please specify how the government treated Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
   a. The government discouraged the inflow of FDI;
   b. The government permitted FDI, but placed strong conditions on it and/or provided little support;
   c. The government encouraged FDI, placing moderate conditions on it and/or providing moderate support;
   d. The government strongly encouraged FDI, placing few conditions on it and/or providing a high level of support;
   e. The government did not have an FDI strategy

24. Please specify how vigorously the state intervened in the economy.
   a. Strong: The state controlled most industries and heavily regulated and coordinated private companies, or at least it attempted to.
   b. Medium: The state controlled only a few key industries, yet strongly regulated and coordinated private companies, or at least it attempted to.
   c. Light: The state controlled only a few key industries if any, and otherwise did not intervene strongly in the business of private enterprises.

25. Please specify whether de facto state policy prioritized the agricultural over the industrial sector.
   a. Agriculture was strongly prioritized over the industrial sector.
   b. Agriculture was prioritized over the industrial sector.
   c. Agriculture and industry were treated equally.
   d. Industry was prioritized over agriculture.
   e. Industry was strongly prioritized over agriculture.

26. Was economic development a priority for the top leadership, beyond their statements? Please code on a scale from 1-5, where
   a. Very low priority
   b. Low priority
   c. Medium priority
   d. High priority
   e. Very high priority
27. Was social development, for example spending on education, health, potable water, social insurance, etc, a priority for the top leadership, beyond their statements? Please code on a scale from 1-5, where
   a. Very low priority
   b. Low priority
   c. Medium priority
   d. High priority
   e. Very high priority
6 Publication bibliography


