ESID Working Paper No 14

---

**Co-producing Ineffective States: Social Knowledge, Social Policy and Social Citizenship in Africa and in development.**

Maia Green¹
September, 2012

---

¹ University of Manchester

(Email correspondence: maia.green@manchester.ac.uk)

ISBN: 978-1-908749-13-0
Abstract

This paper explores the links between social knowledge, social policy and state forms in Sub-Saharan Africa. Its central argument is that the capacities of states to establish inclusive welfare regimes (Gough et al 2004) for citizens are limited by the ways in which states themselves are organised, including the constitution of state society relations (see also Neocosmos 2003). Moreover, the capacity constraints of African states in relation to citizen welfare are accentuated rather than mitigated by the range of policy interventions promoted by development actors. Academic and policy knowledge about states and society in Africa, as elsewhere, provides the rationale for certain kinds of interventions which have implications for the organisation of states and regimes of citizenship (Skopkol & Rueschemeyer 1996; Stavrakis 2002). Consequently, the new generation of social protection programmes currently being implemented in countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia and Tanzania are not only inadequate in the context of the increasing mobility of capital and labour, accelerated by regionalisation policies and the privatization of land; they perpetuate what Mahmood Mamdani has characterised as the `bifurcated state’ (1996) based on a dual system of social entitlements.

Keywords

Africa, social policy, social protection, social funds, community development
Introduction

This paper explores the links between social knowledge, social policy and state forms in Sub-Saharan Africa. My central argument is that the capacities of states to establish inclusive welfare regimes (Gough et al. 2004) for citizens are limited by the ways in which states themselves are organised, including the constitution of state society relations (see also Neocosmos 2003). Moreover, the capacity constraints of African states in relation to citizen welfare are accentuated rather than mitigated by the range of policy interventions promoted by development actors. As in the majority of modern nation states, academic and policy knowledge about states and society provides the rationale for certain kinds of interventions which have implications for the organisation of states and regimes of citizenship (Skopkol & Rueschemeyer 1996; Stavrakis 2002).

In Africa, as in other post colonial settings, the institution of `community' is central to these discursive regimes and to the state architectures they legitimate (e.g. Creed 2006; Povinelli 2002). Consequently, the new generation of social protection programmes currently being implemented in countries such as Ghana, Ethiopia and Tanzania (Nino-Zarazua et al. 2011) link entitlement with community residence or with community structures of beneficiary selection. Such interventions are not only inadequate in the context of the increasing mobility of capital and labour, accelerated by regionalisation policies and the privatization of land. They perpetuate what Mahmood Mamdani has characterised as the `bifurcated state' (1996) based on a dual system of social entitlements. In this situation the potential capacity to implement inclusive social policy is effectively designed out of state systems (Bevan 2004; Green 2005).

The paper sets out the continuities between old and new social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa in relation to ways in which the policies of African states and the donors which finance them have conceptualised state society relations. A core argument is that current analytical paradigms concerning `the African state' as a locus of ineffectiveness and corruption and the ensuing preoccupation with notions of fiscal citizenship, concerned solely with the rights of citizens to hold governments to account, preclude consideration of the potential of other kinds of citizenships to enhance welfare in African states. The originality of the approach taken in this paper is to situate analysis of attributes of states in Africa within a discussion of links between the organisation of actual states and regimes of `social citizenship' (Marshall 1949), that is the extent to which states have obligations to ensure the welfare and entitlements of citizens, and to make explicit the links between the development emphasis on `governance' and the compromised capacities of states to effect social policies which contributes to `illfare regimes' ( Bevan 2004).

The paper refers to a number of distinct concepts which recur in contemporary discourses about social policy. Social policy is a broad category which encompasses all policies directed at improving human welfare. Although economic policies have social impacts the differentiation of social policies is politically and practically useful because it enables the prioritisation of human development outcomes and the consideration of `direct instruments’ to achieve them (Mkandawire 2001). These instruments include what Deacon refers to as the three R’s; rights, regulation and redistribution (2010).
In current policy discourses social protection refers to a range of interventions which are believed to mitigate against adverse circumstances likely to be experienced by persons categorised as vulnerable. The term can encompass indirect instruments, as in the social protection strategies of states such as Tanzania which do not wish to commit to funding direct interventions, or in the World Bank’s initial conceptualisation of ‘social risk management’. It also refers to a number of direct interventions including regulation to protect livelihoods and the transfer of resources. Pensions, cash transfers and food aid are social protection instruments. Two other concepts derive from political sociology. Social citizenship refers to the kinds of social support which citizens can expect from the states in which they live and to which they contribute, a concept first proposed by Marshall to describe the new social forms of welfare states in the twentieth century (1949). Finally, ‘social contract’ refers, after Hobbes and Rousseau, to the mutual set of obligations between states and citizens (see Nugent 2010).

This paper makes use of literature from African studies, political science and anthropology; policy literatures on governance, state capacity and social policy and documentation from African social protection programmes. The analysis is informed by participation in an appraisal of the Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Programme in 2005, work on social policy for children affected by HIV and AIDS conducted for UNICEF in 2005 and 2006 and an analysis of state capacity in relation to African Union social policy carried out in 2009. I draw on in country experience of Tanzania, focusing on decentralisation and civil society and interviews with Tanzania Social Action Fund staff conducted in 2007 and 2012.

Rather than focus on whether new structures of social protection are effective or ineffective, or on the relevance of selected policy instruments for their target social categories, I situate transformations in social policy in Africa within the global context of contestations in the political imaginaries of welfare and associated drives for reform (e.g Waquant 2009; Peck 2001; 2011; Green & Lawson 2011; Clarke 2004). Despite novel components of the new generation of social protection programmes, of which the most radical is cash transfers in preference to food aid, these interventions arguably reinforce rather than confront existing bifurcated (Mamdani 1996) modalities of social citizenship.

The paper is structured as follows. Part One provides an introduction to the changing conceptualisation of social policy and citizenship in African states. Key concepts of community and the importance of land are considered. Part Two explores various conceptualisation of the state in Africa in relation to the constitution of state society relations and state capacities. Of critical importance is the organisation of states, that is the institutional architecture through which states work as systems of organisation. In Sub Saharan Africa, this architecture of incapacity is heavily influenced by particular kinds of knowledge about the state which has informed the policy of northern donor agencies towards states and social policy. Part Three examines the community development model of social entitlement, first established in colonial times, as an outcome of these modes of organisation. Its limitations are explored in the rapidly changing context of increasing mobility, accelerated by the push to regional economic integration. Part Four introduces examples of new social protection programming in Africa.

Note how this language of social protection represents mitigating economic crises as technical rather than political, as the protective parallel to market economics.
Analysis of two programmes, the Ethiopian Productive Safety Nets Programme and the Tanzanian Social Action Fund, demonstrates the fundamental continuities between old and new social policy regimes and considers the implications of programme design for state capacity. Part Five considers the absence of a social dimension to current citizenship discourses through which current development programming is structured. In conclusion I suggest that the normalisation of community support in development policy models for Africa mitigates against state effectiveness in relation to social policy.

1. Social policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

1.1 Naturalising poor communities

Few states in Sub-Saharan Africa have established national systems of social welfare or prioritised social policy. Most are characterised by a restricted conceptualisation of social policy as pertaining to education and health as ‘social sectors’ (Adesina 2007), along with the persistence of frameworks established for colonial governance, in which the relation between rural people and the state is mediated through membership of community as a naturalised association between a specific population and a specific territory (Smyth 2004; Lewis 2000). Welfare transfers for children, the elderly and persons with disabilities are not institutionalised, with the exception of pensions for formal sector workers predominantly in the public sector. The costs and burdens of social reproduction are deemed to be the responsibility of communities, supported through limited state interventions in the domain of basic health care directed towards mothers and children (Bevan 2004). Until recently, community as a political institution in various forms was the primary vehicle through which rural persons acquired access to land and hence to the means of subsistence (Nugent 2010; Boone 2007). This could take the form of devolved state systems of land allocation, as with Village Governments in Tanzania (Cleaver 2002; Odgaard 2002) or largely autonomous local structures, as in the case of Senegal (Boone 1998; 2007). Entitlements to the means of subsistence and to social support are presumed to be organised around membership of, or association with, particular communities. ²

Everyday vulnerabilities are managed through informal transfers between kin and neighbours, diversification of income strategies and food sources and cutting back consumption (Guyer 2004). Reducing the number of meals eaten remains a taken for granted strategy for huge numbers of households, especially during the annual hungry season which continues to characterise the lives of small farmers (eg de Boek 1994; Moore & Vaughan 1994). Chronic food insecurity, malnutrition and high rates of infant and child mortality persist across the continent. With few exceptions, state action is prompted only in the event of shortages considered extreme enough to merit classification as emergencies when food aid is provided on a temporary basis, often financed through donors and delivered through Non Governmental Organisations (12002; Adesina 2007; Bevan 2004). The combination of ongoing income insecurity with limited social safety nets prompts citizens to take action to protect their households and their livelihoods, of which the most usual is long or short term migration.

² Such regimes are not limited to Africa. In Australia, for example, community entitlements depend on the enactment of practices which can mitigate against accessing the entitlements associated with national citizenship (Povinelli 2002).
The fragmentary nature of social safety nets, piecemeal social assistance and limited options for mitigating risk contribute to widespread problems of poverty and vulnerability in much of Africa, which are by no means restricted to failed or fragile states. Where new economic opportunities, such as those in the natural resources sector, are concentrated in certain locations, the institutional void in the domain of social policy mitigates against direct linkages between growth and poverty reduction (Mkandawire 2001). Given the frailty of small-scale rural economies in Africa, accentuated by lack of investment and globalisation, not only does growth in one sector have minimal impacts elsewhere, the institutions and relations through which increased revenue could potentially impact on the poorest have yet to be brought into existence.

Populations are weakly integrated into national and local systems of taxation. Personal taxation, especially for rural citizens, retains strong associations with coercion under diverse colonial and postcolonial regimes (Lund 2006: 694). The bulk of tax income derives from a small number of corporate taxpayers at national level, supplemented by sales taxes and more recently, VAT (Hesselbeing et al; Fjelstad & Moore 2009). Local governments depend disproportionately on property taxes, even in rural districts. In countries such as Tanzania a substantial proportion of state revenue derives from development assistance. The persistence of poverty and vulnerability are institutionally determined in the absence of effective sources of state revenue and redistributive systems.

This situation is consolidated by the political organisation of African states and the conceptual architectures of policy analysis and practice. Because poverty is naturalised as a consequence of environmental, epidemiological or geographic factors (see Mitchell 2002) rather than an effect of the ways in which societies are organised (Green & Hulme 2005), the incapacities of states to manage poverty and vulnerability are in effect co-produced (Jasanoff 2004) through knowledge practices and the regimes of government which they support, including those promoted through international development assistance (cf. Mueller 2006). This is clearly evident in post Washington policy thinking about poverty and African development, and in much of the social science writing on states and politics in Africa. The former has in the main sought to privilege market models, community capacities for ‘graduation’ out of poverty and a minimalist role for the state restricted to the provision of basic services3. The latter has broadly accepted the existing topography of states in Africa as an inevitable attribute of the ‘African state’ rather than as the hybrid products of successive models of state building - colonial, post colonial and aid affected - all of which have been founded on a conceptualisation of the state as ruling through dispersed localised and self sufficient populations4.

Central to the conceptualization of the ‘African state’ is an idea of the territorially, culturally and authentically embedded community which, as the locus of indigenous social support systems, mitigates against the ‘need’ for other forms of governmental social action (cf Fraser 1989). This conceptualisation of community is not confined to post colonial settings. Ideas of community have regained a political salience under neo-
Co-producing Ineffective States: Social Knowledge, Social Policy and Social Citizenship in Africa and in development

liberalisation (Amin 2005; Rose 2000; Peck 2002). Associated with notions of territory, genealogy and belonging, community can be invoked as powerful trope for modalities of inclusion and authenticity in virtually all types of political order. The significance of community in contemporary Africa is threefold. As a concept, community connotes local and established persons and practices, often elided with the constitution of the ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’. Second, it equates persons, practices and territory. Finally, community as the base on which the modern state is constructed is that which requires mobilisation for the purposes of development. Here the state and development imaginaries of community align. Community as institution is integral to the organisation of development interventions as well as to the governmental strategies of developing states. Community as village or collective (as in the panchayat) performs similar work in India (Corbridge et al 2005), Nepal (Pigg 1992) and Indonesia (Murray Li 2007).

The constitution of community as in effect an institution of government in the organisation of African postcolonial states (Boone 2007: 564; Lund 2006: 694) is a consequence of the political and institutional legacies associated with colonial governance regimes, post colonial developmental states and ongoing development policy interventions. These prioritize education and health over an expansion of social support and, concurrently, promote community development and decentralization (Eriksen 2001; 2010; Adesina 2007; Tendler 2002; Doornbos 2010). The constitution of community as a basis for social organisation and the allocation of entitlements plays an important role in the ‘politics of needs interpretation’ (Fraser 1989), legitimating the absence of a distinct sphere of state action dealing with the ‘social’ directed at the welfare and security of citizens.5

1.2 Reimagining welfare in African states

The absence of a distinct social as a domain of policy action is naturalised within policy and analytical discourses, both inside and outside Africa, which consider social policy the concern of developed countries welfare regimes (e.g. Gough et al 2004). This has important political implications, not only for the constitution of citizenship and the content of diverse political settlements, but for the capacity and organisation of states and hence for the dynamics of state-society relations. Such issues are in the process of renegotiation in some southern African states. In a move which parallels ongoing political reconfigurations in some Latin American states, the middle income Southern African states of Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and South Africa are coming to institutionalise social policy as a development policy and as the basis of inclusive citizenship (Barrientos, Gideon & Molyneux 2008; Bastaghi 2009). The struggle in South Africa over the over the proposed Basic Income Grant (Matisson & Seekings 2002; Ferguson 2007; Barchiesi 2007) and on-going public demands for wider access to social support in North African states are an indication of the aspiration of changing imaginaries of citizenship and entitlement6.

5 As, for example, in the notion of ‘community support’ within AIDS policy discourses (Green 2005; 2011).
6 For the importance of the imagination in welfare systems and claim making see Fraser (1999), who talks of how ‘the political imaginary of social welfare’ changed under Clintonism in the United States. Imaginaries of entitlement are transforming labour relations and political consciousness elsewhere, not necessarily in relation to the state but to private sector employers. See Miller (2005) for an account of how Zambian shop workers imagine the labour rights of South Africans and seek to make regional claims on the South African company which is their employer.
Co-producing Ineffective States: Social Knowledge, Social Policy and Social Citizenship in Africa and in development

Elsewhere, a number of African states in receipt of high volumes of development assistance, including Kenya, Uganda and Ghana, are responding to new policy opportunities promoted through the World Bank to transform existing modalities of emergency assistance into longer term `social protection' through the creation of national strategies. Such initiatives are significant in reconceptualising the social contract in such a way that the responsibility for social welfare is no longer wholly the obligation of `communities' but is shared between government and citizens. This sharing does not imply a wholesale transformation of social citizenship. The majority of recent initiatives introducing new entitlements around social protection actually reinstate community or its proxies as the institution through which needs are assessed and targeting effected. This is evident in the allocation of support to children categorised as `vulnerable’ under AIDS programming in Tanzania; in the Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Programme and the delivery of subsidised inputs to poor households in Malawi (Green & Mercer 2012; Swidler & Watkins 2009; Eggen 2011).

A potentially more radical reconceptualization of social policy as foundational to the social contract is now being promoted through the African Union Commission. Drafted by a succession of international social policy technocrats and supported through consultative stages by HelpAge International, a leading civil society advocate of universal pensions, the African Union Social Policy Framework attempts to link diverse social development outcomes to a range of policy interventions which are the responsibility of societies and states and the right of citizens. Agreed in 2008 at the height of global economic crisis, the Framework makes an explicit claim for the necessity of differentiated economic and social policies and for the use of direct, as opposed to indirect, social policy instruments (African Union 2008:7). Significantly, the Framework makes a purposive statement concerning the responsibly of states for the social welfare of citizens (op cit 9; Wright & Noble 2010). Citizenship within the African Union, and hence in all member states, should have a normative social dimension. This reframing of citizenship as `social’ (Fraser & Gordon 1992) in Sub-Saharan Africa is potentially extremely challenging, not only for national governments which are politically and institutionally unprepared for such directions, but for contemporary understandings of state society relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and for the parameters and operationalisation of `social policy’.

2. Ineffective states

2.1 Limitations of governance approaches

Since the 1980’s issues of poverty and underdevelopment in Africa have been consistently explained by the persistence of weak, failing and ineffective states, states which have lacked the capacities to create environments in which security and markets

---

7 The emphasis on co-responsibility is important, informing the transition to workfare style approaches to social welfare.
8 This is discussed in more detail below.
9 The Framework is the product of multiple authorship and successive iterations. Key contributors included the leading South African social policy academic, Vivien Taylor. Personal communication, Sylvia Beales, HelpAge International.
can function\textsuperscript{10}. This emphasis on the limitations of states is partly explained by the political drivers of development assistance along with the neo-liberal policy paradigm which prioritised market lead development (Olukoshi 2007; Mkandawire 2001)\textsuperscript{11}. The pervasive ‘good governance’ agenda which has dominated aid policy and, by extension, internal policy (Lie 2011) in aid dependant countries over the past two decades is an attempt to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of states in what are defined as their core functions of macro economic management and the delivery of basic services. Institutional reform, not reordering, has been at the heart of the development initiative, with variable results (Fritz & Menocal 2007)\textsuperscript{12}.

In parallel with the transition to direct budgetary support and poverty reduction strategies as a devolved conditionality, the development prioritisation of governance has reframed focus on the state as prioritising what are considered to be core components of state functioning. These centre on fiscal management through regulation and accountability instruments such as public expenditure reviews, and on a narrow definition of state capacity as capacity for fiscal management (see Craig & Porter 2006; Levy & Kpundeh 2004; Fritz & Menocal 2007: 544). Capacity enhancing efforts have been directed at key Ministries, ensuring ex ante conditionalities are in place as demanded by PRS contracting. This emphasis has had important effects. The state as an object of reform is reduced in practice to the Ministry of Finance and its satellites (Harrison 2001; 2004) while rural areas are tasked with managing their own services through decentralisation. What is happening in Uganda is representative. Here ‘the state has turned upwards and outwards towards the incentives that pervade the economy of international development’ (Jones 2009: 165). It is ‘mostly uninterested in rural Uganda’, where ‘It... is in its absences that the state matters most (op cit 164-5, emphasis in the original).

Governance reforms have not lead to dramatic improvements in the levels of poverty in Africa. The reliance on technical interventions in governance reform without adequate sensitivity to context has been blamed for the lack of embedded country ownership of reform packages. ‘Good enough’ governance (Grindle 2007), understanding context and building on existing institutions are now advocated as ways forward in achieving human development, not only in Africa (e.g. Booth 2011a; 2011b; Unsworth 2010). Governance literature, if not programming, now claims that ‘one size fits all’ approaches to development and service delivery are misguided, citing research which demonstrates that effective states, even those which are severely financially constrained, rely on a range of formal and informal institutions in hybrid alliances to deliver public goods to citizens (Booth 2011a: 523; Cleaver 2002; Moore 2004). In focusing on institutions as the incentives motivating individual actors rather than on actually existing institutions, which are the responsibility of functioning states, this perspective risks obscuring an important area in the analysis of states and public goods provision, namely the organisation and operation of state agencies, including the organisational impacts of states devolving responsibility for the delivery of services to other institutions at different scales\textsuperscript{13}. This omission inhibits adequate analysis of the institutional determinants of state capacities, and, in relation to social policy, ‘illfare’ regimes (Bevan 2004: 95).

\textsuperscript{10} For an overview of the failed states literature see Di John (2008).
\textsuperscript{11} There are numerous other reasons, including the tendency to prefer apparently ‘technical’ aid instruments to political interventions, not only to ‘de-politicize’ development as authors such as Ferguson (1994) have proposed, but to enable multi country implementation.
\textsuperscript{12} Including what Booth calls ‘policy driven institutional incoherence’ (2010: 8).
\textsuperscript{13} As in PPPs or relations with ‘civil society’ contractors.
2.2 'State', 'Society' and the 'Social'

This tendency to make claims about the state while not necessarily prioritising actually existing states as institutions is not confined to policy commissioned research on states in various forms. Accounts of states in Africa produced by political theorists, historians and anthropologists have, in seeking to make claims about the ways in which states are socially embedded, focused on cultural practices rather than the constitution of actually existing states as organisations (Olivier de Sardan 2008: 7; Pitcher et al 2009; Eriksen 2001: 297). The analytical preoccupation with the 'African state' as characterised by cultural tendencies towards patrimonialism, corruption and 'economies of affection' (Hyden 1983) derives from two distinct theoretical traditions which, combined, come to have powerful resonance in this field of study. The first is the conceptualisation of the state derived from Weberian sociology in which the separation between state and society is a normative precondition of effective stateness as a rational bureaucratic mechanism for the administration of government in modern society (Mitchell 1991; Eriksen 2010). The second is the social theoretical interpretation of political relations in Africa as inevitably articulated through modalities of relational inequality which imply obligation and relations of unequal reciprocity resulting in neo-patrimonialism (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Bayart 1993). As Olivier de Sardan makes clear, such approaches in privileging an interpretation of state failure as pathologically related to cultural idioms render the 'delivering state', that is states which function in various ways to deliver goods and services to populations, invisible (2009: 6). State forms and functioning in Africa cannot be adequately explained in terms of either colonial legacies or indigenous cultures (Eriksen 2001; Pitcher et al 2009). State forms based on widely accepted organisational templates have broad based legitimacy in African countries, even where state performance is poor (Eriksen 2010). Ideas about the state, that is the normative expectations of citizens, provide resilient models for the organisation of public services (Pitcher et al 2009) in conditions where, as in the case of education in DRC, the state itself is incapable of financing their delivery (Titeca & Herdt 2011).

States as organisations and the cultures associated with them are distinct fields of practice in all countries, not merely as a consequence of the kinds of practices through which states as systems of organisation are effected, but through the inevitable cultural boundary making which 'doing the state' requires (Mitchell 1991: 78; Migdal cited in Titeca & de Herdt 2011: 4). This boundary should not be taken too literally. As Mitchell suggests, what is at stake is the constitution of a separation between state and its object, a separation which permits the delineation of relations between governor and governed and between policy implementer and object. State society relations are therefore part of the imaginative and organisational repertoire through which states govern. They do not exist in the same way in all state societies, but are renegotiated according to the political attributes and power relations in particular states. In Mitchell's words, 'the boundary of the state (or political system) never marks a real exterior. The line between state and society is not the perimeter of an intrinsic entity which can be thought of as a freestanding object or actor. It is a line drawn internally, within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is maintained' (1991:90, emphasis in the original). There is then no 'society' distinct and separable from the state as entity, but a series of practices aimed at establishing this separation. What states are in different places and at different times are, in part, the effects of these practices of organisation (op cit 1991: 92). Apprehended through Mitchell's lens, neo-patrimonialism and what some have claimed to be the uncertain
boundaries between state and society in Africa are revealed not so much as a problem of political relations as an effect of boundary placing, an issue not of culture as an essentialised attribute of persons or places but of political organisation\textsuperscript{14}. The absence of a clear separation between society and the state in African post colonial political orders is accentuated by the institutionalisation of community within state systems, that is by the inclusion of community as both agent and object of state action.

The ways in which states as organisations manage and establish systems of ordering between constituent units within or beyond territorial space is simultaneously material and conceptual. What states imagine citizens to be, how persons are related to states and to each other and the legitimate reach of states into what comes to be demarcated as the personal and private domains of citizens are all aspects of this moral imaginary mapped onto a national territorial space. Such imaginaries are not confined to populist or elite conceptualisations of social order, but are reinforced or confronted by competing imaginaries of citizen state society orderings emanating from globalised human rights discourses, academic knowledge, regional economic communities, internal and external political struggles and neighbouring states (e.g Miller 2005: 125; Taylor 2004). Neither ‘citizen’ nor the ‘social’ are pre existing entities within pre existing relations with states as forms of organisation (Rose 1996). As categories which are politically constituted they have variable content within diverse state and para state systems.

The African Union Social Policy Framework amounts to an attempt to expand ‘the social’ as a normative site for public action as concerned with ‘the welfare and well being of people’ (2008: 9), with special emphasis on ‘vulnerable groups’. As with making markets work through making market institutions, including establishing the forms of labour relations which are amenable to marketisation, a social domain must be realized institutionally for such policies to have traction (Mitchell 2008). The absence of an obvious set of institutions on which to map this initiative accounts for the Framework’s dispersed and fragmented character articulated through eighteen themes ‘in no particular priority’ with four cross-cutting issues (2008:4) as a menu of multiple overlapping areas of intervention without clear indication of the instruments or institutions through which state action can be rendered effective\textsuperscript{15}. Just as hybridity and informality are in effect designed in to state systems through unfilled gaps and the incentivisation of certain institutional relationships (Unsworth 2010), ‘ill fare’ and insecurity for the poorest are the inevitable outcomes of undeveloped modalities for promoting welfare and mitigating risk. This is likely to be accentuated where economic

\textsuperscript{14} Mitchell’s argument about the state as an effect of disciplinary practices is distinct from another argument proposed by Trouillot (2001) and promoted through the writings of authors such as Ferguson & Gupta (2002). Trouillot argues for an analytical focus on ‘state effects’, as the organisational and representational outcomes of state practices which facilitate inclusion on governance. Trouillot argues that contemporary modalities of neo-liberal governing incorporate non-state actors into government regimes and that ‘state effects’ are thus generated by organisations other than the state.

\textsuperscript{15} The key thematic social issues are : population and development, labour and employment, social protection, health, HIV/AIDS and TB and malaria and other infectious diseases; migration, education, agriculture, food and nutrition, the family, children, adolescents and youth; ageing, disability; gender equality and women’s empowerment; culture; urban development; environmental sustainability; the impact of globalisation and trade liberalisation in Africa; good governance, anti corruption and the rule of law.

The four additional issues are drug and substance abuse and crime prevention, sport, civil strife and conflict situations and foreign debt.
and social restructuring intensifies risk for persons who are vulnerably positioned (Bevan 2004; Gough 2004).

3. Community, social contracts and rural society

3.1 Land

In Sub-Saharan Africa successive colonial and postcolonial state and aid regimes have sought to generate a national society comprised of persons with a restricted set of rights obtained through membership without establishing a distinct social as a space of obligation between citizen and states (Eckert 2004; Smyth 2004; Garba 2007). Obligations and entitlements are formally allocated through community as a territorially defined political institution through which citizen state relations are mediated (Boone 2007). Access to land, owned by states but allocated through a range of community authorities ranging from kinship groups to village councils, is the primary means through which such ‘social contracts’ are formally effected (Nugent 2010). These contracts are increasingly superseded in practice by overlapping contracts between individuals and groups with differential entitlements.

The association of community residence with native authorities and indigenous homelands in colonial policy not only naturalised the association of people with territory; it sought to naturalise the ideal of community-based social reproduction through reliance on land—an association justifying the rationale of male migrant labour while women and children remained as self supporting dependants in the reserves (Lewis 2000; Boone 2007). The centrality of access to land as the basis of social contract consolidated a dual form of citizenship, one national in which the citizen had entitlements deriving from recognition within the nation state and the second community based in which they may or may not secure access to land and hence the means of subsistence (Mamdani 1996). Tenure tights are further differentiated within community entitlements depending on whether a person secures rights through inherited association with place or through the acquisition of use rights built up over time. As Catherine Boone points out, these rights have implications for the scope of citizenship in different countries and, where different tenure regimes apply, as where large areas are privatised, within different parts of the same country (2007: 579). Market relations provide the basis for a third form of citizenship and associated dispossession, based on the ability to access land through rent or purchase from the recognised customary user.

Sub-Saharan African post colonial states continue to be organised along lines established for colonial government. The basic organisational device remains the distinction between a regulatory state responsible for national security and the delivery of basic services through lower tier institutions and localised political authorities (Lund 2006). As colonial states were organised around natural resources and the export of tropical products the management of rural populations and their agricultural productivity took precedence over other objectives of government (Berry 1993). Irrespective of whether colonial states aimed to control rural populations directly or through intermediaries they sought to establish a continuity of relationship with rural production through tenure regimes mediated through local political authorities which promoted a degree of fixity in the relation between population and territory established through either use rights over specific tracts of land, or rights established through hereditary
association. What amounted to a *de facto* social contract based on use rights in land mediated through the newly established political institution of community came to be established at this time (Boone 1998: 8). ‘Community’ has proved to be a remarkably durable organisational template, providing the foundation for post colonial governance and, with its emphasis on land as citizenship, for the initial redistributive forms of nation building through producer subsidies and state marketing boards in the post independence period in countries such as Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania.

### 3.2 Community development

Post colonial regimes committed to modernization sought to develop rural populations by changing attitudes and practices pertaining to tradition and authority and by altering agricultural performance\(^{16}\). Community as form and community member were reconstituted during this period which saw the establishment of a new kind of institutions through which communities were organised, such as village development committees. Community development as involving explicit efforts to transform the subjectivities of rural citizens was operationalized through education, films and through group activities, especially for women (Smyth 2004; Lewis 2000). The antidevelopment trinity of poverty, ignorance and disease could only be conquered through the efforts of communities to develop themselves in their locations (Adesina 2007). Nationalist development strategies resonated with a strong sense of politicised commitment to community as a valorised indigeneity associated with land consolidated during independence struggles, according an emotive moral resonance to economic strategies founded on agricultural development (Garba 2007).

Because of the significance of land as social contract, states have been largely reluctant to amend colonial land laws in which territory is held in trust by the state. Citizens have user rights of various kinds mediated through a variety of community institutions (Boone 2007: 561). States also pursued the perceived interests of the peasant producer over and above more commercial farming. Not only was this strategy reliant on favourable price structures for traditional tropical export corps, it depended on the economies of scale achievable through state marketing boards and the provision of input subsidies (Berry 1993). Migration to urban areas was discouraged and urban growth not actively pursued. A small formal sector with contribution-based social security systems was introduced for public servants, consolidating the bifurcation of citizenship into the domain of the social as a largely urban, elite phenomenon (Lewis 2000; Kabeer 2004; Eckert 2004). Rural residents were assumed to access community structures of support through kinship and neighbourhood associations. This bifurcated approach to citizenship and social entitlement established in colonial times (Mamdani 1996; Lewis 2000; Maclean 2002) is refracted through the institutional architecture of contemporary states where the ‘social’ is simultaneously narrow, restricted to formal sector workers\(^{17}\) and social security, and general, referring to social reproduction hence the concern with women and children, as in Ministries of Social Welfare, as well as the remits of Social Action Funds and community development interventions. Here ideas about civil society

---

\(^{16}\) In East Africa newly independent government development strategies were more or less a continuation of colonial social development strategies, consisting of community development, agricultural extension and producer incentives see for example Lewis (2000) for Kenya, Eckhart (2002) and Jennings (2002) for Tanzania.

\(^{17}\) Including the military and ex combatants.
as proxy for community legitimate continued non state action in local areas (Mindry 2001; Hearn 2001; Tendler 2002; Robins et al 2008).

The organisational templates of particular states are reiterated in the kinds of social knowledge produced to inform the kinds of interventions with which they are associated (Rueschmeyer & Skopkol 1996). In Africa, as in other post colonial settings, the production of truths about community organisational forms first became the remit of specialists in localised cultures and politics, as in colonial anthropology (Povinelli 2002), now superseded by participatory methodologies designed to access local knowledge in collaboration with local populations or their civil society interlocutors (Green 2010). Strong normative discourses about legitimate dependency which resonate with global policy constructs emanating from the United States delineate a clear distinction between those deserving and undeserving of assistance (Fraser & Gordon 1994), as in the ‘vulnerable group’ category associated with the World Bank’s promotion of ‘social risk management’. The provision of social assistance for the poorest in most countries in Africa, with the exception of the Southern African states, is restricted to emergency situations and to ad hoc externally supported programmes. In these conceptualisations of justifiable need transfers are framed as short-term safety nets for the most vulnerable and not as redistribution which would confront the assumed norm of community self reliance.

The economic crisis of the 1980s accentuated by structural adjustment, public sector reform and neoliberal paradigms of responsibilisation and localisation has worked against any substantial transformations in the principles underlying these systems. On the contrary, reduced allocations for social sector spending and the insistence on sustainable, if not market-led, public goods provision has ensured the unquestioned perpetuation of the community development model of social welfare, which looks to be indigenous, hence legitimate, and can be claimed as affordable and responsive. There is no doubt that the validity of the community model of African society has been reinforced by academic and development knowledge paradigms about Africa, and by the ongoing initiatives to extend civil society, which have either reiterated models of community as a form of organisation, or promoted understandings of states in Africa as culturally compromised (Swidler & Watkins 2009). In actuality, indigenous forms of inclusion and exclusion prior to colonial administration were never confined to territorial communities. Entitlements to land and productive resources were relationally determined and could be negotiated for men who could choose where they lived and to whom they offered loyalty. Mobility offered the option of exit in the event of hardship or political conflict and new allegiances in new communities could be established. The situation of women was different as they depended on relations with husbands, fathers and brothers to access entitlements. Other persons whose relational entitlements rendered them vulnerable sought protection through integration into relations of mutual if unequal obligation such as pawnship 18 (Wright 1993; Douglas 1964; Richards 1960).

The community development model of social welfare could only ever be effective where communities as political institutions had the capacity to allocate productive entitlements with some degree of inclusion, and where the economic basis of community participation

---

18 For an historical account of the survival strategies of social excluded persons in East Africa in the late 19th and early 20th century see Wright (1993), for livelihood strategies of the food insecure in Zambia see Richards classic text on ‘Land Labour and Diet’ (1958), Moore and Vaughan’s updated study (1994) and on inclusion and exclusion Douglas’s (1964) paper on the social institution of pawnship in Central Africa.
ensured that there were sufficient resources to sustain local forms of social support (Cunguara & Hanlon 2010). This was probably never the case. Rural living standards in most countries depended on significant transfers in the form of agricultural subsidies. Their ending and the loss of state marketing boards, along with the collapse in world prices for the traditional tropical export crops produced by small scale producers, has pushed farmer earnings to the brink. Land shortage is common, even in countries such as Tanzania which have not fully operationalised wholesale privatisation and where the state retains title over public land (Bryceson 2002). Finally, the impacts of the AIDS pandemic continues to impose huge social and economic costs on residents of Sub-Saharan African nations, especially in Southern and Eastern Africa. These costs, as of social reproduction more generally, fall disproportionally on women, an outcome of gendered divisions of labour in which burdens of care fall on women and girls and of the gendered dimensions of the community development / male labour mobility model in which home remains predicated on women and rural areas.

3.3 Mobility and the redistribution of persons

While Sub-Saharan African states, with the partial exception of South Africa, and its immediate neighbours retain community as the basis of social entitlement, populations have responded with a mix of institutions that can mitigate the tensions inherent between the community basis of entitlements and the economic pragmatics of mobility. Such institutions transcend national borders and include migration, kinship, markets and transnational religious organisations such as Christian churches (Meagher 2010). Community as a political institution incorporated into governance regimes through land allocation necessitated the increased fixity of relations between population and territory, rendering contentious pre-existing distinctions between indigenes and strangers (Nugent 2010; Boone 2007). Those lacking genealogical claims to an area could find their entitlements to land tenuous, especially where indigenes retained rights to traditional tenure long after they had moved away. Even prior to the land reforms of the nineteen nineties which have promoted private tenure in many African countries, informal land markets had come into being, with various land sales and rental arrangements. Single season rentals are common in many places because of traditional tenure regimes which would risk allocating use rights to longer term users, (Odgaard 2002).

Mobility continues to be the primary risk reduction and income diversification option for those able to take advantage of it, in practice those who have the economic or social capital facilitating long or short term resettlement. Community offers limited security of entitlements for some people, depending on their capacity to realise claims through rights to use or inheritance, as well as to access forms of relational entitlement to informal social support (Guyer 2004). Where claims are subject to marketisation, access to land cannot be guaranteed and even the very poor may have to opt for seasonal renting. High levels of migration out of rural areas and a thriving urban informal sector orients African economies towards major cities, which are in turn oriented towards centres of global capital. Links and entitlements conserved through membership of community can fuel, as in Kenya, incommensurable conflict between those with differential entitlements (Hyden 2008: 16; Nugent 2010). Meanwhile, livelihood and income strategies are ever more spatially dispersed and multiple as people seek opportunities to generate cash income (Bryceson 2002). Governments’ efforts to keep people in place and limit mobility have in the main been unsuccessful, despite attempted prohibitions of movement or restriction on urban settlement and trade. International
migration within and beyond Africa is rising\textsuperscript{19}. While this has implications for the remittances which now comprise a substantial proportion of GDP for countries such as Ghana, the possibility of exit for members of the elite, who potentially have a stake in reform works against challenges to the organisation of the system (Hirschmann 1978; Birdsall 2007: 589; Unsworth 2010: 19; Eriksen 2005: 403; Hyden 2008: 19)\textsuperscript{20}. The practical result of the large-scale restructuring of rural livelihoods and new forms of differentiation are overlapping systems through which social entitlements are organised relationally, on the one hand the formal division between central and local government incorporating ‘community’ structures and, on the other, an increasingly marketised system of access to resources which permits the long and short-term mobility of persons who are in effect redistributed with differential claims and differential entitlements (Roitman 2005).

Rural differentiation is accentuated by the options for mobility, with investors moving in to rent productive lands and displacing poorer residents while the very poor are unable to move to seek other opportunities. If poor households are unable to move towards improved opportunities it is not unusual for household members to be redistributed, through extended visiting and the fostering of children (Madhavan 2004; Lockwood 1998). These practices are acknowledged in the design of the South African child support grant which is payable to the carer of the child, whatever their relationship, on the principle that the ‘grant follows the child’ and that children are likely to live for long or short periods of time with people other than their parents. Community as a political institution is far removed from the neo-traditionalist fantasy of reciprocal social capital as a community resource, but a highly differentiated collectivity of persons with different entitlements and one in which families and households may have their strongest relations with persons in other communities, perhaps in other regions (Bevan 2004). Its continued entrenchment as the foundation through which entitlements are negotiated consolidates a \textit{de facto} system of encompassing inequality founded on the concentration of entitlements and the dispersal of persons.

\subsection*{3.4 Regional agenda}

Recent policy reforms and political reordering across and beyond the continent accentuates these processes of restructuring. Decentralisation implemented as part of governance reform packages in many countries has strengthened the legitimacy of community tiers of governance at the same time as re-formalising the allocation of social responsibility onto lower levels of government (Tendler 2002; Laird 2007). Neoliberal policy imaginaries which seek to ‘refigure the territory of government’ (Rose 1996) in developing country settings find pre-existing structures readily compatible with imported ideas of community and responsibility. The community is not so much refigured in this evolution of policy as reinstated as the primary organisational form for the allocation and resourcing of social entitlements.

Despite claims by some analysts that these processes represent as convergence of policy across north and south through the dissemination of policy instruments associated

---

\textsuperscript{19} One in ten African citizens will live in countries other than their own by 2025. Of the 150 million estimated migrants in the world one third come from African states (African Union 2008 22).

\textsuperscript{20} Botswana is the exception that proves the rule in this context. According to Pitcher et al, the fact that Botswana’s elites invested in their home country through cattle ranching gave them a stake in core elements of state stability, such as effective property rights (2009: 147).
with neoliberalisation (Peck 2011: 167), there are important divergences between Euro-American instantiations of neoliberal governing and the outcome of donor-driven reform processes in Africa. While notions of community, devolution and responsibility populate the discourses of social policy as social development - that is as institutional reform for poverty reduction (Caroll 2009)\(^2\), along with new organisational forms of civil society as proxy for community, forms of citizenship are differently configured. In Central, West and East African states the individual’s membership of a household within a community provides access to entitlements in a fixed location. Access to the entitlements held by other communities can only be achieved on the basis of differential membership. Community refers here not to a shifting aggregation of individuals who must institutionally organise responsibly for the delivery of goods and services in a place, but to a formally fixed relation between persons and place. This principle of political organisation confronted with practical mobility as social security renders mobility politically contentious, at the same time as revealing the differential bases of a localised social citizenship within and between countries.

At the same time as locality persists as the basis of rural entitlement, albeit mediated through market mechanisms such as renting, mobility is enthusiastically embraced by policy elites as a driver of economic opportunity. National integration into globalisation through regional economic communities is accelerating, along with the political significance of the African Union (Deacon 2010). Commitment to regional economic integration presents an inequitable mix of opportunities and risks, especially for the poor. These include encroachments on productive agricultural land and pasture from citizens of neighbouring states, mass displacement due to foreign investment, as in Southern Ethiopia, and competition for limited numbers of formal sector jobs. As has been the case in the health sector (Massey 2007; Connell et al 2009), enhanced labour mobility for skilled workers is likely to accelerate the loss of core staff from failing and recession bound states, furthering inequalities between states and, as in South Africa, the possibility of ethnic violence.

The orientation of the regional agenda towards greater mobility is to be expected. Regional trans state authorities as forms of emergent governance supporting the interests of the transnational corporate sector seek policy solutions which facilitate the mobility of capital and labour across national borders. The African Union makes the case for the creation of an integrated regional economic space which “has a potential market of 900 million people and a natural resource base of unique dimensions and diversity, unsurpassed by any other continent” (2008: 41). As Kapferer remarks of the similar orientation of the European Union, on which the African ventures are modelled, “The market is its transcendent ideal and gives it ontological direction. This direction has minimal interest in control over persons (except through the dictates of the market) or control over territory (other than that defined by consumption)” (2005: 291).

\(^2\) For a good description of the differences between the various socials see Kanbur (2005). Perhaps without meaning to Kanbur shows that social development is imagined quite differently to social policy, as a set of policies concerned with institutional reform in order to yield poverty reduction outcomes such policies do not necessarily conform to the expectations of social policy in terms of instruments or organisation. Civil society promotion for example and participation can be perceived as social development not because they are redistributive but because they conform to the implicit theory of development through accountability which improves service delivery. For an account of social development as a policy determined discipline see Green (2005).
4. New approaches to social protection in Africa?

Policy discourses around regionalisation and the possibility of social policy represent change, as well as continuity, in African development. The most significant aspect is the up fronting of a concept of social policy as involving state intervention on a demarcated social through core instruments of rights, redistribution and regulation (Deacon 2010). This articulation of social policy is intended to contrast with the indirect instruments approach promoted through social risk management and indeed the Bank’s definition of social development as an effect of dispersed institutional reform creating accountable governance (Kanbur 2005; De Haan 2007). The African Union Social Policy Framework advocates cash transfer mechanisms as social protection instruments and as a means of effecting social policy outcomes, while at the same time retaining a commitment to supporting ‘community’ and strengthening African family institutions. It does not set out the kinds of legal instruments or the institutional system which would guarantee a rights-based approach to social welfare. More fundamentally, the lack of clarity in the framework concerning the mobility of entitlements and failure to take into account the land issue and the huge risks posed by regionalisation severely limit its potential to bring about an effective paradigm shift in social policy for the poorest in the twenty-first century.

The extent to which the welfare imaginaries espoused in the Framework will be taken up by national governments is debatable. Relations between AU structures and national governments, complicated by the intermediate layer of sometimes overlapping sub-regional associations, remain uncertain (Deacon et al 2008; Tavares 2009). Social policy and the organisation of the social appear relatively unchallenged in the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of Southern Africa. Here, after the victory of the ANC, norms of social citizenship once reserved for the white citizen were extended to become more encompassing, through an expansion of the means tested old age pension, disability and child support grants to all South Africans (Lund 2008).

Amending the social basis of citizenship in South Africa has not been accomplished simply through widening the web of beneficiaries and making inroads into bifurcation, but through commitment to the institutionalisation of the social as a core activity of the state. This has involved establishing new architectures for the organisation of social welfare, the integration of social policy into government policy through the recently established national planning commission, the creation of a national Social Security agency for the disbursement of grants, and the utilisation of legal instruments to enshrine social entitlement as an attribute of citizenship. South African capacity to restructure the social and state capacity to address it owes much to the industrial basis of the national economy. Political relations are also important. Strong unionisation along with social activism through the struggle against apartheid created the political space in which social sector reform was not merely optional, but a necessity (Matisonn & Seekings 2002) and in which the promotion of an inclusive national identity overrode the dubious legitimacy of the community based entitlements in the form of Bantustans created by the apartheid regime.

22 The Framework states under recommended actions for agriculture, ‘Review the land tenure system and actively promote the expansion of mechanised agriculture’ (208 28).
23 The Framework views regional integration and a necessary precondition for growth and social policy.

Regional integration remains the best paradigm for responding to the challenges of globalization and liberalisation (200841).
Limited forms of community entitlement persist within the current system through the land policy which gives communities control over areas deemed to fall under communal tenure regimes (Cousins 2007). The South African land law and its process of reform since the end of apartheid are highly contested, as conflicting principles of access, allocation and rights to alienate land are brought within the ambit of an inclusive national law. What differentiates Southern Africa from other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is the fact that access to communal land is additional to other entitlements to which all citizens have access. The extent of South Africa’s transformation should not be exaggerated. Entitlements to support remain organised on the basis of established notions of the deserving poor and categories of legitimate dependants, hence adult men and women, unless they are disabled or carers of children, are not entitled to state support. Working age adults are expected to be self supporting irrespective of the extremely high rates of unemployment, which are most severe in rural areas. This results in a situation where large numbers of South African adults depend on the social allowances of pensioners with whom they live and where people with AIDS may refuse treatment in order to maintain their T cell count at a level which guarantees their ongoing categorisation as disabled and hence as entitled to benefit (Robins 2008).

4.1 Conditionalities and Co-responsibilities

Attempts to transform the social and entitlements for citizens have been less far reaching in Central, West and Eastern Africa. Ongoing initiatives to promote a portfolio of social protection instruments as part of policy interventions aimed at reducing vulnerability and risk mitigation have resulted in the circulation of a range of policy templates in Sub-Saharan Africa centring on what have come to be termed ‘social cash transfers’. This dissemination effort is accelerated by political support for enhanced south to south learning inspired by the apparent success of Latin American social policy reforms including the extension of social welfare in Brazil, the Mexican government’s conditional cash transfer programme and Chile Solidario. These initiatives are interesting not only for their social welfare effects, but for the design of social assistance interventions within neo liberal policy frames (Peck 2011) and their strongly moral orientation to be achieved through such design features as conditionality, targeting and duration of support. Attempts to use conditionalities to ensure that programme beneficiaries, generally women, adopt behavioural changes, along with encouragement to save and become entrepreneurial, demonstrate the explicit aspiration of such programming extends beyond the simple transfer of cash to the transfer of values believed to foster the creation of ‘social self reliance’ (Molyneux 2008: 793).

Whereas some countries in Latin America have integrated social cash transfer programmes within large-scale government reforms aimed at establishing the social as a sector where human development impacts can be managed (Molyneux 2008), this is not occurring in most Sub-Saharan African states which are characterised by small-scale pilot programmes depending on donor funding (as in Zambia and Kenya) where

---

24 About the scope and success of various programmes, such as the Kalomo Social Cash Transfer Programme in Zambia promoted by GTZ, the DFID supported LEAP programme in the Gambia and the Ethiopia Productive Safety Nets Programme (see below).

25 It is also accelerated by what Peck calls ‘fast policy’, the increased pace of policy making and globalisation through ‘best practice’ and international networking among donor financed policy elites (2002; 2011).
programme emphasis is on the reach of the instrument, such as cash transfers, rather than on the refurging of social citizenship or reorganisation of the state. One of the largest and longest established social cash transfer programme in Africa the Productive Safety Nets Programme in Ethiopia is a case in point. PNSP became operational in 2005. Its aim was to provide predicable ongoing livelihood security for residents of a proportion of woreda (local government units) who had previously been regular recipients of emergency food aid. The programme is managed by the Ministries of Agriculture and Food Security and financed through a multiple donor basket fund, to which the World Bank is a major contributor.

PNSP owes much in its conceptualisation and design to the imaginative universe of managing social risk in which mitigation doubles up as a ‘springboard’ of entrepreneurial opportunity and hence a future free of poverty, except for the ‘vulnerable groups’ who, unable to be productive in their own right, count as legitimate dependents (see Fraser & Gordon 1984). Ideological commitment to the legitimacy of ‘safety nets’ only if they are productive provides the PNSP rationale of social enterprise in preference to social assistance. Beneficiaries must work in order to get access to benefits, in the form of cash or grain. As PNSP is designed to promote beneficiary responsibility and productivity, it prohibits the open ended reliance on external support that would constitute ‘dependency’. Successive engagement with the programme after a number of years is not permitted because not only would this encourage dependency, but successful beneficiaries, according to the programme logic of self reliance which transcends structural poverty, are expected to have ‘graduated’ out of poverty.

PNSP is an institutional hybrid, combining elements of standard food security interventions with the ethical principles of ‘welfare reform’ (Peck 2011). The programme is innovative in important respects, in promoting the medium of cash where possible rather than food, and in its longer term approach to addressing insecurity but it is far from radical. In contrast to employment guarantee schemes in India, access to which are enshrined in law as a right of all citizens as individuals, access to PNSP is not a right deriving from national citizenship. It is an aid programme with partial coverage of a proportion of Ethiopia’s districts providing support to selected households. Access to entitlements depends on residence and emplacement within communities. Support through PNSP is devolved through community allocation mechanisms which identify the vulnerable as those deserving of assistance the delineation of eligibility on the basis of ‘vulnerability’ criteria and access to workfare opportunities. In so doing the programme reinforces the political institution of woreda as community and as the basis of entitlements for rural populations. PNSP consolidates rather than confronts the bifurcated basis of social entitlement in Ethiopia.

4.2 Strengthening community as social contract

Elements of the design of PNSP, including conditional cash transfers and community targeting of vulnerable households, are fast becoming commonplace in a number of donor supported national and sub national social protection programmes in Africa. Some of these, including the Ethiopia programme (Hailu 2010), are situated within donor promoted social protection strategies, as with the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme in Ghana. Not all countries have committed to social

---

26 World Bank technical inputs contributed to the design of the programme.
protection frameworks as national policy. This does not mean that new design principles, supported by World Bank credits, are not influencing development programming. Tanzania, for example, has redesigned its Social Action Fund into a Productive Safety Nets Programme, complete with conditional cash transfers and public works, without yet signing up to a social protection strategy. The GTZ initiated Kalomo pilot social cash transfer scheme in Zambia has been scaled out into a national programme, building on the existing Public Welfare Assistance System of which a key component are the Community Welfare Assistance Committees responsible for targeting the ten percent of the poorest households (Chiwele 2010:5).

The extension of such programmes is claimed by some as amounting to a kind of revolution in social assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is not in fact the case. Not only do such interventions inscribe existing institutional and authority mechanisms around community through practices of targeting, along with strict delineation of boundaries between the deserving and undeserving poor, they are not part of broader efforts to transform social policy, the constitution of citizenship or the organisation of states. Social assistance interventions along these lines provide temporary safety nets on an ad hoc basis to a proportion of households by virtue of their association with communities as political institutions. These are specifically rural support mechanisms, founded on the idea of fixed households whose orientation is towards a sustainable income from agriculture. This conceptualization is reflected in the location of the PNSP in Ethiopia, across the Ministries of Agriculture and Food Security.

The basis of such programmes on rural self sustainability seems at odds with global changes in smallholder agriculture (Rigg 2006). Not only are more rural people seeking lives and livelihoods in towns and cities, income sources are likely to be dispersed across locations and regions. Rural dwellers mix farm and off farm income, migrate for short term labour opportunities and hope for remittances from absent kin (Ellis 2003). Labour is predominately individualised and marketised, creating small scale income opportunities for some at the expense of their own production, while increasing production costs for those who must hire labour even for household production (Berry 1993). This is why economically vulnerable households, who are the most food insecure, are those with fewer able bodied persons or the absence of extra household social ties which would provide a means of on farm support. Access to land, as distinct from ownership, remains negotiable through a diverse tenure regimes supported by state land policies which cede use rights rather than ownership to communities but which are overlaid by newer arrangements for long term leasing, between states and outsiders and for the private sales of various sorts of use rights. If land is indeed constituted as the de facto basis of the social contract between rural people and the state, as Boone (2007) and Nugent (2010) assert, then augmenting people’s ability to live on that land, albeit temporarily, supports this, and with it the fiction of the sustainable rural community as the bedrock of African social organisation.

27 A social protection strategy was drafted in 2008 but not approved by the government which is reluctant to get involved in long term financial commitments from own revenue. The design document for TASAF 3, dated April 2012, implies that the strategy is shortly to be approved by Government.
5. Ineffective states and social policy

Community as proxy for ‘the social’ is not simply the focus of a set of policies directed at supporting rural livelihoods; ideas of community inform programming through social funds which devolve small grants to local authorities for investment in community infrastructure, as well as programming which is oriented towards civil society support. Social funds, like conditional cash transfers, are a policy instrument originally incubated in the development banks of Latin America and globally exported (Tendler 2000; 2002). In operation for over two decades they have become part of the adapted architecture of African states, combining community infrastructure development with public works rather than the Latin American employment creation programmes. In countries such as Tanzania, social action funds have been used to providing an infrastructure support fund to decentralisation programmes (Lange 2007) with project selection devolved to district level. Core principles of responsibility and participation drive the organisation of social fund interventions, which are co financed through ‘community contributions’ in the form of cash, materials and labour. In line with the discursive slippage between local as community and social, investments made through Social Funds are assumed to have social impact because they are made in communities. The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) in its first two phases has predominantly contributed to the repair and building of village dispensaries and schools (Braathen 2004). Social funds thus contribute to the realization of community as institution and hence to the governance template of state society relations. Social funds as a way of enacting the social in development co produce community and the ineffectiveness of state capacity for social policy.

Social funds in Latin America have to some extent been superseded by new social protection programmes. These take forward core social fund principles of community, responsibility and participation devolving responsibility to individuals as beneficiaries as self reliant subjects (Molyneux 2008). This continuity is not accidental. The World Bank is a principal provider of finance for both types on interventions, along with the ideological rationale for programmatic interventions around ‘social risk management’. Similar transitions are underway in some countries in Africa, including Tanzania, where the Social Action Fund’s Third Phase, commencing in 2012, will implement a conditional cash transfer programme combined with sensitisation training for beneficiaries, mostly female, who will be placed on a new national register of poor households.

The segueing of social funds into social protection is also intellectual, an effect of the constitution of the policy imaginary around the organisation of developing country societies in which households, families and communities bear the burden of social reproduction in rural areas, produce enough to meet consumption needs and organise work and responsibilities around a hard working male household head and a female carer. This model is realized through the knowledge generation practises of international development which quantify households, as in economics, or assume communities as in the participatory methodologies designed to represent them. It is institutionalised through the kinds of interventions which support these social forms. The promotion of the status quo of reformed post colonial states built around colonial welfare templates has important consequences for states and societies in Africa south of the Sahara. States capacities to use direct instruments to achieve social welfare outcomes for citizens remain compromised. State society relations are also affected. States lack of social
commitment and continued calls for community and individual self reliance works against popular commitment to taxation as establishing a relation between contributions and entitlement. State power is experienced as extractive and where social programmes are in place they are associated with donors. Shopworkers in a Zambian superstore look to their South African employer for access to social rights, rather than to the Zambian government (Miller 2005).

5.1 Conclusion: Governance, Politics and Social Citizenship

The policies of leading donors continue to define the space for social action, a space in which social is equated with community and where responsibly can be allocated. As Peck and others have remarked, these approaches to policy making align with neoliberal concerns about small states and responsibility, accommodating accompanying theorisations about decentralisation, social capital and the role of civil society (Tendler 2002). Community development through decentralisation supports the good governance agenda ideologically, establishing locally accountable governance and hence strengthening a kind of citizenship which is predominantly fiscal rather than political or social. This is clearly evident in current trends in development programming around social accountability which are being merged in interesting ways with the social protection agenda, as in the state of Andhra Pradesh social accountability intervention in relation to the Indian employment guarantee scheme. Indian citizens who have a legal right to participate in the programme can monitor contract allocation, spending on public works and hold contractors personally to account (Aiyar & Samji 2009).

The idea of social accountability promoted here ties together notions of social as community as a collectivity of beneficiaries with governance notions of financial accountability. Programme managers are personally accountable to citizen beneficiaries for the implementation of the programme. What is being promoted here is not political accountability. Citizens are not engaging on issues of policy or politics but as beneficiaries or customers as receivers of services in narrow financial terms of personal fiscal responsibility. The space of accountability here is not defined as a political space, i.e. as the negotiated outcome of political dialogue and contestation around normative expectations on social welfare. The social is once again conceptualised as community and good policy presented as a matter of governance not an outcome of politics. Citizenship is construed within this reforming space as fiscal.

Citizenships take multiple forms. In the contemporary United States, for example, ideas of citizenship as civil and political, that is as prioritising concerns with rights of individuals over property and to participate in democratic process, take precedence over the conceptualisation of social citizenship as a right to a basic level of livelihood (Fraser & Gordon 1992). Development policy in recent years has been preoccupied with restricted notions of citizenship as political and civil. Assumptions that better governance, democratisation and individualised property rights would lead to increases in human welfare have proved unfounded. As recognised by Latin American states, redistributive

---

28 Janet Roitman uses this kind of idea in relation to popular action around the fiscal practices of government but not in quite the way I am proposing here. In the example she uses of Cameroon, citizens refuse to pay tax as an act of fiscal disobedience and hence of political citizenship. What is promoted in these new donor programmes is the opposite, the attempt to reframe the citizen as customer monitoring value for money or fairness in relation to individual recipients, not in relation to a wider social project. This could be possibly be termed 'audit citizenship'.
institutions are necessary to address the challenges of rising inequality, falling producer prices and globalisation. Ideas about citizenship and entitlement are politically constituted. They are the outcome of struggles and contestations (see Skocpol 1992). The increasing attention to social citizenship in Latin America and India is an outcome of political struggles to change the relation between society and the state to ensure greater protection for citizens, an achievement not of international development policy transfer but of situated political society.

Programming within a narrow governance paradigm has not only failed to analyse how states are organised in Africa. In privileging a fiscal citizenship which conflates financial with political accountability it has failed to consolidate the kinds of relationships between civil and political citizenship which could strengthen political society (Chatterjee 2004) and hence facilitate social claim making. If such gaps are to be addressed through research and policy a starting point has to be increased attention to the ways in which actual states are organised in relation to services and policy delivery, and to the ways in which relations between states and citizens are constituted.
References


Berry, S 1993 No Condition is Permanent. The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.


Green, M. & Lawson, V. (2011) Recentring Care, interrogating the commodification of care, *Social & Cultural Geography*, 12;


The Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre

The Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) aims to improve the use of governance research evidence in decision-making. Our key focus is on the role of state effectiveness and elite commitment in achieving inclusive development and social justice.

ESID is a partnership of highly reputed research and policy institutes based in Africa, Asia, Europe and North America. The lead institution is the University of Manchester. The other founding institutional partners are:

- BRAC Development Institute, BRAC University, Dhaka
- Institute for Economic Growth, Delhi
- Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Malawi, Zomba
- Center for Democratic Development, Accra
- Centre for International Development, Harvard University, Boston

In addition to its institutional partners, ESID has established a network of leading research collaborators and policy/uptake experts.