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China in Africa:

Impacts and prospects for accountable development

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Abstract

China is the major ‘new’ player in Africa and impacts on development and politics in numerous ways. The paper sets out an analytical framework which identifies the channels through which China engages with African development and the role the African state plays in mediating these interactions. We then apply this framework to three case studies that are emblematic of differing African state types. Analysis shows that China impacts on African development in multiple ways that go well beyond aid. A feature of this engagement is inter-elite brokerage which tends to bypass domestic channels of accountability and so undermines good governance. That said, in most cases it delivers much needed infrastructure which benefits wider society. Crucially, as civil and political society in Africa has started to contest this elitism we are seeing slightly more transparent attempts to negotiate the relationship. It concludes with an outline of emerging trends and future research themes for the short- to medium-term.

Keywords

China, Africa, governance, development, aid, state, elites, accountability.

Acknowledgements

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1. Introduction: Asian Drivers and effective states

Development cooperation is changing as rising power donors (re)enter the fray. While a growing body of evidence explores some of the economic trends (e.g. UNCTAD 2007), we know little about the impacts of new (and predominantly Asian) drivers of development on state capacity-building and elite commitment to development in poor countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is a key site given existing problems of economic development and governance, but crucially it is emerging as a strategic region in terms of resource access, trade, investment, aid and migration (Alden 2007). Of the rising Asian countries China remains the largest player in Africa, and for this reason is the main focus of this paper (Brautigam 2009). India is growing in importance (Naidu 2008, Vines 2010, Mawdsley and McCann 2011) and shares many of the characteristics, but not scale, of China. This report reviews the existing evidence on China's engagement with Africa and maps out a future research agenda in this area.

Over the past decade Africa has gained in international importance and the Chinese are among a number of rapidly industrialising nations that see the continent in strategic economic and political terms (Carmody 2011). Moyo (2009: 120) argued that the emergence of China is a ‘golden opportunity’ for Africa offering the continent a ‘win-win’ alternative to the scenario of an ‘aid-dependent economy’ by focusing instead on trade and investment and by providing the infrastructure that will enable Africa to ‘move up the development curve’ (Moyo 2009: 122). This ideal of ‘help for self help’ is underpinned by an accompanying discourse of development ‘cooperation’ rather than aid and donor-recipient relations (Rampa and Bilal 2011).

While Moyo (ibid.) is one of the optimists the pessimists focus on the aid-governance nexus where the Chinese are accused by some of unscrupulous behaviour that undermines good governance (Manning 2006, Phillips 2006, Tull 2006, Naim 2007). Some (Marks 2006, Trofimov 2007) have taken this focus on aid further to argue that China is essentially a neo-colonial power, where African resources are ‘plundered’ by Beijing which cements the long standing uneven division of labour between Africa and the rest of the world. In some ways the ‘China threat’ in Africa reflects a more general concern about China’s challenge to US hegemony (Campbell 2008).

The political effects of China in Africa

While we noted that most analysis of China in Africa has focused on the economic ties, and where studies dealt with governance (e.g. Broadman 2007) it is in function of enabling smoother flows of trade and investment. Recently there have been some attempts to analyse the politics of these relationships. Tull (2006) concludes his piece by arguing that ‘China’s massive return to Africa presents a negative political development’ (p. 476) and his thesis usefully examines this in broad political economy terms – something I return to below.

The tendency of China to exacerbate African governance problems is seen by some as an extension of China’s own lack of concern for human rights and accountability at home – the Chinese export the capitalism they know best (Alden 2007, Henderson 2008). In terms of putting Chinese aid in the wider context of ‘older’ donors, Dreher et al (2010:
18) point out that new donors ‘do not generally exhibit a stronger bias against better governed countries’, the corollary being that older donors, despite their criticisms of China, have also been willing to support corrupt and authoritarian states.

Although there have been useful contributions over the past few years as better data has emerged (e.g. Brautigam 2009), they still tend to attribute the power to China at the expense of Africa. For example, the ‘Asian Drivers’ agenda (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008), which we adapt later, is premised on a conflation of all Asian countries as sharing some essential characteristics and that they do the ‘driving’, which denies African agency in this relationship. This is echoed in Carmody et al’s (2011) analysis of Chinese ‘geogovernance’ in Zambia which argues that the Chinese state projects its power into Africa as part of broader goal of shaping globalization, although they are among the few analysts to factor in African political agency (see also Large 2009, Haglund 2009).

Meeting the ESID agenda
The concern with new donors in Africa feeds directly into a number of key ESID concerns.

- Primarily it is about the transnational politics of development and how a set of actors have risen in prominence over the past decade. Not only do they provide alternatives for the recipients of aid, but the competitive footing of these actors means that reducing the role of aid in international engagements is a possibility. The potential downside of this for African states is the pursuit of strategic minerals and energy could simply reinforce unaccountable elites with few benefits spreading to the wider population.

- This issue of growth and investment covers another ESID agenda around the politics of accumulation since debate exists around whether these new actors simply strengthen a subordinate position for African economies in a global division of labour or whether they bring opportunities for African businesses.

- The analysis in this report also hinges on the interconnections between multiple actors on the Chinese side and a disaggregated view of African states. Hence, this is a relational analysis looking at the agencies of both Chinese and African actors within and beyond the state. That said the bilateral and elite nature of this engagement has implications for elite commitments to development.

- The report is also analytical and uses theoretical insights for this analysis rather than just mapping activities.

The key questions are:

1. What are the emerging and potential impacts of China in Africa on the interconnected processes of (a) more effective and accountable forms of governance for development and (b) elite commitment to development?

2. How can these relationships be subject to systematic investigation? What are the existing gaps and key research priorities in this field?
Structure and argument
The report starts by setting out an analytical framework which identifies the channels through which China engages with African development. To avoid seeing these channels as dominated by Chinese agendas we use work around the African state to produce an analytical grid that factors in domestic politics. We then look at the actual impacts on governance by applying this framework to three case studies, although other cases are mentioned. The cases are selected as emblematic of the African state types identified in the framework and are not intended to be an exhaustive review of all African cases. We conclude with an outline of emerging trends and future research themes for the short-to-medium-term.

The argument is that China impacts on African development in multiple ways that go well beyond the western focus on aid. On one hand we have to be much more aware of the multiple interests and actors on the Chinese side combined with an awareness of African agency on the other. Unpacking the African state and analysing the arenas where Chinese and African actors come together is crucial to this, although good quality data on these political sites is sparse. However, a common trait of this engagement is inter-elite brokerage which has tended to bypass domestic channels of debate and accountability and so tends to undermine good governance. That said, in most cases it delivers much needed infrastructure which benefits wider society and so could kick start economic growth that in turn might spread benefits. Crucially, as civil society and political processes in Africa have started to contest this elitism and Chinese practices we are seeing slightly more transparent attempts to negotiate the relationship though these are relatively ad hoc and nascent. Moreover China’s entry to Africa is also though independent businesses who lie outside of Chinese state direction and whose impacts on local development could be significant in terms of job creation, although their political involvement will be limited in the short-term.

2. Analytical framework

In this section I elaborate an analytical schema for assessing the political impacts of China’s development cooperation. It has two basic elements – the channels through which China impacts on domestic political processes based on an amended version of the framework developed by Kaplinsky and colleagues (e.g. Kaplinsky and Morris 2009, Kaplinsky 2008). As noted above this tends to downplay African political agency and in practice was used to examine economic trends and linkages rather than political aspects. To address this we use the work of Alden (2007) and Tull (2006) who have developed classificatory schema of African regime types to hypothesise the possible impacts of China on African politics.

Asian Drivers

The first element is identifying the channels of interaction and impact. The framework distinguishes different channels of impact transmission, the distinction between complementary and competitive impacts, and between direct and indirect impacts. These channels are contingent and change over time, and vary in significance depending on such things as location, resource endowment, trade links, and geo-strategic significance. Six key channels stand out in importance: trade links, investment flows (FDI and portfolio investments), aid, governance, flows of migrants, and
environmental spillovers. I will elaborate on each of these below. As a heuristic it is also important to stress that these channels are clearly not discrete.

**Table 1: A framework for assessing the impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa**

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<th>Channel</th>
<th>Complementary</th>
<th>Competitive</th>
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(Source: Kaplinsky 2008)

In each of these channels of interaction, there will be a mixture of complementary and competitive impacts. For example, with regard to trade, China may both provide cheap inputs and consumer goods to sub-Saharan Africa and be a market for African exports. On the other hand, imports from China can displace local producers. In relation to FDI, China can be a direct source of inward FDI into sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps crowd-in FDI into Africa from third countries as parts of extended global value chains. These are complementary impacts. But China may also compete with other economies for global FDI.

In terms of thinking through the developmental and political impacts the key aspect of these interactions is the ‘for whom’ component. Countries may be affected differentially – in some cases, for example, the export of fabrics from China to Africa may feed productively into a vibrant clothing and textile value chain; in other cases, it may displace a country’s exports and production for the domestic market. However, these effects are not just felt at the national level, but affect groups within countries differentially. For example, cheap clothing imports from China may displace clothing and textile workers, but cheapen wage goods and hence reduce wage costs for producers in other sectors. These impacts on a complementary-competitive axis may also change over time, and most importantly, they will vary for different classes, regions and groups within economies.

The complementary-competitive axis of impacts is generally quite well recognised and understood. Less widely acknowledged is the distinction between direct and indirect impacts, partly because indirect impacts are difficult to measure. Indirect impacts occur in third country markets and institutions. For example, China’s trade with the US may open or foreclose the opportunities for African economies to export into that market. Similarly, China’s high savings rate has had the effect of lowering global interest rates, indirectly facilitating investment in Africa. As in the case of the complementary/competitive access, the impact of the direct and indirect impacts can be gauged either at the country level, or at intra-national levels. Yet impacts are not just conditioned by the needs of the Chinese actors ‘driving’ this process, but are realised relationally through the ways in which these channels interact with African states and societies.
Making sense of the African state

The second element is the nature of the political system with which these channels interact, which is largely but not exclusively a state-centred issue given the bilateral and elite nature of the way China engages with Africa (Taylor 2006, 2007). Carmody and Taylor (2010) use the term ‘flexigemony’ to try and capture the more dynamic interactions between China and a differentiated landscape of African politics. For them flexigemony denotes how ‘Chinese actors adapt their strategies to suit the particular histories and geographies of the African states with which they engage’ (p.497). From an African perspective, the ‘emerging’ powers give recipient countries some leverage, what has been termed the ‘revival of triangulation’ (Large 2008). On the face of it China’s interests do not radically alter the role Africa plays in the global division of labour (Tull 2006) but what is interesting to analyse is whether individual African states are able to harness this hegemonic rivalry for their own ends. How can we conceptualise African state agency?

Much of the 1970s Marxist theory on the peripheral state dealt with the question of the state’s autonomy from international capital and its ability to engender autonomous national development (Leys 1996) and so remain relevant for our analysis of Asia in Africa. It is important to realise that capital is fragmented – through firms, sectors – and international capital is never completely ‘external’ since it combines with fragments of local capital, through joint ventures or supply chains.

While the Marxian position on the relationship between capital and the state determines certain structural possibilities for state autonomy they are less able to focus on the actual dynamics of state/society interactions and the enactment of politics. Here the work of Hagmann and Peclard (2010) is instructive in seeking to “understand how local, national and transnational actors forge and remake the state through processes of negotiation, contestation and bricolage” (p. 544). Their ‘analytic of statehood’ is about the dynamic and always undetermined, but not random, process of state (de)construction which is a multi-level phenomenon. Their heuristic framework comprises diverse actors, many of whom lie outside formal political structures and the resources and repertoires they deploy in shaping their political authority. The process of negotiation takes place in particular political spaces called ‘arenas’ which are simultaneously social, temporal and spatial and often hard to locate and delimit. More focused and formalised processes occur at ‘negotiating tables’. Such politics is also historically conditioned, with previous rounds of negotiation or stabilization of a social contract shaping the playing field for subsequent negotiations. Doornbos (2010) rightly cautions against universalisation of the idea of ‘negotiation’ because there are many instances in African politics of ‘negation’, something Nugent (2010) captures in his idea of the ‘coercive social contract’.

In order to systematically analyse the relationships between Chinese channels of engagement and African polities we can use the typologies generated by Alden (2007). Alden sets out a broad typology of states - pariah states, illiberal regimes and weak democracies, and democratic countries with diversified economies. Tull (2006) also focuses on three groups of states – democratising, mineral-rich and post-conflict – which cover some of Alden’s concerns. Alden’s schema has an implicit scaling of democratisation and his first two groups are essentially resource rich states. Moreover, post-conflict tells us little about the underlying political-economy and really covers whether China has a peace-keeping role which is less about the relationality of the process.
With **pariah partnerships** China is seen as a source of stability and provider of FDI and development assistance which is denied by other avenues. Examples are Chad, Sudan and Zimbabwe, with Angola dropping in and out. We will explore the details below, but these cases show that while the Chinese will pursue interests in the face of glaring governance and rights abuses there are times when they draw the line for pragmatic reasons or through international pressure. So, it is wrong to characterise the Chinese as endlessly cynical in such cases.

The **illiberal regimes with weak democracy** cover much of the rest of SSA, but notably include Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia. The relationships with the Chinese are brokered at elite levels to access strategic resources. But at the same time Chinese investments are more diverse and so bring much needed FDI and development aid, but this can compete with indigenous firms which can cause conflict. There are also strong ties between political elites and leading local firms so that foreign investments can proceed relatively quickly compared to states with stronger and more accountable institutions. In these states the Chinese are willing to secure leverage via self-aggrandising symbolic infrastructure projects which impact on regime legitimacy.

The **democracies with diversified economies** are few and far between, but South Africa is the notable (and powerful) example. Alden includes Namibia, Botswana and Ghana though these are more debateable cases in terms of the diversification of their economies. In these states the relationship is complex and varies according to the local business interests and policy coherence of the state. There may be competition with local firms but the possibility exists for strategic guidance that could create more local benefits. Here local CSOs are more likely to exist and be able to voice dissent in policy arenas, which could effect the direction and nature of Chinese investment and aid.

Combining the two frameworks produces an analytical grid to track the political effects of the type that ESID is interested in.

**Table 2:** Political impacts framework

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<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Impacts by state type</th>
<th>Pariah states</th>
<th>Illiberal regimes and weak democracies</th>
<th>Democratic countries with diversified economies</th>
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Before analysing specific exemplar case studies we flesh out the six channels in more detail and assess aggregate trends at a continental scale.

**Trade**

Chinese trade with Africa stood at US$817 million in 1977 just before the major reforms that liberalized the Chinese economy, but from 2000 to 2009 bilateral trade rose from US$10.6 billion to US$91.07 billion (CAITEC 2010). In the first half of 2011, China-Africa imports and exports totaled US$79.01 billion, an increase of 29.1 per cent year-on-year.
China in Africa: Impacts and prospects for accountable development

In the same period revenues from China’s contracted and engineering projects in Africa rose from US$1.1 billion to US$28.1 billion (CAITEC, 2010). In Africa, these activities have translated differently in terms of aggregate gains and losses for the continent. African states have benefitted from commodity exports such as oil, minerals, cotton and logs; building of infrastructure, for example, transport and construction of public buildings which are a means of assuring social gains such as education and healthcare in the future; imports of machinery and auto-parts; and welfare gains from consumer imports from China. However, these Chinese imports also brought about losses due to the low quality products and competition. For example, the Chinese tend to import older equipment often resulting in lower quality production. Competition with local industries resulted in some closures of local enterprises and job losses, especially around clothing and textiles (Amankwah 2005). This in turn contributed to losses in export to third country markets and further capacity losses in terms of labour and management deskilling (Kaplinsky and Messner 2008).

As a means of stimulating trade and facilitating inward investment the Chinese have recently initiated a series of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) across Africa (Brautigam and Tang 2011). It is expected that these proposed SEZs will focus on value-added industries and provide liberalized investment environments for investors (China Economic Review 2010). According to Davies (2010:26), the zones will create employment opportunities and generate foreign exchange reserves through more diversified sources of income. Over the past four years, Chinese companies have been taking responsibility for designing, building and managing the planned zones: Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Zambia and possibly a sixth in Algeria (China Economic Review 2011). Companies operating in these zones have cumulatively invested US$920 million (CAITEC 2010). Although these zones are mainly invested in and built by Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs), their main occupants are small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), amounting to 85 per cent of the businesses (Tang and Zhang, 2011).

FDI
China’s direct investment in African countries reached $1.44 billion in 2009 (Han 2011), in which non-financial direct investment soared by 55.4 per cent from the previous year (China Daily 2010). In 2008, nearly 1,600 Chinese enterprises had started business in African countries (Wen 2009). Some 180 of these companies were spearheaded by the ‘going out’ policy and have been designated by the Chinese state to benefit from preferential finance, tax concessions and political backing in order to become true multinationals.

In terms of China and Africa one of the important differentiating factors is the scale and type of Chinese enterprise (Kragelund and Van Dijk 2009, Gu 2009). While we talk about packages of aid and investment it largely relates to the ties between key Chinese ministries, development banks and large SOEs (Hubbard 2008). These projects are often spatially enclaved with relatively few multipliers in the local economy or ‘deep’ linkages to local society (Ferguson 2006). By contrast we see Chinese private TNCs entering under ‘open’ commercial contracts, where they lack any of the protection afforded by the tying of loans to investment. And finally there are the myriad small Chinese private firms that date back, in some cases, to the colonial period (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009). Each type of firm has different levels of engagement with local capital, the state and society and we will explore these differences through our case studies.
A recent policy vehicle or enhancing FDI in Africa is the China-Africa Development Fund (CADFund) established under the 2006 Africa Policy. The CADFund is the first equity investment fund in China focusing on Africa (Tradeinvest Africa 2009). Other than providing funds for companies, CADFund provides various consultancy services and information sharing for investment in Africa, partner sourcing, finance structuring, and environmental and social issues (CADFund 2010). Its target industries and sectors are agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure and energy industries, natural resources, and – as noted above - industrial zones set up by Chinese firms. By the end of 2009, the CADFund had earmarked US$700 million for over 35 projects (CAITEC 2010).

Aid
One of the problems of assessing Chinese aid is that it is not measured in the same way as DAC aid (Glosny 2006, Lancaster 2007, Jacoby 2007, Kragelund 2008).and a lack of domestic transparency compounds the uncertainties, although the publication of an aid White Paper in April 2011 went some way to clarify these issues (Xinhua 2011). China does not separate Official Development Assistance from economic cooperation or investment as long as the intent is to expand local capacity. Respondents in Beijing used the famous analogy: ‘it is better to teach them how to fish’ as opposed to giving poor countries hand-outs as the West has been doing. This is much more about mutual benefit than a discourse of charity or of ‘catching up’ (King 2010). Moreover China pursues a principle of diverse forms of interaction or ‘multi-form and mutually-beneficial cooperation’ (Xinhua 2011).

Given these caveats Brautigam (2008) put Chinese aid worldwide in 2005 at US$970 million but World Bank estimates put the figure at US$2 billion whilst Lancaster (2007) estimated a figure of US$1.5-$2.0 billion. The 2011 Chinese White Paper on aid gave a breakdown of aid disbursement as of 2009 as 256.29 billion yuan of aid including 106.2 billion yuan in grants, 76.54 billion yuan in interest-free loans and 73.55 billion yuan in concessional loans (Xinhua 2011). Of the latter category – concessional loans – 61% went on economic infrastructure, 16.1% on industry, 8.9% on energy and resource development, 4.3% on agriculture and 3.2% on public facilities. In terms of geographical distribution 45.7% has gone to Africa, 32.8% to Asia, 12.7% to Latin America and The Caribbean, and 4% to Oceania. In terms of sector the Chinese have been much more focused on growth and productive investment as opposed to the less tangible institutional and governance reforms that might underpin economic development. Much is also given as technical cooperation. For example, according to the Chinese, China offered scholarships to nearly 16,000 Africans from 52 countries.

Many of the features of China’s contemporary aid giving were laid down during the Cold War period. Today, much of the aid is bilateral and delivered through three modes of grant aid, interest free loans, and concessional loans (Davies et al 2008). Aid is also project based (often turnkey) rather than sectoral or programme aid as encouraged by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Glosny 2006). Decision-making around aid usually involves the recipient country approaching China, either through the embassy or at a higher diplomatic level (Brautigam 2009). At the Chinese side there is a range of ministries responsible for aid and overseas investment (Sautman and Hairong 2007).

One of the contentious elements is that much of China’s aid and concessional lending is tied (Kragelund 2008). Hubbard (2008: 225) asserts that the Chinese insist that the Chinese contractor appointed by MOFCOM should ‘purchase and import from China as
much equipment, technology and services as possible’, which is similar to the earlier Japanese model. This goes against the OECD’s efforts to untie aid, although despite these efforts many DAC donors still have significant proportions of tied aid (Brautigam 2009). A similar issue is raised around export credits which are the preferred currency used by ExIm and potentially allow for more tying (Manning 2006), but Reisen and Ndoye’s (2008) study for the OECD suggests that China’s lending is not ‘imprudent’. As Dreher et al (2011) conclude ‘we find little reason to blame new donors for using aid as a means to promote commercial self-interest’ (p. 1961).

**Governance**

As we noted China’s engagement with Africa has often been reduced to a question of exacerbating governance issues. Yet China’s impacts on governance and politics are multi-layered. Given its insistence on ‘non-interference’ and a respect for sovereignty the Chinese would argue that they do not have a direct impact on African politics, yet even if this were true China can impact through multilateral institutions and, importantly, at the ideational level. We discuss these various channels in turn.

One of the key criticisms around China’s apparent insistence on non-interference concerns conditionality. Why China exorcises some commentators and activists is that it seemingly attaches no conditions to its loans and therefore undermines, ‘undercuts’ in Manning’s (2006) terms, the good works of western donors around governance, human rights and environmental protection (Naim 2007). Yet Dreher et al (2011) found relatively little difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ donors in terms of their aid allocating behaviour despite ideological differences alluded to by analysts. In particular, levels of corruption made little difference to either set of donors in allocating aid.

The Chinese defend their non-interference line in various ways, which usually fall back on evoking historical ties between China and Africa as well as a shared sense of injustice by the west (Xinhua 2008, Huang 2007). This reinforces the projected image that China is now ‘non-ideological’, since its concerns are commercial or altruistic.

The Chinese rarely emphasise issues of civil society or democratisation in their engagements with Africa. New analysis of aid data (Bermeo 2011) suggests that there is some correlation between the democratic orientation of the donor and the likelihood of democratic transition in the recipient country. This is useful analysis that needs deeper investigation around the precise mechanisms linking these observed trends. As we will see later in the case of Angola the mechanisms for financing development – some aid, some commercial loans – is brokered at elite levels which bypasses channels of accountability which might exacerbate problems with transparency.

While China publicly distances itself from internal political issues, the backlash against China’s role in Sudan has pushed China to weaken its ‘non-interference’ line and to become more involved in diplomacy (Large 2008, Carmody 2011). Holslag (2011) found that China is flexible and pragmatic in its political engagements with Africa. The question remains as to whether this weakening on non-interference is impacting on the ground in Africa in terms of China’s engagement with domestic governance and capacity issues. Additionally Glosny (2006) argues that the Chinese are aware they need to understand local institutional cultures to maximise the benefits from their interventions, something analysed in Eisenman’s (2008) study of the Communist Party of China’s International Department (CPC-ID). In essence through low-key activities by the CPC-ID in specific African countries the groundwork is laid for the wider commercial and political
engagements. While this is not the same as direct influence it suggests that the Chinese have a series of ‘quieter’ foreign policy mechanisms (Shambaugh 2007).

Secondly, China’s influence in Africa is also felt through its roles in multilateral organisations. Gu et al (2008) note that China’s role as an international actor has grown as a result of its economic rise. This occurs through a range of channels: its imports of energy and resources have shifted prices and ushered in a renewed period of geopolitical anxieties around security of supply; its currency reserves impact on other countries’ financial markets, notably – but not exclusively - the US; it is a significant player in the WTO and other trade and investment forums; and as a polluter it impacts on climate change.

In essence these are economic drivers with political effects but China also plays an increasing role in purposive political processes and institutions. While China still engages in bilateral diplomacy it is leading the way towards what some have argued is a multipolar world (Wade 2011) that will reduce the influence of the US-dominated unipolar order of the past 70 years. As Easley (2008) notes, Chinese foreign policy discourses are shifting as multilateralism is prioritized over concerns with anti-hegemonism and non-interference (which underpinned much of the Mao era) and as a new vision of a strong and globally engaged China (‘win-win’ diplomacy and ‘harmonious world’) starts to emerge. Some realists in the west view China as a zero-sum challenge and argue for a need to pre-emptively weaken China whereas liberals are more open to mutual gains for all (Ikenberry 2008).

As China engages with a wider set of global multilateral fora it has adopted a cautious, reactive and pragmatic diplomatic approach (Gu et al 2008). Different global governance arenas, characterized by different interest structures and institutional settings, are following different political logics yet China does not yet have an irrevocably defined and comprehensive global governance strategy. In practice China’s strategy is mercantilist and the country pursues self-interest in various ways and realises that domestic legitimacy is built on onward growth which in turn requires access to resources and markets. This can create tensions in terms of how far China ‘speaks for’ the rest of the developing world or promotes its own interests which might conflict with those of its ‘brothers’ in the rest of the global South. For example, in 2001 China formally entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) a move that promised among other things to further liberalize the Chinese economy, accelerate economic growth, increase the country’s international prestige and enhance the flagging legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (Jahiel 2006). While the implications of WTO membership have been heatedly debated (Hsiung 2003) it is clear that the WTO’s prioritisation of economic growth has reinforced the ideological foundation of China’s reform era. As part of its liberal internationalism China thus increasingly recognizes it needs to court votes to protect and promote its interests. African votes have been crucial, for example, in blocking resolutions at the UN Commission on Human Rights condemning alleged human-rights abuses in China or in garnering sufficient support to win a second bid to host the Olympics in 2008.

While China’s growing influence has come through its enhanced role in various multilateral forums Wade (2011) is somewhat sceptical about how much power China has gained as a result of recent changes to IMF and World Bank governance that have given greater powers to emerging economies. China has also been involved in various new international configurations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which
is around building leadership and promoting interests in Central Asia (Campbell 2008), various BRIC forums, and an active role in ASEAN (Bader 2010).

A third important political influence of China is at an ideational level. This revolves around, first, a post-colonial solidarity based on shared histories of colonisation and, second, the potentially powerful demonstration effect of the ‘China model’. Six (2009) argues that a key difference that China and India bring to the aid and development agenda is ‘they do not share the same history of colonial and postcolonial relations…and thus do not use historicist development rhetoric to legitimize their interventions’ (1108-09). As such, according to Six, they occupy a ‘dual position’ (p.1110) being both of the developing world but also key drivers of growth in the global economy. This means they do not need to fall back on teleologies of emancipation bound up in western development discourse but are freer to be honest about their interest-based engagements with African countries. Indeed, Six sees this new honesty as potentially liberating for all concerned, including established donors, who no longer need to conceal their interests behind legitimatory discourses. Six’ insistence on the transparency of China’s interests is fair although questions of ‘partnership’ and ‘solidarity’ (King 2010) that are the watchwords of China’s discourse of development cooperation also need to be empirically tested rather than taken at face value as inherently better for African states and peoples.

Obiorah (2007) argued that China provides a powerful development model, which has a number of possible effects on African development debates. First, he argued, African leaders can use this model to deny political rights to their people. Second, China exports its model via growth-oriented aid and overlooks the social impacts of its actions under the banner of non-interference. Ultimately so Obiorah feels it is the duty of African civil society to debate and discuss China’s role, because rentier regimes will not engender such debate. While Obiorah is rightfully circumspect about the political (ab)use of the ‘China model’, Schmitz (2007) has argued that China’s rise means that the idea that ‘west is best’ is defunct. Schmitz argues that China and the NICs show that following a relatively experimental and untrodden path to economic development has worked and that development studies should move away from studying the poor towards explaining the drivers of growth. However, problems arise in exactly what we mean by the ‘China model’ since arguably there are multiple models in different provinces, something acknowledged by both non-Chinese (e.g. Mittelman 2006) and Chinese analysts alike (Junbo 2011).

Migration
China’s geopolitical strategy in Africa during the cold war was around challenging the major superpowers through its conspicuous targeting of aid (Brautigam 1998). Between the 1960s and the early 1980s at least 150,000 Chinese technical assistants arrived in Africa. Although the numbers of aid workers were not huge, and many stayed only temporarily, some remained behind to pursue commercial activities (Hsu 2007). At the same time, China’s domestic perception of Overseas Chinese shifted from a view that they were traitors to a view that casts them as new vanguards of Third World anti-colonialism (Thuno 2001).

China’s more recent emigration patterns occurred in the wake of the economic reforms that weakened the state’s role in its peoples’ movements (Biao 2003, Wong 2006). Africa received private traders, and waves of independent workers migrated to Africa for
Additionally, large numbers of state-sponsored construction teams came to work in the extractive industries (Broadman 2007).

While most observers accept that China sent an increased number of workers to Africa, a major problem is that data are speculative (Table 3). Notwithstanding, however, these data lend themselves to several interpretations. First, data shows that sizeable, long-standing Chinese migrant communities in South Africa and Mauritius dating back to the colonial period. Second, the data also shows that the rapid increases in Chinese immigration to Africa over the past seven years coincide with China’s increased FDI and trade with various African countries. Most growth is found in countries with significant oil resources, notably Nigeria, Angola and Sudan (Mung 2008).

Table 3: Estimates for Chinese in selected African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>5105</td>
<td>70000</td>
<td>30000*</td>
<td>100000-400000 (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>23266</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>35000</td>
<td>30000 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1000-3000 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>45^</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5000-10000 (2004-2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5000 (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>6000 (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45^</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>600 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1735</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1500 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>3000-4000 (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8000 (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10000 (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10000 (2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009)

To assess the impacts on Africa of this migration requires what Mung terms a ‘triangular’ perspective in which ‘the Chinese diaspora does not only relate to China, but also interacts with the society where it has settled’ (p. 105-6). One upshot of increased trade and migration with Africa has been a rise in political responses to it, largely within civil society (Alden 2007, Davies 2007, Campbell 2008). A number of Africa trade unions and business associations have led the critique of China’s role in national economies. Most recently a pan-African trade union project (Baah and Jauch 2009) has identified some common traits across Chinese firms in Africa. Unilaterally trade unions are not welcomed by Chinese firms and on the flip side many African workers doubted the ability of their respective unions to represent and defend them (Lee 2009, Human Rights Watch 2011).
Moreover, there is some evidence of Chinese migration becoming politicised. Despite the tangible evidence of modernisation that Chinese projects bring there are growing signs of disaffection with the Chinese among Africans (Trofimov 2007) though this has often been whipped up by western media and varies between countries (see Sautman and Hairong 2009, Gadzala and Hanusch 2010). Overall surveys that exist suggest a relatively high approval rating for the Chinese (e.g. Ngome 2009), but exceptional cases exist where the Chinese presence is used to fire nationalist sentiment. One such example was the election campaign of Michael Sata in Zambia in the 2006 Presidential election, 2008 Presidential by-election, and again in the 2011 Presidential election which he eventually won. In his first two attempts Sata’s Patriotic Front played the anti-China card to win votes in Lusaka and The Copperbelt. The government were critical of Sata’s ‘racism’, but clearly had a vested interest in maintaining good relations with the Chinese. In the 2011 elections this complicity with the Chinese may have arisen again with the incumbent Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s campaign allegedly bankrolled by the Chinese in an attempt to stifle Sata’s chances (Redvers 2011). Clearly, if this proves to have even a grain of truth, it counters any claims by the Chinese towards ‘non-interference’ in local politics.

Environment

As noted much of the use of the Asian Driers framework has been to analyse economic interactions to the relative exclusion of other development channels. A more complete approach to studying China’s development footprint might draw on the insights of ‘political ecology’ (Peet and Watts 2004). Bryant and Bailey (1997) have developed three assumptions in practicing political ecology. First, costs and benefits associated with environmental change are distributed unequally. Second, this unequal distribution inevitably reinforces or reduces existing social and economic inequalities. Third, the unequal distribution of costs and benefits and the reinforcing or reducing of pre-existing inequalities holds political implications in terms of the altered power relationships that now result.

For a study of China and Africa relations natural resources and the environment are key for a number of reasons. First, given the resource focus of much Chinese activity what are the implications for ecosystem sustainability in areas where new exploitation is taking place under conditions of lax regulation (Haglund 2009)? And are the Chinese any better or worse than other multinationals in this regard (Chan-Fishel 2007)? Second, China and other rising powers are moving into agriculture which has huge implications for access to land and thereby impacts upon the livelihoods of the poor, which we are only just beginning to comprehend (Mahmoud 2010). Third, China is a major producer of greenhouse gases which indirectly impact on low income economies through climate change so that export production in China for western markets has impacts on the poor in the developing world (Watts 2010). In turn this creates complex global governance problems where the relatively powerless developing country governments have little say.

In terms of the political implications of these ecologically and socially disruptive projects it has been international civil society groups that have been most active, most notably around dam building. For example, at the Merowe dam in Sudan the resettlement colonies were poorly planned and the soil around the villages was very low quality forcing many resettlers to abandon farming and migrate to Khartoum. A lobbying group has been contesting the scheme and in 2010 they brought a legal case against the German Company that supervised the project construction for recklessness and violation of human rights (Bosshard 2010). As Askouri (2007) notes the dam is part of on-going
Chinese engagements with Sudan in the oil sector and elites on both sides are colluding to conceal the truth. What the Merowe case shows also is that much of the debate around China’s role in Africa and elsewhere is being facilitated by international civil society actors that are not Africa based. In the case of dams it has been the International Rivers Network that has produced evidence of China’s practices and lobbied ExIm and Sinohydro to adopt better environmental and social standards.

3. Analysis of existing engagements

The preceding analysis has identified the channels through which China engages with Africa and the nature of the states that in turn mediate these engagements and ultimately determine the developmental impacts. These two dimensions were captured in an analytical framework and in this section we use that framework to analyse the impacts across the three types of African state. This allows us to identify what is known and not known and as a case study approach fits with ESID methodologies.

Table 4 provides an overview of the findings and the subsequent section gives detail of each case. Gaps in the table below indicate either a lack of knowledge (Unknown) or a weak relationship (Limited impact).
## Table 4: Political impacts framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Pariah states (e.g. Sudan)</th>
<th>Illiberal regimes and weak democracies (e.g. Angola)</th>
<th>Democratic countries with diversified economies (e.g. Ghana)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>Cheaper manufactures; Oil revenue.</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Cheaper manufactures; Oil revenue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>Infrastructure investment.</td>
<td>Possibly crowding in other Asian FDI.</td>
<td>Infrastructure investment; Limited local employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Investment in hydropower; Abuses of local populations Weak local regulation.</td>
<td>International condemnation and INGO activity (e.g. IRN).</td>
<td>Investment in resource extraction; Weak local regulation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Angola

As an Illiberal regime with weak democracy, Angola’s post-war economy required huge amounts of social and infrastructural investment and so sought external financing. It was in this context that China in need of energy resources sought to offer Angola a series of
oil-backed credit lines with little conditionality (Corkin 2011a). China’s ExIm Bank provided the first funding for infrastructure development in 2002 and a ‘framework agreement’ for new economic and commercial cooperation was formally signed by the Angolan Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Ministry of Trade in 2003 whilst in March 2004 the first US$2-billion financing package for public investment projects was approved. The loan operates like a current account such that when ordered by the Ministry of Finance, disbursements are made by ExIm Bank directly into the accounts of the contractors. Repayment starts as soon as a project is completed.

Two additional ExIm loans of US$500 million and US$2 billion were made in 2007 with the repayment terms increased to 15 years with a revised interest rate of Libor plus 1.25 per cent (Campos and Vines 2008). A further $1 billion loan from the China Development Bank was granted in March 2009 (rising to US$ 1.5 billion in 2010) with a view to supporting the development of Angolan agriculture. In the first official estimate of Chinese credit to Angola, the Chinese Ambassador said in early 2011 that an estimated US$14.5 billion in credit had been provided since the end of the war from the three Chinese state banks (ExIm Bank, the Commercial and Industrial Bank of China and the China Development Bank) (Power et al 2012). These credit lines have opened up well over 100 projects in the areas of energy, agriculture, water, health, education, telecommunications, fisheries and public works including key elements in the governments post-war National Reconstruction Programme. Project proposals identified as priorities by the respective Angolan ministries are put forward to the Grupo de Trabalho Conjunto, a joint committee of the Ministry of Finance and the MOFCOM (China). For each project put to tender, the Chinese government proposes three to four Chinese companies and all projects are inspected by third parties not funded by the credit line while sectoral ministries are in charge of managing these public works and making sure that sufficient staff are trained.

Additionally, oil-backed loans amounting to as much as US$10 billion have also been provided by a private equity firm based in Hong Kong called the China International Fund. Further, some Chinese businesses based in Hong Kong have been a key feature of China’s push into African markets. Levkowitz et al (2009) have shown many of the Chinese companies currently operating in Angola have the same Hong Kong address (88 Queensway) at which a handful of individuals control over 30 firms. Key personnel involved in CIF have ties to Chinese state-owned enterprises and state agencies including China International Trust and Investment Corporation, Sinopec and possibly China’s intelligence apparatus. By posing as a private firm, the Group creates numerous companies within a complicated organisational structure to invest globally, thereby enabling the Group to acquire assets ‘unnoticed’. This credit facility has been managed by Angola’s Reconstruction Office, the Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN), which has been exclusively accountable to the Angolan presidency and originally managed most of the major infrastructure projects. In the major government reshuffle of March 2010 (in which the President called for a crackdown on corruption) a replacement was sought for the GRN in what was widely seen as a vote of no confidence in the agency and later in the same year the President announced that a company called Sonangol Imobiliária [Sonangol Real Estate] would be taking over responsibility from the GRN for implementing various projects relating to construction and the rehabilitation of infrastructure (Power 2011).

The Angola case points to the ‘China-Africa’ relationship being organised through hybrid and enclaved yet spatially diffuse institutions which are detached from national
democratic processes. Agency on the part of selected Chinese and Angolan actors has produced in the CIF-GRN an institutional assemblage that sits within the state apparatus but is only connected to selected and clandestine elements within the state. As Corkin (2011a) argues this might be a response on the part of the Chinese to Angola’s rampant corruption in which direct ties are seen as better than diffuse budget support. The creation of unaccountable enclaves within states echoes the Structural Adjustment era when ‘parallel governments’ (Hutchful 1989) were set up, mainly in finance ministries, by appointed technocrats. However, in contrast to the adjustment era there is no obvious political conditionality, rather a diffuse form of authority based on a small number of powerful actors.

Given that such a small part of the state is actively acting in this relationship is it meaningful to talk about ‘the state’ at all? Social collectivities - like states – that are driven by a small number of actors can have agency if they are given the authority to act by wider society. It is debatable if the Dos Santos regime has such a social contract yet the delivery of much-needed infrastructure not only deepens (or seeks to deepen) the regime’s legitimacy but might benefit wider Angola society. In Dos Santos we see an active and single-minded leader who exercised his agency to create institutions to channel inward investment in particular directions.

The ‘Angola-mode’ of financing is often hailed as the paradigm for Chinese engagement with African states, but by looking comparatively across states we get a different picture. Vines et al’s (2009: viii) study of Asian investment in Angolan and Nigerian notes ‘Neither Nigeria nor Angola fits into the stereotype of weak African states being ruthlessly exploited by resource-hungry Asian tigers’. Angola’s state structures – like the GRN – and President Dos Santos’ leadership combined to see successful oil exploitation by China to the exclusion of other Asian countries. By contrast Nigerian oil politics is deeper and older, with the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation treated as a cash cow for political elites. The period around 2007 when Chinese and other Asian interests in Nigeria oil stepped up a gear coincided with the transition of power away from President Obasanjo and so there was a fluid and contested political arena which meant that many of the agreements entered into with the Chinese were not enforced. However, despite these political difficulties Chinese investment in Nigeria has continued apace, reportedly reaching $6.1 Billion which was around 25% of all Nigeria’s inward FDI (Abiodun 2011).

Ghana

While we use Ghana as an example of a democratic country with a diversified economy it is noted that the economy is not hugely diverse. The presence and intensity of Chinese involvement is less evident in Ghana compared to Angola, largely due to the lack of strategic minerals although this has changed with the discovery of offshore oilfields in late 2008. Given the relative lack of Ghanaian exports to China Ghana has a trade deficit compared to Angola’s trade surplus. In 2008, China exported US$1.4 billion to and only imported US$91.8 million of goods from Ghana, creating a trade surplus of US$1.33 billion (MOFCOM 2008). Although China has had a long-standing relationship with Ghana since the 1960s, it is only in recent years that the relationship has been taken to a higher level.

Over the years, Chinese aid has been used to build physical infrastructure like roads (for example, the Ofankor-Nsawam section of the Accra-Kumasi road) and buildings (the
National Theatre). It was in 2004/2005 when relations improved and Ghana began to receive grants and interest free loans directly from China such as a US$24 million debt relief on interest free loans (Interview with Xi, counsellor, 2008). In the 2006 FOCAC, Ghana and China signed six agreements, including a US$66 million loan for the expansion of Ghana’s telecommunication infrastructure and a US$30 million concessionary loan for the first phase of the National Fibre-optic and E-government project. The project was executed by the Chinese telecom giant Huawei and aimed at linking all the 10 regional capitals and 36 townships on fibre routes (Daily Graphic, 15 August 2007).

In general the process is similar to Angola in which the Chinese sign a framework document for construction and then engage their own contractor from China and procure the materials from the mainland. Upon completion, the Chinese effectively donate the building to the Ghanaian government (Interview with Xi, counsellor, Ghana). There is a perception amongst ministers and think tanks in Ghana that the Chinese are serving genuine infrastructure needs. As one think-tank told us the ‘Chinese also got it right from the beginning as countries must get infrastructure in place before any development can take place’ (Interview, Private Enterprise Foundation 2008). Other sectors that have benefited from China’s technical support include education (three schools), the public sector and military cooperation (Interview with Xi, counsellor, Ghana).

Undoubtedly the most significant Chinese engagement with Ghana is the Bui hydroelectric dam. Like many Chinese-funded infrastructure projects the majority of the money comes from ExIm Bank. The Bui Dam will cost US$622m of which US$288m is from buyer credits and US$298 is a commercial loan, the interest on which is repayable after September 2012. It should bring 400 MW of electricity to Ghana’s struggling grid and even allow some to be exported to West African neighbours. The Chinese favoured the dam project as opposed to the Ghanaian Government’s preferred option of a railway from the coast to Burkina Faso, because the sale of electricity would guarantee repayment in a way that a railway could not. This revenue will be paid into an escrow account and funds used to service the debt. In addition there is a special arrangement with the Ghana Cocoa Board to supply cocoa as part payment of the debt.

Like projects in Angola much of the capital equipment is Chinese. The contract with Sinohydro specified the upper limits of Chinese labour on the project (capped at 600). The interviews with Chinese workers revealed that they took jobs in Africa for economic reasons, mentioning a wage differential of 300-400% compared with China. Chinese corporations in general do not encourage trade unions, and originally did not allow for it at Bui. But a deputation from the Ghana TUC argued that it was enshrined both in Ghanaian law and the contract and so had to (Baah and Jauch 2009). More broadly this highlights an important issue for the developmental impacts of China in Africa. Where local laws are well elaborated and, more importantly, enforced then expropriation is more difficult although the trade off may be lower levels of absolute investment.

An example of weak adherence to the planning process and environmental standards around the Bui Dam reveals both obedience in some areas and noncompliance in others (Hensengerth 2011). The Bui Dam had a long genesis and in the process a feasibility study and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) were undertaken not long before the Chinese showed a willingness to fund and build it in 2005. Under Ghanaian law, securing the right to proceed with construction requires various permits and consultations. In terms of the environmental permits one respondent in Hensengerth’s
China in Africa: Impacts and prospects for accountable development

research commented “the government sometimes jumps steps” (2011: 15). The EIA process also stipulates a consultation with affected citizens but these hearings relied on a narrow set of representatives from local government and other statutory bodies rather than direct representation from the communities. This process suggests that where the Ghanaian state is determined to see a project realised then regulatory short-cuts can be taken. While not confined to Chinese investments these large, elite brokered projects are likely to encourage this flouting of due process in favour of the Chinese (Haglund 2009).

Sinohydro and other Chinese firms are looking to deepen their footprint in Ghana and Africa more broadly. Although the Chinese seemed to have got a foothold in Africa through these Chinese government-supported projects they are now competing more openly for tenders and as one European aid official told us ‘winning in straight fights’ (see Corkin 2011b). Furthermore in terms energy oil reserves were discovered in 2008 in Ghana (McCaskie 2008). Estimates of revenue are difficult to determine but the IMF calculates around $20billion over 20 years, peaking between 2011 and 2016. The oil producers soon began arriving. Initially the discovery was through a UK-US consortium – Tullow and Kosmos - but before long a range of applicants was seeking drilling blocks. Importantly the Chinese state-owned enterprise China National Offshore Oil Corporation has sought to purchase Kosmos for a reported $3 billion on the basis of its Ghanaian and Ugandan oil discoveries.

The danger is that with a high budget deficit the government will be tempted to emulate the ‘Angola model’ by collateralising the oil in return for credit. Major multilaterals are urging the Government of Ghana to sort its underlying structural problems first rather than simply use the windfall rents to shore up budget deficits which will re-emerge once the boom ends. Additionally there are worries about a ‘Dutch Disease’ scenario where this resource exportation discourages investment and taxation in non-oil sectors (Oxfam 2009). Agriculture is one of the key sectors likely to suffer under this scenario.

Like Angola’s recent return to the IMF it appears that the Government of Ghana has turned to the Chinese investment packages when other avenues for commercial financing have been closed. As one aid official noted:

…a package of tied lending is only interesting when there is more limited access to the international market and I think that is why many African countries find this package interesting, because they don’t have access to the markets.

The coming years are likely to see market access to finance even more limited and so China’s leveraged option may well be much more appealing.

In terms of donor harmonisation invitations to become more involved in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy were rejected by the Chinese, although they often attended meetings as observers. One interpretation is that the Chinese do not see themselves as donors. A western aid official spoke rhetorically from a Chinese perspective:

…we are not a donor, we are a poor country so we can’t really afford to give grants, on the other hand we want to trade and that would benefit everyone.

The Government of Ghana has in the past shrewdly played off the DAC focus on liberal reforms with the Millennium Challenge Account’s growth orientation to pursue its own growth agenda (Whitfield and Jones 2007). In dealing with the Chinese the Ghana
Government had far less scope; for example, accepting the Bui Dam project against the preferred railway linking the coast to Burkina Faso (see also Grimm et al 2011).

Importantly, with the discovery of oil in Ghana the Chinese announced in 2010 a US$15 billion fund for oil-related infrastructure development which was negotiated at the highest levels, with Ghana’s President Atta-Mills eschewing a high level meeting in New York about the future of aid to stay on in Beijing for the signing ceremony. This signals the changing power balance in African development relations and the established donors in Ghana have expressed concern about the transparency of these deals (Ghanaweb 2010). However, this situation appears to be changing with greater Parliamentary scrutiny in Ghana over a $3 billion loan from China for an oil and gas corridor (Reuters 2011).

Sudan

Sudan is key to China’s African oil interests but also a pariah regime. While the Chinese government may be an ‘old friend’ of Sudan based on the idea of non-interference, in practice China has played a deep and critical role in Sudan’s politics. In late 1995 China’s ‘energy cooperation’ with Sudan gathered momentum when President Bashir visited Beijing and secured a reduced rate loan with an agreement between China’s Exim Bank and the Bank of Sudan to finance oil development (Ali 2007).

The turn to China by the National Islamic Front’s (NIF), later re-named the National Congress Party, was borne of necessity. Its renewed war against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) continued, prosecuted as part of a project of Islamist transformation in Sudan. Having poor relations with the IMF and World Bank, Sudan also became the object of sanctions by the UN (1996) and the US (1997) so that turning to China was pragmatic given Beijing’s political dependability and willingness to invest. China viewed Sudan as a friendly state with a more open oil market not, as elsewhere in Africa, dominated by established Western corporations.

From early 1997 CNPC has operated a 40% share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), the main oil consortium in Sudan. However, oil production in Southern Sudan had been constrained by the lack of a proper infrastructure. So, a CNPC subsidiary was involved in constructing a 1,600-km buried pipeline for GNPOC to connect oil production with the international market. The Khartoum oil refinery was built as a CNPC-Ministry of Energy joint venture with an investment of some $638 million and became operational in February 2000. Following GNPOC, the second major oil consortium in Sudan, Petrodar, was created in 2001. By 2006 China was by far the most important external economic actor in northern Sudan, whose oil-fuelled economic boom saw real GDP growing by 12% in 2006.

Sudan’s oil development during the 1990s was inextricably connected with armed conflict (Askouri 2007, Large 2008). The Sudan Armed Forces combined aerial bombing raids and use of proxy forces of northern Baggara Arab militias and Nuer groups from Southern Sudan in attacks aimed at depopulating Nuer and Dinka settlements and cattle camps located in oil-rich areas to enable oil expansion.

The successful running of Sudan’s oil industry by CNCP and other foreign oil companies amidst the civil wars demonstrated a willingness to side with Khartoum, despite the principle of ‘non-interference’. China’s ‘blind-eye’ support for the NIF has been the
China's preference for bilateralism encourages negotiations between senior officials which often occur outside of domestic accountability structures. In Ghana, for example,
earlier Chinese investments such as the IT spine had very little discussion with telecommunications companies or within government and in Angola the GRN was effectively insulated from public scrutiny. In Angola the restructuring of the GRN in 2010 also indicates that considerations of probity are affecting governance, although how far these changes are window dressing remains to be seen. In Ghana inputs to the Bui Dam were given to a company owned by a cabinet minister and in Namibia Chinese scholarships went to the children of high-ranking officials suggesting that China’s entry may do little to alter existing forms of patrimonialism. That said, as Davies (2007) notes the Chinese claim that their project focus as opposed to modalities like direct budget support reduces the chances of malfeasance since there is less free-floating cash to be siphoned off. Again, evidence of such arrangements is sparse and arguably part of the Chinese argument is to justify its tying of loans to Chinese SOEs.

**Legitimacy and policy space**

But whether these arrangements are elite-based and relatively unaccountable is somewhat different to whether they build legitimacy and contribute to a longer term view of development. At one level the Angola and Sudan cases show that policy triangulation is possible with African states playing donors and investors off against one another. With resource security a global agenda, Africa’s abundance of strategic minerals has given selected countries on the continent a degree of space to negotiate. And in this regard it is vitally important not to fixate on China since a raft of new investors are entering these markets (such as India in Sudan, Korea in Ghana, etc). But as the Busan HLF noted that while these actors and economic relationships may provide enhanced markets for African exports they do not alter the structural position of these economies and do little to kick start broader industrialisation. It is here that purposive policy on the African side is vital if developmental gains are to spread beyond mineral rents. Investment in training, for example, is important if more local employment is to be generated by this new investment.

In terms of regime legitimacy, Tull (2006) and Holslag (2011) note that Chinese investments have enhanced the legitimacy of recipient regimes. This is more than the aid-based vanity projects, such as ministries and stadia, but much-needed transport and energy infrastructure (Foster et al 2008). While it is too early to say definitively this infrastructural development might not only enhance the legitimacy of incumbent regimes but will have multiple, indirect benefits to citizens through such things as enhanced mobility and information flows. Moreover, effective transportation and communications can only increase the ability of the central state to reach and administer its territory, although how this plays out politically and developmentally depends on the intentions of the regime that controls the system. For example, in Ghana the Chinese-funded IT spine links all regional capitals which would enable greater flows of information but given the history of decentralisation in Ghana (Mohan 1996) could equally be used to penetrate the rural areas for centralised, party-political gain. In Sudan we also saw that Chinese owned infrastructure was used by the Sudanese army to mount attacks in the South so we need to be attuned to the progressive and regressive uses of technology and infrastructure that the Chinese bring.

**Labour and environment**

The issues around investment and labour are again clouded by sloppy western reporting which seeks to demonise the Chinese. The limited evidence that exists suggests that labour importation varies according to the nature of the project, the Chinese firm involved, and the labour market conditions in Africa (Chen and Orr 2009). In Ghana, for
example, Chinese labour was limited and firms had relatively little trouble finding semi-skilled labour, although the conditions and pay of this work are not high. That said, research by the author in Kano revealed that while local employees acknowledged the lower wages they were also grateful for the resilience of Chinese firms. Where a number of major Nigerian employers had gone bust the Chinese firms were still operating. By contrast the post-war labour market of Angola was poor so that labour importation is higher despite local content clauses (Corkin 2011b).

Moreover the extension of the ‘China Inc.’ assumptions into Africa tends to suggest that ethnic economies are internally coherent and enclavistic – the Chinese only look after their own. But this is clearly misplaced as our evidence showed hard capitalist logics determining business behaviour as opposed to favouring of co-ethnics. There are complex migrant trajectories such that there was no inherent trust within a ‘Chinese’ community and extensive relationships with African businesses. That is not to say that these business relationships are random, but that ethnicity and nationality are over-determined in the literature on Chinese migrant businesses, which in turn diverts attention from the potential benefits to African economies. For example, recent research in Zambia (Fessehaie 2011) and Angola (Corkin 2011b) suggests that the Chinese are not as enclaved as earlier reports suggested and local firms have secured a growing number of contracts.

In all cases the environmental impacts are poorly understood and the focus has been on high profile cases, such as the Merowe Dam in Sudan. Again, there are issues around the contracts underpinning these investments, which go beyond a simple China-Africa logic. In the case of the Merowe Dam it is the German consulting firm that is being prosecuted which suggests that mitigating negative social and environmental impacts is a matter of complex arrangements between multiple actors, although as the Ghana and Angola cases show local laws are poorly enforced around these major projects though there is no evidence that this situation is worse regarding Chinese projects.

4. Emerging issues and research gaps

We conclude with emerging issues and research gaps, with suggestions of methodological approaches to address them.

Emerging issues

The foregoing analysis suggests that China and other Asian powers are changing the political landscape of African states though not as drastically as western sceptics would believe. As a recent report noted ‘There is a clear opportunity for Africa to grab now, since both traditional and ‘new’ players are in an important phase of reforming (e.g. Europe) and designing (e.g. China, India and Brazil) their development policy towards Africa’ (Rampa and Bilal 2011: VIII). To capitalise on this opportunity requires a series of coordinated responses across African, BRIC and multilateral political spaces.

Changing China

China’s domestic development has been the driver of its overseas engagements so as it changes there are likely to be implications for Africa. Kaplinsky and Farooki (2011) show
that China’s and India’s high levels of commodity demand are likely to continue for at least 25 years which means that Africa will remain a strategic commercial interest. Despite the global recession and a slight drop in China’s growth rate, China honoured its aid commitments to Africa and FOCAC 2009 promised a series of development-related engagements around climate change, energy and capacity-building.

Yet the Chinese model is clearly imperfect with large and growing domestic inequality and environmental damage (Shirk 2007, Watts 2010), both of which have engendered political protest within the country. As international scrutiny and the influence of policy norms deepens it is likely that Chinese SOEs and policy makers will adopt more sustainable approaches and we are already seeing CSR agendas amongst some policy banks and SOEs. But as Chinese firms proliferate, diversify and internationalise it becomes ever harder for the Chinese state to monitor and regulate them (Reilly and Na 2007) while the large numbers of smaller private firms never even enter these regulatory mechanisms. Hence, we are likely to see some high profile firms voluntarily adopting better practices but for the majority it will be business as usual unless and until African states have the capacity and willingness to regulate and prosecute.

We are also seeing an evolution of Chinese firms, especially SOEs. Most come in under tied arrangements linked to state-backed concessional loans, which reduces the risk to these firms, even if the absolute levels of profit are thin. However, there is emerging evidence (Corkin 2011b) that once established in an African market these firms operate like any other TNC and tender for open contracts which they are increasingly winning.

The cases reviewed in Section 3 showed that despite China branding itself as ‘non-interfering’ this has always been a flexible discourse. The Sudan case showed a growing involvement in domestic political agendas and the Libyan evacuation of autumn 2011 suggested that a priority for China is ensuring the safety of its nationals which is linked to stability of the political operating environment. Hence, we are likely to see growing direct involvement in African governance. This is likely to be below the radar rather than through public governance programmes and the knowledge of African politics is growing through strategic individuals (Eisenman 2008) although He (2008, 2010) notes the need for more investment in African Studies in China to help in this regard.

Despite the long-standing discourse around ‘South-South’ cooperation and the distancing of China from mainstream donors and aid discourses, there is growing self-awareness of China as an international development actor. The establishment of the International Poverty Research Centre of China (IPRCC) in 2004 with the backing of international aid organisations has an international development dimension and they have undertaken training around Chinese development for African officials (Brautigam 2009). The White Paper on aid in May 2011 was relatively light on details (Provost 2011) but was significant for using the term aid and acknowledging, despite its fragmentation, that China has an evolving aid ‘system’. Other institutional reorganisation identified in the White paper and the establishment of the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development (Davies 2007) suggests that a reflexive analytical move within China’s aid system is under way and noises are being made about closer convergence around international development norms.

**African states**

Many of the issues that China in Africa raises are not unique to this specific relationship. As Broadman (2007) notes many of the issues around Africa’s engagement with China
concern long-standing problems of policy coherence, political stability and border controls which pre-date China’s entry. As such this raises a much wider series of questions about the African state and political economy, which are beyond the scope of this report though are part of the ESID process.

One of the key issues at the interface of accumulation and inclusion is around the use of African labour. We noted that use of African labour varies according to labour market conditions and nature of the project, but that it is generally quite high (US Congress/Brautigam 2011) in comparison to the negative portrayal of mass importation of Chinese labour. However, much of this African labour is relatively unskilled and so skills transfer is low and few African governments are investing in vocational training (Okonjo-Iweala 2010) which creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of the Chinese requiring the importation of skilled labour. However, we have seen companies like Huawei setting up training centres in Africa (Chang et al 2009) as it is aware that local workers have certain advantages over Chinese staff, not least cost if they are adequately trained. A similar issue is around linkages to local firms. We have seen in the cases of Angola and DRC that local content clauses were part of the agreements around loan packages but that adherence is uneven. While some see the SEZs as a way of integrating the Chinese value chain to benefit Chinese firms there is emerging evidence that Chinese investment is creating local linkages to African firms though the jobs created in these firms tend to be relatively low skilled (Teka 2011) and in the case of Angola contracts are skewed towards firms owned by the ruling party (Soares de Oliveira 2007). These studies also show that local policy can make a difference and so while, for example, Angola has set up joint venture clauses that encouraged foreign firms to partner with local firms much of the rest of the policy needed to kick start industrialisation (such as training) was poorly elaborated.

However, while an elite commitment to development that the Chinese help realise may be beneficial things are dynamic. We noted earlier that a policy space may be opened up by the fact that China offers recipient countries other options. However, the policy space that this ‘triangulating’ with the new donors brings may be closed down for two reasons. The first factor which might reduce the ability of African states to manoeuvre is the growing role of China in African politics. The second is around the convergence of donors around certain norms which will mean that apparent policy alternatives are not so different and hence the space to manoeuvre is reduced.

In terms of China’s growing role in African politics, Sudan has been a seminal case. Although the Chinese began high profile diplomacy and aid missions around the Southern Sudan and Darfur issues they were all the time manouevring smartly to ensure access to oil and markets following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and ultimate secession of Southern Sudan (Large 2008). Indeed, given that China supported various African liberation movements in the 1960s and ‘70s ‘non-interference’ has always been a fluid concept. The Sata saga in Zambia also showed that – if rumours are at all true – that the Chinese state was prepared to back Sata’s opponents which represents a more recent direct intervention in domestic politics. So, the linkages between development cooperation and regime legitimacy are fluid and poorly understood.

The second factor that might close down the policy space opened by the rising powers is a gradual convergence around the ideology of development. We noted that some responses to the new donors have been ‘hawkish’, but more sanguine debate see the rising powers doing some things differently and in this difference there is opportunity for
learning and collaboration based on the ‘comparative advantage’ of each donor (GRIPS 2008). The start of this is ‘dialogue’ with the Chinese which has over the past five years become the mainstay of the European donors. Some calls seek to socialise China into the western aid paradigm through existing forums. Indeed Zhao (2007) sees China becoming more involved in multilateral institutions as signalled by the Olympics, membership of the WTO as well as international condemnation of the Darfur situation. All this is presented as a part of China’s ongoing ‘responsible’ and ‘peaceful’ ascendance on the world stage.

Multilateral forums
The previous sub-section argued that it is long-standing structural issues within recipient states that need to be addressed rather than simply reforming the mode of entry of the new donors. While the Chinese White Paper on aid echoed some of the concepts and makes some concessions to international norms, it is unlikely that they will wholeheartedly throw themselves into these institutional processes. Their own development models are too powerful and different for them to, for example, suddenly start championing civil society and governance reform, but as we noted there is space for consensus around business-led growth (Chaponniere 2009). So, there is likely to be some convergence with Western donors around issues which do not threaten China’s own growth or domestic political agendas, such as greener technologies and investments in technical capacity building and social infrastructure. Where the lines will not be crossed are around governance reform. However, if the ‘China model’ is used ideologically by recipient states in Africa to oppose liberal reforms then this could become a site of conflict between Chinese, western and African actors.

The need for ongoing dialogue and learning (European Commission 2008, Davies 2010) between new donors, old donors and recipients is still high on the agenda, as evidenced by debates at the 2011 Busan HLF on Aid Effectiveness. In comparison to the Paris and Accra meetings the new donors were much more prominent with a designated Theme on ‘South-South and triangular co-operation’. The debates were salutary and while they recognised the benefits that South-South cooperation could bring to LDCs they noted that terms of trade are generally not altered by these relationships and Africa still largely imports manufactured goods while exporting raw materials. In the case of China they noted that the 2009 FOCAC meeting did pledge technical training and this might be one area where African states can use the commodities boom to upgrade skills levels, but this requires concerted and coordinated policy.

Research Gaps
We conclude with a series of research gaps in terms of the impacts of Chinese and Asian involvement on elite commitment to development and state effectiveness in Africa.

Development discourses
A recurring theme within the major Chinese projects is that the Chinese get things done and that what they provide is important, notably infrastructure. In terms of questioning notions of ‘effectiveness’ the issue for international development actors is more around development effectiveness than aid effectiveness per se (Rampa and Bilal 2011, Chaponniere 2009). The Paris Declaration usefully focuses on aid effectiveness but for recipient states the entry of China has refocused the debate around what is needed for development since the causal link between more/better aid and development is
inconclusive. Sachs (2007) argues that China has forced the ‘nuts and bolts’ of development back on the agenda after a period in which liberal institutionalism fixated some policy makers. The China model, such that it exists, is one in which legitimacy is built on sustained growth and while its social and ecological effects are problematic it has recalibrated the wider debates around what development means.

Emerging issue: What is development effectiveness and how does China effect a change in this understanding? How do other actors respond to this changing discourse?
Methodological possibilities: This requires international work around changing aid regimes, which most crucially sees detailed work on Chinese and other non-western actors. There is still a tendency towards Orientalism and reductive reasoning when analysing China which presents its internal debates and motives in singular and simplistic terms.

Elites and inclusive development
The analysis above suggests that recipient states and regimes can play a determining role in how relations with new donors play out, how far broader development priorities are negotiated with their respective polities, and who ultimately benefits from this new phase of development cooperation. Under all three regime types discussed in sections 2 and 3 we see elite compacts evolving in unaccountable ways. However, domestic and international scrutiny is growing as is China’s own sense of ‘social responsibility’ for its development and investment projects. Despite this lack of accountability to domestic societies, these engagements with Africa do not necessarily make them anti-developmental if the effectiveness of these arrangements is directed at social and economic infrastructure which might benefit broader society. Moreover if these investments stimulate economic growth and produce socially useful tax revenue then the developmental gains could spread further.

Emerging issue: Does China’s preference for elite brokering undermine moves to democratic and open government? If new investments stimulate growth will these gains be channelled to broader developmental goals?
Methodological possibilities: The few studies of the politics of China in Africa are case study based and identifying and attributing causality is often weak. The recent quantitative analysis of AidData (Dreher et al 2011, Bermeo 2011) powerfully shows that in some cases the political complexion of the donor and recipient affects aid targeting and its impacts. More could be done at this level which analysed relationships between various governance indicators (e.g. TI, Ibrahim) against various indicators of Asian engagement (AidData, trade levels, CPP exchanges, bilateral agreements, migration, etc). This could be done on a time series basis to see changes and also comparatively across Rising Power actors.

Process monitoring
Linked to the previous point for many African countries and external actors we still lack the basic ‘facts’ of how decision-making around these new forms of cooperation actually work and with what political effects. Hensengerth’s (2011) analysis of the Bui Dam planning process is the only one on the minutiae of how, in this case, the Chinese operate in the Ghanaian state as an example of other ‘market entry strategies’ (Chen and Orr 2009). In keeping with political analyses of developing countries more generally there is a problem of unpacking the ‘black box’ of the state, which is made more difficult by the elite and hybrid institutional arrangements we see emerging in places like Angola. But it is possible to work through discrete projects to track the various actors and
decision making processes (see Power et al 2012), but there are still too few of these studies to make meaningful generalisations or offer policy advice.

**Emerging issue**: How does decision-making around investments operate and to what extent does it evolve over time?

**Methodological possibilities**: Taking the general patterns identified in quantitative analysis we could drill down into specific projects – or assemblages (Murray Li 2009) – to identify the networks of actors involved and the ways in which they operate. Such an endeavour is necessarily ethnographic since it takes sustained immersion in a relatively localised field of activity.

**Governance interventions**

While the Chinese, for example, stress ‘non-interference’ we have seen that this was always something of a myth and is now breaking down. If this proves to be the case then this has major implications for politics in these countries, as well as for relations between the rising powers and ‘established’ powers that have long held trusteeship over these states (Kornegay and Landsberg 2009). At the same time as China’s power within multilateral organisations grows we are likely to see influence brought to bear in more indirect ways that will affect pan-African and national policy processes.

**Emerging issue**: What forms of more direct and multilateral political intervention in Africa are the Chinese engaging in? To what extent does this conflict with established powers on the continent?

**Methodological possibilities**: This could be monitored through country case studies and we could hypothesise that direct intervention would be most intense where Chinese interests are greatest; namely around major investment opportunities. Organisational ethnographies might also be useful to chart whether and how multilateral agencies are responding to the Chinese presence.

**Civil society responses**

Although the approval for the Chinese in Africa seems to be relatively high across Africa we have seen localised flash points linked to a perceived exploitation of market opportunities and whipped up by vested political interests. And bound up in these moves is a manipulation of racist sentiment on both sides of the ‘Africa’ and ‘Asia’ divide (Nyiri 2006), which stands in stark contrast to the ‘win-win’ discourses of the African and Chinese elites who benefit from the so-called ‘south-south cooperation’. Hence, an unfolding issue which needs monitoring across different countries is the social and civil society responses to China’s presence and whether migrants become more politically assertive as their foothold in Africa strengthens. Moreover, given the wider geopolitical concerns about the rise of the Asian powers in particular among international policy-makers and civil society we are likely to see more ‘domestic’ civil society campaigns in Africa being orchestrated by international actors.

**Emerging issue**: How and around what substantive issues are more everyday forms of African politics emerging around the activities of China? In what ways do these connect to international political movements?

**Methodological possibilities**: This could be assessed through social surveys of local attitudes as well as ethnographies of everyday interactions between Chinese and Africans. As with the previous point civil society responses could be analysed through case studies, possibly sectorally organised (e.g. trade, environment, etc).
New actors
Despite the importance of China in Africa there is a lack of analysis on countries operating in Africa besides China. We noted a few books are emerging on ‘non-DAC’ donors but these are basic mappings of actors and activities. Hence, we need much better data on who the new actors are, where they operate, how they operate and with what impacts on development and politics in those countries. While we can hypothesise, that new donors share certain characteristics and are different in some regards to DAC donors there is nothing substantive on how these play out on the ground in Africa.

Emerging issue: To what extent are new actors stepping up their African engagements? How is this organised and with what impacts?
Methodological possibilities: By applying the range of methods identified for China in the previous points to India and other players in Africa.

Environmental impacts
Another emergent issue noted in the analysis of section 3 is that we know very little about the environmental impacts and questions of land rights in Africa. In the past these have proven to be important political issues but have hardly been touched upon in the existing work on China and the Rising Powers in Africa. However, there is no primary or comparative work on these issues, with some rather sloppy causal analysis implying that the Chinese export the capitalism they know best and so overlook environmental consequences. Certainly, China’s domestic environmental record is not good though neither have been other countries that have industrialised in the past. And the Chinese have made a concerted and rapid shift to greener growth so it is not possible to simply project bad practices onto Chinese overseas operations. Rather we need systematic and comparative studies which assess whether Chinese firms are in fact worse than other nations’ firms, which require a sample of different types of sizes of firms.

Emerging issue: What are the environmental impacts of Chinese activity in Africa and to what extent is this different to non-Chinese actors? What are the African responses to this?
Methodological possibilities: This could be more ‘hard’ environmental science around physical changes to the environment, but more likely to be around questions of livelihoods and sustainability. Delimiting environmental impacts is difficult but manageable studies would start by focusing on communities directly affected by a given project or investment.
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