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Political settlement and the politics of legitimation in countries undergoing democratisation: Insights from Tanzania

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Abstract
In recent decades, reforms have been introduced in developing countries to promote economic transformation, democracy and the rule of law. However, structural factors have often undermined their implementation. This is a key insight of the political settlement analysis that has proliferated in scholarly research. Its unpacking of the sorts of intra-elite relations that are instrumental in choosing policies and their modes of implementation is a major achievement. However, with its focus on hard force and economic rents, it is less clear regarding the role of elections and popular legitimacy, which have become more important recently. Inspired by an adapted political settlement analysis, and by drawing on the strategic-relational approach, this paper aims to explain contemporary forms of power and legitimacy in greater detail. Using Tanzania – which has had the same party in power since independence – as a critical case study, we demonstrate that, in the context of democratisation, the country’s political elites are increasingly attempting to earn popular legitimacy. In Tanzania, earlier attempts to earn popular legitimacy through the expansion of social services to the rural majority were radicalised when a new president came to power in 2015. During the historically competitive elections, he campaigned on a platform of reversing years of domination by business and political elites. He later crafted a series of nationalist narratives and attacks on private investors, not least foreign ones, to bolster his legitimacy in the eyes of the wider population. This implies a more prominent role for populations in developing countries than is often acknowledged. We also suggest that, in the context of democratisation, analyses of legitimacy should include two more dimensions: first, a political elite’s relationship with its political opponents, who in Tanzania have been systematically delegitimised; and secondly, international recognition, which since the 1980s has required the holding of regular elections and is important for resource mobilisation. We therefore argue that legitimacy should be analysed as a source of power in its own right, in line with force and rents; it is the combination of these different sources of power that matters.

Keywords: Legitimacy, political settlement, elites, democratisation, electoral politics, nationalism, Tanzania

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1. Introduction

Political settlement analysis has proliferated in scholarly research on developing countries in recent years. This approach has helped explain why so little has changed after the good governance reforms that have been pursued to promote economic transformation, democracy and the rule of law over the last two to three decades, pointing to structural factors that undermine their implementation (Khan, 2010; Khan, 2017). This suggests that, in societies with limited resources, economic and political interests are so closely intertwined that elite groups are rarely willing to fundamentally challenge the existing distribution of power and benefits, since this would undermine their own positions (Di John and Putzel, 2009; Whitfield et al., 2015). In the early settlement literature, the (re)introduction of multi-party elections and issues of popular legitimacy were therefore treated first and foremost as instances that increased elites’ needs for campaign finance, sometimes to finance lower-level elite factions, but that otherwise their impact on intra-elite struggles tended to be limited.

By exploring in more detail the role of popular legitimacy in countries undergoing democratisation, this paper adds to an emerging political settlement literature on softer forms of power that goes beyond studies of force and economic rents, which dominated the early literature. It builds on and develops further recent strands of this literature that put more emphasis on the role of ideas and ideology. Lavers and Hickey emphasise that ideas may be introduced by coalitions of international development partners, domestic politicians and bureaucrats in bringing about sector-specific change, but also that deeply held ideologies by ruling party coalitions are likely to limit such ideational influences, unless a major crisis of legitimacy occurs (Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Lavers, 2018). Behuria et al. point out how ruling coalitions may have ideas and ideologies that help them legitimise their actions (Behuria et al., 2017: 519). Popular legitimacy in countries, we would argue, is not a mere branding exercise, but should be seen as a source of power in its own right that becomes more important in countries undergoing democratisation.

The paper draws on a strategic-relational approach (Jessop, 2005), in order to unpack and explain contemporary popular forms of legitimacy in greater detail. It focuses on processes of legitimation, that is, attempts to legitimise elite rule among other strategic actors in the context of democratisation, rather than on hard-to-measure legitimacy per se. It draws on Sandby-Thomas’s work on processes of legitimation in China, which he sees as the result of tripartite relations between political elites, intermediate staff in context-specific settings (i.e. bureaucrats and/or party members) and populations (Sandby-Thomas, 2010, 2014). The present paper therefore argues that, in the historical context of democratisation, developing countries’ political elites are making increasing attempts to earn popular legitimacy, thus pointing to a potentially more prominent role for populations than is acknowledged in much of the political settlement literature. Whereas populations are rarely directly involved in policy-making or implementation, perceptions of popular legitimacy do frame the behaviour of elites in profound ways that are increasingly
linked to democratic norms and institutions (Cheeseman, 2018). However, the forms of legitimation will vary, depending on a country’s type of regime.

The paper unpacks and discusses legitimation in countries undergoing democratisation, using Tanzania as a critical case study (see Flyvbjerg, 2006). Tanzania has conducted multi-party elections since the mid-1990s and has experienced increasingly competitive elections in recent years (Paget, 2017b). It has also undertaken major economic reforms that have affected the distribution of rents during the same period. However, the country has also had the same political party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, or the Party of Revolution) in power in various guises since independence in 1961. This party has never completely given up its grip on the state apparatus and control of civil society (Jennings, 2008; Paget, 2017b). State and elite legitimacy therefore partly overlap, but unlike Parks and Cole (2010), who focus on the legitimacy of the state where the state is fragile, the paper distinguishes between the two situations analytically. Given that ruling politicians from this party use popular democratic legitimation as a source of power in a way that affects the country’s political settlement, we suggest that this may apply in other countries undergoing democratisation too.

Indeed, our findings suggest that, under the impression of intensified electoral competition, the ruling party in Tanzania is increasingly targeting the rural majority through expanded social service provision (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018b; Pedersen and Jacob, 2018). This approach was radicalised after the historically competitive 2015 election, when the new president, Magufuli, bypassed the existing political, bureaucratic and economic elites to appeal to the majority of the population and to the party base by invoking national interests, often through attacks on private investors, not least foreign ones. He promised ordinary Tanzanians a greater share of the nation’s wealth by pursuing a more state-led economic development strategy. This populist strategy has helped him gain control over the state, maintain the ruling party’s popularity and win most by-elections, thus galvanising his hold over the CCM. However, these achievements were not always made through democratic means, as the ruling party used its control of the state to undermine its political opponents. In other words, the fact that popular legitimacy becomes more important does not necessarily imply conformity with constitutional rules in a western sense, as suggested by some legitimacy theories (see, for instance, Beetham, 2013).

Based on the Tanzanian evidence, the paper suggests that contemporary settlement dynamics involve different combinations of power, in which popular democratic legitimacy earned through elections is becoming increasingly important. Indeed, research on democratisation and legitimacy in Africa suggests that the ‘third wave’ of democratisation on the continent was driven more by crises of legitimacy related to failed economic policies than by the diffusion of democratic norms (Chabal, 1998, 2005; Schatzberg, 2001; see also Huntington, 1991). Nonetheless, democratic elections have been increasingly institutionalised, though this has also made incumbent elites more prone to attempt to skew elections in other ways, for instance,
by gerrymandering and by repressive measures between elections (Lindberg, 2006, 2009; Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018; Kovacs and Bjarnesen, 2018). Opinion polls from Tanzania suggest that popular support for democracy remains high (Afrobarometer and REPOA, 2018; Twaweza, 2018).

This suggests that there is a fine line between undermining the opposition and maintaining regime legitimacy, both internally and internationally. In addition to the internal processes of legitimation, we suggest that contemporary analyses of legitimacy placed within a strategic-relational framework for analysing countries undergoing democratisation should include two more dimensions. The first dimension is the political elite’s relations to its political opponents. Despite the improved quality of elections in Africa, the strength of incumbents on the continent allows them to manipulate the electoral rules. The systematic de-legitimation of the opposition often becomes an important element in the regime’s legitimation strategies – for instance, through accusations of treason, constant arrests or their being prevented from campaigning (Zariski, 1986; Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009a; see also Berger et al., 1998 on how a lack of task fulfilment can serve to delegitimise an order). Opposition parties in turn may combine the mobilisation of financial resources with strategies of discursively highlighting the legal or legitimate rules of the democratic game by means of issues-based politics, often of a populist character (Rakner and van de Walle, 2009a, 2009b; Rakner, 2017).

The second additional dimension we suggest is international recognition. With the third wave of democratisation, democracy as a system of government became an increasingly important element of regime legitimacy internationally in the 1980s. For developing countries, international recognition is all the more important as the international community often recognises them as sovereign states, even if they often have limited control over their territory, until recently an otherwise important criterion of effective and legitimate statehood (Jackson, 1993; Reus-Smit, 2007; Scott, 2017). Having international recognition also affects their ability to raise funds through development assistance and international finance, though this has come under pressure from the rise of the Chinese development model recently. However, we do not elaborate further on the international dimension of legitimacy in this paper, as more research is required in the context of political settlement analysis.

The present paper is based on several years of in-depth field research into a number of sectors in Tanzania, combined with intensive studies into Tanzania’s political settlement through a review of the existing literature, public debates and numerous interviews with key informants at the national and sub-national levels. The next section provides a brief review of the place of legitimacy and elections in political settlement theory, which identifies rents and force as the main sources of power in developing countries. It is followed by a section on the dual process of economic liberalisation and democratisation in Tanzania with shifting political settlement dynamics. The following two sections identify intensified elections from around 2010 onwards as the major impetus to re-legitimise CCM and reshape the ruling coalition
by separating money and politics. This was reinforced under President John Magufuli, whose populist appeals to the rural majority were combined with the delegitimation of the opposition and the partial substitution of private capital by a state-led development model. Finally, the conclusion suggests that legitimacy should supplement, not replace, the focus on rents and force in political settlement analysis, as these factors continue to play important roles.

2. Sources of power in political settlement theory

Though elections and legitimacy are recognised as playing a role in the political settlement literature, that literature is not clear on what exactly this implies. This has to do with some core tenets in political settlement analysis that see political and business interests as so closely intertwined that there is little room for the development of more formal political, administrative and economic institutions. Political settlement analysis was developed as a critique of the new institutional economics (NIE) literature, which emphasised the reduction of violence in developing countries as a precondition for political and economic transformation (North et al., 2009). NIE has been criticised for its failure to engage with informal institutions and their interplay with formal ones. As Hazel Gray put it, informal institutions are important, especially in countries where the informal structures of governance dominate and certain elites ‘operate through informal routes, primarily through patron–client networks, to protect their political power and rights over income flows, including state-generated rents’ (Gray, 2016: 69; Gray 2018). In her study of large-scale corruption in Tanzania, Gray demonstrated empirically the importance of looking at the hidden level of informal deals and networks and the power held by those individuals, businesses and groups that influence and operate in the shadows and extend their influence over key sectors of the economy. She also offers insights into how the state tends to support business elites and domestic capitalists operating outside the formal sector (Gray, 2015).

Whereas the NIE literature tends to focus on how the emergence of formal institutions facilitates such changes, the political settlement approach has a clearer focus on the relations between economic and political structures that shape or, alternatively, hamper institutional change. Political elites thus rely on business actors and domestic capitalists in mobilising resources to help them maintain power, while, conversely, business actors rely on politicians to gain access to state resources and to obtain assistance from the state to create markets for their products and shield them from undue competition (Whitfield et al., 2017). What in a western context would be perceived as corruption thus merely reflects the fact that developing countries do not have the capacity and resources to establish and maintain more formal institutions. As Whitfield et al. remark, ‘rent-seeking always occurs, but it is not always bad’ (p. 12). For example, a political settlement may provide much-needed political stability.

From this structuralist perspective, elite bargaining and intra-elite relations are decisive for whatever is decided and implemented. The interdependence between
the political and economic elites tends to produce an equilibrium of the distribution of power and benefits, or, as stated by the settlement approach’s most prominent theoretician, Mushtaq Khan: ‘A political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability’ (Khan, 2010: 4). Due to its focus on structural factors, political settlement analysis therefore seeks to unpack those intra-elite relations that are instrumental in choosing policies and their modes of implementation in society. As the main sources of power, the early settlement analyses emphasised (i) hard power through the military, which was key in pre-capitalist settlements, but retains a potential role if a settlement enters into crisis; and (ii) rents and patronage. Reforms that challenge the status quo will be met by resistance from within, not least in African countries, where the capacity of domestic capitalists is weak and the understanding of the logic of the market economy therefore limited (Di John and Putzel, 2009; Whitfield et al., 2015).

The emphasis on the importance of informal relations between political and economic elites means that the analysis of elections and democratic legitimacy is not well developed, since these are not thought that important for the distribution of power and economic benefits. In his seminal text, Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions, Khan only mentions elections after 67 pages and in relation to the dominant parties, which are only likely to opt for competitive elections if they are likely to win (Khan, 2010). On the one hand, Khan also mentions that perceptions of legitimacy may play a role in mobilising in conflicts that explains ‘why richer individuals or groups do not always win’ (p. 6), thus potentially opening up a space for the influence of the broader population. On the other hand, he does not elaborate on this further. As the most electorally competitive variants of Khan’s patron-client types of regime, so-called ‘competitive clientelism’, elections merely ‘provide a mechanism for testing the organizational power of competing coalitions’ (p. 68).

From this perspective, popular legitimacy plays a limited role in much of the political settlement analysis, since power is decided by intra-elite struggles. Khan explicitly criticises Weber’s notion of legitimacy for emphasising the legitimacy of charismatic individuals over structural factors (Khan, 2010: 62). Whitfield et al. (2015) pay much attention to campaign finance, but little to how elections affect relations between elites and populations. Similarly, Di John and Putzel (2009) mention elections in a footnote on page 16 of their text, noticing that elites may opt for transfers of power through elections in order to prevent disruption, but, if they do so, they will make sure that competitors share power, regardless of election outcomes. In other words, elections tend to be depicted as a mere mimicry of those in developed countries, rendering voters mere pawns in elites’ games.

Recent strands of political settlement analysis have put greater emphasis on ideas and ideology that are linked to legitimacy. Lavers and Hickey suggest that ideas, ideology and the transnational influence of development partners may play a role in
shaping sector policies (Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Lavers, 2018). From this perspective, ideas matter, not only from an intra-elite perspective, but also as ‘shared beliefs, popular attitudes and policy-framing’ (Lavers and Hickey, 2016: 390). This points to a more fundamental link between elites, popular legitimacy and policy choices than in previous formulations. Indeed, Lavers and Hickey suggest that in periods of institutional instability, elites may not only revisit sector policy choices, but also renegotiate more broadly ‘the terms of the settlements with citizens’ (p. 394), but they do not shed much light on the implications of this in practice. Similarly, Behuria et al. (2017) suggest that historical legitimacy influences the ability to mobilise support and that this has implications for patterns of accumulation. The relationships between democratisation, legitimacy and political settlements are, however, still little explored.

The literature on democratisation and legitimisation coming out of research on the third wave of democratisation is clearer in this regard. In his work on democratisation and elections, Lindberg has pointed to evidence suggesting that the repetition of electoral processes, even if flawed or manipulated, improves the quality of elections by making a number of actors within a state responsible for protecting political rights, improving procedures, etc. This also makes it harder for other state representatives not to respect electoral processes (Lindberg, 2009; See also Diamond and Plattner, 2010; Lynch and Crawford, 2012). Even if these achievements have come under pressure recently from the strengthening of illiberal regimes (Cheeseman, 2018; Cheeseman and Klaas, 2018; Kovacs and Bjarnesen, 2018), this development suggests that elections are more important for the distribution of power than is often acknowledged. Furthermore, rural smallholders, who are non-elites, are found to have influenced policy-making and implementation if they are well organised and if political elites share their interest in achieving certain outcomes (Kjær and Therkildsen, 2013).

Recent research also suggests that democratisation may have an impact on the policy choices of political elites. Whereas much attention has been paid to the phenomenon of rent in political settlement analysis, democratisation may lead to more issue-based politics, even though the issues of rents and distribution often overlap. Even in semi-democratic regimes, elites increasingly focus on the policies they believe can help them win elections, for instance, in areas of social service provision (Kjær and Therkildsen, 2012; Harding and Stasavage, 2014). The issue of taxation has been identified as a potential mobilising tool, with variations according to party lines, not least when it comes to natural resources, which can also be used to influence political settlements (Rakner, 2017; Jacob and Pedersen, 2018a; Poncian, 2019). Lavers suggests that in competitive clientelist settlements, this is more likely to be played out along neopatrimonial lines of personality, ethnicity and region, when compared to more centralised, dominant party regimes with more programmatic approaches (Lavers, 2018).
Rather than claiming that democratic legitimacy replaces clientelist politics in countries undergoing democratisation, it would be more correct to state that it adds another source of power that can be applied next to those of force and rents. Indeed, the fact that the third wave of democratisation in Africa may have been due more to dissatisfaction with the failure of economic policies to provide for economic needs than to a push for democracy (Huntington, 1991; Chabal, 1998, 2005; Schatzberg, 2001) suggests that the distribution of rents may also have an effect on legitimacy. Indeed, the material progress of Asian countries has proved to be an important source of elite legitimacy, even in the absence of democratic elections (Parks and Cole, 2010; Sandby-Thomas, 2010). This points to the fact that rents can be channelled through informal as well as formal institutions and that the balance between the two and its effect on power and legitimacy will differ from one type of regime to another.

Even if we are interested in how democratisation affects elite legitimacy in countries undergoing democratisation, we should not limit the focus to legal, constitutional issues, as some legitimacy scholars tend to do (see, for instance, Beetham, 2013). The context of democratisation does, however, affect forms of power and legitimacy and is likely to have distributional consequences. Jessop’s strategic relational approach points out that a context may reinforce specific forms of action and that individuals and groups may be more or less successful in exploiting and strategically shaping the changing structural configuration, depending on their ‘feel for the game’ (Jessop, 2005: 49). Analytically, this directs more attention to the forms of actions that form part of processes of legitimation. Whereas legitimacy per se is the result of long-term processes, and ultimately involves the consent and approval of other actors that is hard to measure, the politics of legitimation can be analysed through attempts to legitimise (Sandby-Thomas, 2010).

Attempts to legitimise may have both a discursive and a material dimension. Discursively, political elites will seek to legitimise their rule. Materially, they distribute rents among different groups in society. Whereas the two may be correlated, enabling a political elite to claim that its policies benefit some parts, even a majority, of the population, they need not do so. In the long run, however, such attempts are unlikely to succeed if the discrepancy between discourse and policies is too great. In the context of democratisation, this points to a more complex politics of legitimation. Whereas political settlement analysis has a well developed understanding of the significance of intra-elite relations for legitimacy, we suggest that more groups of actors have to be included. Apart from political elites attempting to legitimise their rule among bureaucrats and party members, as some of the recent political settlement literature has pointed out, as Sandby-Thomas notes, this first and foremost involves the general population. However, the inclusion of the latter in our analysis also implies a need to include the political elite’s relations with the opposition and the international community. In the following sections we demonstrate how this is increasingly the case in mainland Tanzania.
3. Shifting policy agendas as responses to crises of elite legitimacy under liberalisation

Structural adjustment and the adoption of multiparty politics in 1992 heralded the advent of a new reform coalition in Tanzanian politics that fundamentally changed the political and economic dynamics in the country. The private sector had never completely been abolished during the era of African socialism, but now it acquired a prominent role in Tanzania’s development, most conspicuously demonstrated by the revision of the Arusha Declaration in 1991, which allowed and encouraged party members to engage in private-sector activities (Gibbon, 1995). After the separation of party and state, the ruling party, the CCM, maintained its dominant position, in part by striking an alliance with domestic businessmen able to help its politicians finance party activities and development projects that could help it win elections (Gibbon, 1995; Therkildsen and Bourguin, 2012; Gray, 2015). Another element in this emerging coalition was the informal ‘grand bargain’ between the government and development donors, after a major crisis over reform implementation had led to the suspension of aid in 1994 (Edwards, 2014). By then, donors had tired of a policy-making process in which reforms were passed under the auspices of the reform-minded President Mwinyi, only to be undermined by traditionalist CCM ministers and bureaucrats during implementation (Therkildsen, 2000; Lofchie, 2014). After the bargain, privatisation and the opening up to the FDI that was meant to drive the economy gained speed for real.

The ensuing dominant party coalition that was formed between reformers, development partners, FDI and private Tanzanian businessmen gave the new president – the reform-minded and market-friendly Benjamin Mkapa, elected in the first multi-party elections in 1995 – a freer hand to pursue reforms that gradually changed the country’s development model away from the state-centric policies of African socialism. The emergence of this intra-elite coalition fits well with general political settlement theory, as well as with much of the existing political economy research on Tanzania, which tends to focus more on the liberalisation of the economy (see, for instance, Coulson 2013; Lofchie, 2014; Gray, 2015; Kimambo et al., 2017). However, we would argue that a no less significant change became increasingly apparent from around 2000. In contrast to the early phases of liberalisation, economic reforms were increasingly coupled with improved access to social services. This included Vision 2025, drawn up by the newly elected President Mkapa immediately after the 1995 election.

Vision 2025 was launched in 2000, another election year, its aim being to transform Tanzania into a middle-income country by 2025, through a policy of ‘unleashing the power of the market’, though with the state in a slightly more facilitating role than in the early years of structural adjustment (URT, 2000). What is remarkable about Vision 2025 is its insistence that the hardship of economic reform was worth going through, because it would be coupled with social progress for the broader population:
Ideally, a nation’s development should be people-centred, based on sustainable and shared growth and be free from abject poverty. For Tanzania, this development means that the creation of wealth and its distribution in society must be equitable and free from inequalities and all forms of social and political relations which inhibit empowerment and effective democratic and popular participation of social groups…” (URT, 2000).

Subsequently, social reforms were heralded in CCM election manifestos and targeted the entire population (CCM, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015).

One example of the increased emphasis on improved access to services is the promise of free primary education that Mkapa campaigned on in the 2000 elections, a return to the CCM’s pre-structural adjustment policies. President Kikwete (2005-15) expanded the coverage of secondary schools, a policy taken further with the abolition of secondary school fees at the last elections (Kjær and Therkildsen, 2012; Kjær and Therkildsen, 2013). Also in 2000, the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) was introduced, combining community-driven infrastructure projects with work programme interventions. The construction of health infrastructure in rural areas was prominent in the 2005 Manifesto and has continued to be a priority (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018b). Often the emphasis on improving social services accorded with donor priorities, which shifted during those same years, but not always. For instance, the expansion of health infrastructure in the Primary Health Services Development Programme (MMAM) in 2007 came as an unwelcome surprise to Tanzania’s development partners, who emphasised improvements in the quality of services over physical infrastructure (Pedersen and Jacob, 2018).

Some scholars have suggested that the preference for the conspicuous construction of infrastructure based on promises made by the CCM during elections was mere rhetoric, in order to win votes, only to be forgotten during implementation (O’Gorman, 2012; Kjær and Therkildsen, 2012). It has also been pointed out that the mode of implementation through community-driven projects provided local political leaders and bureaucrats, who were still overwhelmingly CCM members, a platform permitting semi-formalised forms of patronage that were useful at election times (Kelsall et al., 2005). If correct, this would be in agreement with Tanzania’s recent history. The party-state of African socialism had a long tradition of pro-poor policies targeting the rural population on paper, though with their implementation and distributional impact varying significantly over the years. Whereas the Arusha Declaration of 1967 emphasised farmers’ and workers’ ownership of the means of production, leading to the suppression of an emerging group of entrepreneurial farmers and the nationalisation of much property and business, these changes often ended up benefiting the urban middle classes. In 1976, the system of agricultural cooperatives controlled by individual members was replaced by centralised parastatal crop authorities, later turned into crop boards. By keeping prices low, this served to tax farmers and subsidise the urban population and the new managerial class in the emerging parastatal industries (Bates, 1981; Mukandala, 1989; Morrissey and
Leyaro, 2009). Indeed, the implementation of MMAM resulted in a lot of unfinished construction and in health facilities with inadequate equipment and untrained staff. Similar examples can be found in the education sector.

However, we would argue that the increasingly competitive elections of the 2000s motivated the CCM to return to its roots as a party for workers and peasants, as the implementation of its policies increasingly targeted the rural majority of the population, which still overwhelmingly voted CCM. Whereas the Tanzanian population did not participate directly in the formulation of policies, multiparty elections did push the ruling party to formulate policies that it perceived would help it persuade the majority of the population to keep voting CCM. Furthermore, other research suggests that access to basic services did improve during the period (Weinstein, 2011; Rosenzweig, 2015). For instance, from 1998 to 2008, net primary school enrolment increased from less than 60 percent to well above 90 percent (Carlitz, 2011; ADE et al., 2013). In the run-up to the 2015 elections, the extension of cash transfers to the rural poor reached approximately 10 percent of the population (Beegle et al., 2018). This type of intervention had traditionally been regarded with scepticism within the CCM, which tended to emphasise the beneficiaries’ own contributions to social policy (Jacob and Pedersen, 2018b).

In sum, the advent of multi-party politics pushed the political elite to pursue policies targeting the rural majority that they perceived would help them win elections. This had become increasingly important as the urban elites increasingly voted for the opposition. Ultimately, this development ended up undermining the coalition of liberalisation. However, these trends were not unambiguous: whereas interventions were pro-poor discursively, their distributional effects were at times less clear. Though inequalities in education and wealth declined in this period, it was from a very high level, and levels of poverty remain high (UNECA, 2018, Maliti, 2018). The construction of health and education infrastructure and the expansion of access to services were effective means of winning elections, but the quality of services was often wanting. Similarly, despite the abolition of fees in education and, to some extent health, their collection often continued locally (Vavrus and Moshi, 2009). In other words, although the discursive and distributional actions of CCM did not always correlate one to one, nonetheless interventions were used strategically for electoral purposes.

4. Re-legitimation of the ruling party under post-liberalisation

In the late 2000s, the ruling coalition was threatened with fracturing, as disagreements erupted within the CCM over the relationship between money and politics (Whitfield et al., 2015, Gray, 2015). This had already been an issue within the party in the elections in 2000 and 2005, when incumbent MP candidates had been banned from running, due to their violations of the party’s campaign guidelines (Morse, 2018: 139-140), but the sense of urgency increased in the run-up to the 2010 elections. These tensions were related to the emergence of Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) as a strong opposition party after years of organisational
capacity-building, which had given the party an unprecedented presence at the local level throughout the country and also broadened its economic base to include a much broader section of Tanzania’s businesses and urban middle classes (Paget, 2017b). Relentless campaign activities by a number of high-profile party figures, often bringing to light a number of grand corruption scandals, not least in the energy sector, and claims that the country did not benefit enough from its mining resources, contributed to conveying an image to the wider public of a CCM elite tainted by corruption.

The 2010 elections were historically competitive and gave the opposition parties a strong platform in parliament for the first time. In the 2014 local government elections, the CCM lost control of a significant number of local authorities for the first time, and in the national elections in 2015, the opposition was further strengthened. Already prior to the elections the CCM had begun reform by opening up party primaries to include all CCM members, not just party delegates, in order to improve mobilisation (Morse, 2018: 149). As a response to the election outcomes, in 2011 the party embarked on a process of distancing itself from corrupt party members in a rebranding campaign famously known in Swahili as ‘Kujivua gamba’ (‘like a snake shedding its skin’), which included internal reforms. The major elements were (i) to bring the leadership of the party closer to the people, by having the members of the party’s national executive committee elected at the district instead of regional level, and (ii) to take action against corrupt leaders (Daily News, 2012; Msekwa, 2017b). These changes allowed the then president, Jakay Kikwete, and some top party leaders to sideline the leader of the Mtandao (‘Network’), Edward Lowassa, during the selection of presidential candidates in the run-up to the 2015 elections, since for many Lowassa personified the link between businessmen and party politics and was therefore perceived to be corrupt (Branson, 2015; Tsubura, 2017). New nomination guidelines from 2012 gave an ethics committee more power to influence the selection of candidates. Prior to the party primaries, Kikwete warned that the time when CCM could choose any candidate and expect him to win was over; now, a candidate had to be ‘saleable’ to both party members and Tanzanians in general (Citizen, 2015; see also Morse, 2018: 149ff).

Whereas the changes had thus been under way for some time, the implementation of the Kujivua gamba campaign appeared, if not half-hearted, then very slow in the early years, possibly due to the fracturing of the CCM. However, some of Tanzania’s richest men did depart as CCM MPs in the years that followed, and with the deselection of Lowassa and the nomination of John Pombe Magufuli, a compromise candidate, as the presidential candidate in 2015, Lowassa and dozens of others defected to Chadema. The separation of money and politics was reinforced by the fact that Magufuli ran on an anti-establishment ticket of ‘change’, portraying himself as an outsider who was siding with the people against a corrupt elite (Kisanga, 2015; Guardian, 2015). Though he had been a minister since 1995, he was widely seen as having steered clear of corruption and as a firm implementer, and accordingly he won the election (Mbashiru, 2015). Taking over the chairmanship of the party after the
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elections, Magufuli heavy-handedly continued the reform of the party, not only by taking over the agenda of separating money and politics, but also by centralising the decision-making power around himself as party chairman.

Recent reforms of the CCM have reduced the number of CC and NEC members. At the end of an extraordinary party congress in March 2017, the membership of the NEC was reduced from 388 to 163, and the central committee membership from 34 to 24. More important is the fact that the number of meetings has been reduced and that individuals have been prohibited from holding multiple leadership positions (Guardian, 2016; Msekwa, 2017a). In practice, this has reduced the leverage of the other top leaders within the party. A new line-up of both the NEC and CC members was announced, consisting of many fresh faces, most of whom are Magufuli loyalists. Recent reforms also saw the expulsion of prominent members of the NEC and CC who were affiliated with the Kikwete and Lowassa factions. CCM has also recently emphasised that only candidates who reside in a constituency are allowed, in order to ensure that they ‘are familiar with the challenges facing constituents and … can address those challenges’ (Citizen, 2017f). Combined, these changes have made Magufuli stronger within the party than his recent predecessors. This has also reduced the room for internal dissent in the formerly quite diverse party and at times led to open conflicts, something quite unheard of, as well as more defections.

At the same time, the approach towards the opposition hardened after years of expanding the space for politics. The activities of the opposition parties were suppressed through a number of measures. First, live TV coverage from parliament was ended and then, in June 2016, an indefinite ban on public meetings, including party rallies, was announced, denying the opposition major platforms to reach out to new constituencies (Paget, 2017b). Whereas Kikwete had begun acknowledging that the CCM would have to earn power or else lose it, Magufuli has stated that CCM will rule forever (see, for instance, Financial Times, 2007; East African, 2018). Justifying these measures, Magufuli repeatedly contrasted politicking at rallies between elections with his vision of developing the economy:

‘Some people have failed to engage in legitimate politics; they would like to see street protests everyday (…) We want to build a strong economy for all Tanzanians, and we are on the right track. Let us be patient: Tanzania will become a land of honey’ (Reuters, 2018).

Furthermore, members of the opposition were repeatedly targeted by the police and tax authorities on various charges, which meant that they – not least one of their most vocal leaders, Tundu Lissu, who also served as president of Tanganyika Law Society – ended up spending significant time in custody or defending themselves in court. Lissu later survived an assassination attempt in September 2017 in the country’s capital, Dodoma. Recently, a number of MPs and local government politicians have defected back to the ruling party, some clearly having been paid to do so and others being rewarded with lucrative positions in the administration. None
of this is completely unheard of in Tanzania, and the limiting of public debate in fact began with the passing of restrictive media laws prior to Magufuli’s ascent to power. However, the intensity with which the restrictions are now being enforced is new.

The initial opposition response was equally fierce, as it shifted its main emphasis from corruption to issues of democracy and dictatorship (Paget 2017b). By accusing Magufuli of reintroducing a dictatorship and of violating basic democratic rules, rights and procedures, it sought to depict his rule as illegitimate (AFP, 2016; Citizen, 2017g). From a traditional political settlement approach, the measures introduced to suppress the opposition could be explained by the resulting reduction of the cost of maintaining power, as the need to campaign between elections had been reduced significantly. However, we would argue that the concerted efforts to delegitimise the opposition are equally important. In a country where peace and unity have been a part of the dominant national discourse since independence (Bjerk, 2015), often with explicit references to the greater violence of neighbouring countries, the repeated charges, arrests and defections makes it easy to paint opposition politicians as hotheads and trouble-makers. A second opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), which has its stronghold on the coast and in Zanzibar, is also often discursively associated with Islamic extremism (Gilsaa, 2012; Africa Confidential, 2018). What is more, it presents a threat to what Berger has called ‘task success’, that is, fulfilling the expectations that people may have of other actors, which is essential for processes of legitimation (Berger et al., 1998). In a country where people only access information through the public media to a limited extent, rallies provide an important platform for political parties to connect to voters (Paget, 2017b), often facilitated by food, entertainment and gifts. By not being able to campaign, while the president and his ministers are relentlessly touring the country, the opposition struggled to fulfil the basic expectations that people have of a political party. Whether because of the CCM’s de-legitimisation efforts or their own internal weaknesses, the leading opposition parties, such as CHADEMA and the CUF, were characterised by defections, internal fighting, fragmentation and succession battles in the years that followed.

5. Reshaping the political settlement under post-liberalisation: Vying for the rural constituency

The competitive 2010 elections not only marked a watershed for the internal organisation of the CCM, they also caused a rethink of the country’s economic development model, as well as the composition of the coalition that held it in power. However, the shift in thinking was radicalised with Magufuli, whose constant populist interventions reflected his weakness as much as his strength. His being considered an outsider in the party led to him to be constantly pursuing reforms that challenged the vested interests of the political and economic elites, on the one hand, while seeking to build a new power base, on the other hand. The main element in the attempt to reshape the coalition that was to help keep the CCM in power was to reinforce the link with the popular, predominantly rural constituencies. As pointed out above, under post-liberalisation, the CCM increasingly focused on reaching out to the
rural population by improving access to services. Under Magufuli, for the first time this popular element was allowed to influence the economic development model, which had hitherto followed a rather liberal trajectory. Redistribution appeared to have acquired a greater emphasis, as a number of interventions touched upon the property rights and sanctity of contracts, which had hitherto been core tenets in the country’s attempt to attract investments. Now the state was to play a greater role, at the expense of western development donors and domestic capitalists.

First, and hugely popular, were interventions aimed at the privileges of the urban bureaucracy. For the first time, people began being fired more systematically for corruption, incompetence, disobedience or a lack of qualifications, compared to previous administrations (Therkildsen and Bourguin, 2012; see also Khan and Gray, 2006). The president justified this and related interventions by saying that he had not been elected to maintain or increase public servants’ pay, but to work for poor or ordinary Tanzanians (see, for instance, Citizen, 2017h). Compared to the analysis carried out by Therkildsen and Bourguin (2012), which sees the bureaucracy as a major part of the ruling coalition, this is a major change. The reduction in the payment of sitting allowances to public servants, and restrictions on their use of hotels for workshops and on their international travel, could also be seen in this light, signalling a redistribution of resources from the urban middle classes to investments in schools and infrastructure across the entire country. The savings from travel restrictions alone amount to nearly USD 429.5 million a year (Citizen, 2016; Citizen, 2017b). This change also had to do with the fact that the CCM has lost control of significant numbers of local councils, especially since the local council elections of 2014, and especially in urban areas. This has led to decision-making being centralised in a way that has weakened the autonomy not only of the councils, but also of the line ministries, whose technocrats often find themselves being overruled by what they perceive to be politicised decisions by the few influential figures around the president.

Secondly, the repossession of land and extractive resources from investors, especially foreign investors, began soon after Magufuli’s ascent to power and had a redistributive edge in favour of rural constituencies. In interventions that were covered intensely by the media, underutilised land owned by large-scale investors, at times part of or affiliated with the opposition, was expropriated. Recently, the president has declared that repossessed land would be distributed for use by ordinary people (Citizen, 2017a; Citizen 2017c). Artisanal miners, predominantly located in north-western Tanzania, where Magufuli also hails from, emerged as a particularly important constituency and were targeted through a number of measures (Kinyondo and Huggins, 2019). Around 1–1.5 million miners are involved in ASM across the country, a number that becomes even greater when families are included. A large proportion of them come from Lake Victoria’s gold and diamond belt in north-western Tanzania, especially in regions such as Mwanza, Geita, Mara, Simiyu and Shinyanga (Weldegiorgis and Buxton, 2017). While they were officially recognised in the 1998 and 2010 Mining Acts, they remained vulnerable to evictions related to the operations of multinational companies (Jønsson and Fold, 2011; Pedersen et al.,
2016). However, Magufuli ordered government authorities to stop harassing artisanal miners and, in December 2016, he ordered that a prospecting licence issued to Pangea, a subsidiary of the Canadian company Acacia, be revoked and the mining block to be returned to artisanal miners (Guardian, 2016). In April 2018, a new mining commission was constituted, in which artisanal miners are represented for the first time.

A group of staunch nationalists from the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM), where Magufuli did his bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees, highly educated and with a strong faith in planning and research, helped him shape these popular policies. Various posts in the central administration, the cabinet, key state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and national commissions of inquiry are headed by UDSM people. Top of the list is Palamagamba Kabudi, who was appointed Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs in March 2017. While new legislation is normally drafted by the Attorney General’s office after being prepared in the line ministries, Kabudi and another UDSM scholar, Florens Luoga, led the drafting team that drew up the amendments to mining legislation pushed through by Magufuli in July 2017 (see following section). The Ministry of Energy and Minerals and its affiliated institutions, such as the State Mining Corporation (STAMICO), the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) and the now defunct Tanzania Mineral Audit Agency, were sidelined during the drafting process. Kabudi also led the subsequent renegotiation of the contracts of the largest mining corporation in the country, Acacia. He has also been tasked with leading the drafting of the Inter-Governmental Agreement for the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) from Hoima in Uganda to Tanga in Tanzania, another high-level project. Luoga was later appointed governor of the Bank of Tanzania, after being appointed chairman of the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA).

Much of Magufuli’s agenda was taken from the CCM’s manifesto, but, as should be clear, it was flavoured by the president’s own populist mode of implementation. Frequently he justified interventions by pointing to the mandate he had been given by the party members and the people (Guardian, 2016; Citizen, 2017h; Citizen 2017i). The populist strategy of winning popular support seems to be working thus far. The latest Afribarometer published in 2018 shows that of the 66 percent of Tanzanians who feel close to a party, 51 percent feel close to the CCM, with Chadema in second place, at only 11 percent (see REPOA and Afribarometer, 2018). Most of this 51 percent live in rural areas, confirming the ‘inherent loyalty’ in the countryside identified by O’Gorman in her survey and article on single-party dominance in Tanzania (O’Gorman, 2012). CCM has also won almost all by-elections since 2015, though rarely on a level playing field with the opposition, which complains about harassment and violent attacks.
6. Reshaping the political settlement under post-liberalisation: The economic reforms

The attempts to reshape the coalition that was to help keep the CCM in power also came to influence Tanzania’s economic development model. Under liberalisation, CCM election manifestos and poverty-reduction strategies had had high economic growth as their main priority, and they saw the private sector as its engine, to be facilitated by good governance, macroeconomic stability and limited state intervention (Selbervik, 2006; CCM, 2000, 2005, 2010). This rather liberal development model well suited the composition of the ruling coalition, with its inclusion of domestic businessmen that had played an important role in the late 1990s and 2000s in driving the economic development of the country and had thus underpinned the CCM’s grip on power by financing its election campaigns (Gray, 2015). However, after the competitive 2010 elections, the thinking on domestic resource mobilisation started changing. The reintroduction of five-year development plans in 2011 signalled a shift to a more interventionist state (URT, 2011) maintaining that, although the private sector remained important, business as usual was no longer an option.

The shift in thinking began in the mining sector, where a number of government-initiated reports, initiated in response to the opposition’s relentless criticisms of shady and corrupt deals, had concluded that Tanzania had received too little out of its own resources. A major aim of the 2010 Mining Act (section 10) was to strengthen the role of the state as a direct investor in resource extraction (URT, 2010). This move resulted in the goal of reviving and recapitalising SOEs in the mining and petroleum sectors, as outlined in the 2011 Five Year Development Plan (URT, 2011; Jacob et al. 2016; Jacob 2017; Pedersen and Jacob, 2017). Under Magufuli, the shift in thinking was radicalised. In 2017, three bills challenged FDI by reaffirming national sovereignty over extractive resources and removing companies’ ability to go to international arbitration (Woodroffe et al., 2017; Jacob and Pedersen, 2018a). This also allowed the renegotiation of natural resource contracts as part of a declared ‘economic war’ (Paget, 2017a). Renegotiation of the contracts with the country’s biggest miner, the London-listed Acacia Mining, was sought after a commission had alleged that the company had not paid its due share of taxes. Towards the end of 2017, a special gas sector investigation committee was set up by the Tanzanian parliament, which in 2018 presented its findings from an assessment of the gas deals that the country had entered with international companies over the last two decades. This was followed by calls for the renegotiation of contracts (Daily News, 2018a; Bofin and Pedersen, 2019; Pedersen and Jacob, 2019).

Since the 2015 elections, the trend towards increased state involvement in the economy was extended from the extractives to include other sectors. The second Five Year Development Plan for 2016/17-2020/21 places greater emphasis on growth, a pro-active industrialisation policy and transformation. Subsequently, a number of SOEs have been revived and/or strengthened. Acknowledging that the
state has only limited resources, the Plan envisages the pension funds providing the capital to help finance this drive to industrialisation, which has indeed happened, facilitated by a presidential order (URT and Planning, 2016; Kamndaya, 2017). The pension funds are themselves not unlike SOEs, having been established by law, with director generals appointed by the president and limited independence (URT, 1997). Recently the seven pension funds have been merged into two better capitalised funds, one for the public sector, the other for the private sector.

In building a new coalition, the strengthening of SOEs is useful. In Tanzania, SOEs have historically been tools for mobilising resources for development, whose use, furthermore, tends to be closely intertwined with politics, as they provide useful platforms for election campaigns (Mukandala, 1989). Much suggests that they serve similar functions today. The constant launching of new projects across the country, involving the president himself or his cabinet ministers, and the creation of thousands of formal jobs in localities where unemployment is rife, is without doubt hugely popular, even though it also seems to have created some anxiety among those who are footing the bill, namely the urban middle classes who pay into these pension funds (Qorro, 2017; *Daily News*, 2018b). With time, SOE employees and their families might also become important CCM strongholds, as they were in the past.

Whereas the president and his government have repeatedly stated that the private sector remains important, their actions in their first two years of rule point in a different direction. The role of Western development donors and FDI is decreasing, and domestic entrepreneurs are complaining that the business climate has become unfavourable. The presidential order that state entities must procure resources from other state entities to a greater extent, and the directive that SOEs should transfer their accounts from commercial banks to the central bank, have significantly weakened the role of private capital in a country where the public sector makes up such a large part of the economy (*Citizen*, 2016; Kamndaya, 2017). The larger domestic entrepreneurs previously an integral part of the political settlement, have been weakened in various ways, and several entrepreneurs have left the CCM parliamentary caucus, while the seizure of property involving some formerly influential actors has led to protests from these businesses and their business associations (Athumani, 2016; *Citizen*, 2017d; *Citizen*, 2017e).

Again, these developments are not unambiguous. For instance, whereas the strengthening of SOEs had already been announced discursively with the 2010 Mining Act and the 2011 Five Year Development Plan, implementation was often slow, as evidenced by the long drawn-out negotiations between international mining companies and the Tanzanian government (*Financial Times*, 2019). Furthermore, the distributional consequences of government interventions were at times ambivalent. The heavy-handed interventions to prevent the smuggling of ASM-mined gold and gemstones are reported to have increased the tax take (*Daily News*, 2019a; *Guardian*, 2019). However, the same ASMs have recently been exempted from tax liabilities, meaning that ASM miners no longer have to pay a withholding tax (5
percent) or a value added tax (18 percent) (Daily News, 2019b; see also Pedersen et al., 2019).

7. Discussion

Political settlement analysis has provided important insights into the structural factors that have often hampered the implementation of growth-enhancing reforms in developing countries. The limited resources and capacity available thus make possible intimate relations – or settlements – between political and economic elite interests that undermine the emergence of a more competitive private sector. Recently, new strands of political settlement analysis have emerged that pay greater attention to the role of ideas, ideology and how these are linked to elite legitimacy (Lavers and Hickey, 2016; Behuria et al., 2017; Lavers, 2018). This paper contributes to this emerging body of research by exploring the role of popular legitimacy in the context of democratisation, which is still not well developed. By introducing an adapted strategic-relational approach to political settlement analysis, it sees legitimacy as involving processes of legitimation, that is, attempts to legitimate elite rule, whose outcomes are shaped by tripartite relations between political elites, intermediate staff in context-specific settings (i.e. bureaucrats and/or party members) and populations. This potentially provides the latter with a more prominent place than in the early political settlement literature, which tends to focus on intra-elite relations alone.

The paper has used Tanzania, which has had the same ruling party since independence in 1961, as a critical case, suggesting that, if its political elite seeks to legitimate itself in democratic terms and allows this to influence the country’s political settlement, similar processes of legitimation are likely to take place in other countries undergoing democratisation too. Indeed, the paper finds that increased electoral competition has made the rural population, which makes up the majority of the electorate in Tanzania, a more important source of power since multi-party elections were reintroduced in the mid-1990s. This, in turn, has led to concerted efforts by the ruling CCM party to target these voters, initially by improving access to social services countrywide, and later by redistributing resources as a strategy to win popular support. It has also meant that, since the historically competitive 2010 elections, the party has gradually shifted its thinking on the country’s economic development model – from it being a rather liberal model, towards one that is a more nationalist and state-driven. In turn, this has led to attempts to reshape the political settlement away from its reliance on the increasingly unpopular entrepreneurs whether domestic or foreign.

This development has been radicalised under the current President Magufuli, who came to power after the historically competitive elections in 2015. Referring to his popular democratic mandate, he challenged the interests of existing political and economic elites in the name of the people and the party base through populist interventions. However, the increased importance of democratic legitimacy as a source of power does not mean that the old sources of power in political settlement
analysis – force and rents – have become unimportant. Being considered an outsider, Magufuli has become even more reliant on the security services, which were always an important constituency in Tanzania’s ruling coalition. This helps explain his conspicuous post-election courting of the army and the police. Whereas he has challenged most other branches of the public sector and the economy, including former party allies from the business sector, the security apparatus has received more resources. Current military spending increased from 0.93 percent in 2012 to 1.14 percent in 2016 (Odunga, 2016; CIA, 2017) and the police have also seen increased investments (Citizen, 2018; The Guardian, 2018).

Elements of rents and patronage politics used to help build and maintain a coalition can also still be observed. The ban on campaign activities between elections helps reduce the need for campaign finances, and thus reliance on domestic capitalists, for the ruling party. The systematic replacement of top-ranking managers in many SOEs under the Magufuli administration will help the president establish a loyal group of bureaucrats with operations throughout the country, as an alternative. The construction of an international airport in the president’s hometown of Chato, in the Lake Zone, is one of several examples of patronage politics targeting his home region, which until the 2015 elections was an opposition stronghold. The frequent appointment of people from the same Lake Zone to government leadership posts has also led to allegations of nepotism by the opposition, which would be a novelty in Tanzanian politics, in which ethnicity has traditionally played a smaller role than in most neighbouring countries. However, though important, this element of neopatrimonialism should not be exaggerated. First, it is not only people from his own Sukuma ethnic group from the region who are benefiting. Secondly, it may also reflect the fact that, although the Lake Zone has around a quarter of Tanzania’s population, historically it has had a smaller share of posts as ministers and in the bureaucracy, due to the efforts to balance representation from the entire country. In fact, the number of ministers from the region is not significantly higher than the region’s share of Tanzania’s population (see Appendix).

In sum, whereas popular legitimacy has become a more important source of power in countries undergoing democratisation, the paper suggests that a strategic-relational approach to political settlement analysis should look at how it is combined with the classic power sources of rents and force. With democratisation, populations may play a greater role as voters, as well as being points of reference that allow ruling politicians to sideline other elite constituencies. However, this is not a unilinear process, as Tanzania shows. First, the development is not unambiguous, as policy interventions discursively targeting the rural majority of Tanzanians were not always implemented, or were implemented only very slowly. This points to the importance of distinguishing analytically between discursive interventions and their material consequences. Secondly, Tanzania is currently experiencing a setback in democratic terms, with restrictions on political opponents, which may reduce the role of popular legitimacy over time. As should be clear, the country’s political elite strategically undermines the main opposition parties and other political opponents, arguing that
national development should take precedence over democratic bickering. This, in turn, will also affect the tripartite relations between the ruling political elite, intermediate staff and populations, first by limiting the space for dissent, and secondly by making economic development, not democracy, the yardstick by which elite legitimacy should ultimately be measured. Relations with political opponents is the second dimension of legitimacy proposed in this paper.

To some extent, however, setbacks are likely to be limited by increasing popular support for democracy, as well as by the paper’s proposed third dimension of legitimacy, namely international legitimacy. As pointed out by Sandby-Thomas, even in an undemocratic state like China, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party now rests more on persuasion than on coercion. Historically, recognition by the international community has been important in developing countries with limited control over their territory and limited resources (Jackson, 1993; Scott, 2017). This is no less the case for Tanzania, one of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa that has received most development assistance since independence. Traditional donors are reacting increasingly negatively to the developments in Tanzania, by withholding aid or shifting aid away from the control of the state. The way that processes of legitimation are played out will thus differ from one country to another. Lavers (2018) suggests that a basic distinction can be made between competitive clientelist settlements, in which politics tend to follow neopatrimonial logics aimed at distributing rents to specific clients to keep a political elite in power, and more centralised dominant party settings, which tend to adopt more programmatic approaches. More research in this regard is needed.

8. Conclusion

The early strands of political settlement analysis focus on the structural factors that shape politics in developing countries. Due to limited resources, intra-elite relations between political and economic elites tend to be decisive for policy and implementation. Traditional settlement analysis is less clear on the role of democratic elections and popular legitimacy. Recently, some additional settlement literature suggests that ideas and ideology may play a role and be linked to issues of legitimacy, but this is still little explored. Drawing on an adapted strategic-relational approach, it suggests seeing legitimacy as shaped internally by tripartite relations between political elites, intermediate staff and populations. Rather than seeing legitimacy as a characteristic of charismatic individuals, the paper sees it as a process of legitimation, that is, of attempts to legitimate elite rule among other strategic actors. By using Tanzania as a critical case study, the paper shows how electoral dynamics helped reshape, first, sectoral policies and, later, the country’s economic development model, as well as the composition of its ruling coalition. The country’s current president, Magufuli, has used his popular mandate to sideline existing political and economic elites and pursue a range of populist policies targeting the rural majority population.
The paper therefore argues that, in the context of democratisation, popular legitimacy becomes more important and should be analysed as a source of power in its own right, in line with force and rents, which are already part of the existing political settlement analysis. This does not imply that legitimacy is always achieved through democratic means. As Tanzania shows, a ruling political elite may undermine the space of political opponents, the paper’s second dimension of legitimacy. This is justified with the argument that restrictions combined with a more state-led development model will bring prosperity to ordinary Tanzanians. Setbacks, however, are likely to be limited by increasing popular support for democracy, as well as by considerations of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, the paper’s third dimension of legitimacy. In other words, rather than arguing that popular legitimacy is replacing other sources of power, the paper suggests that it is the context-specific combination of different sources of power that should be our focus, of which legitimacy is just one. Without it, it becomes harder to explain contemporary forms of politics in countries undergoing democratisation. How it plays itself out will, however, vary from one country to another.
## Appendix

### Comparing Kikwete's first cabinet (2005) and Magufuli's current cabinet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zones</th>
<th>Kikwete's first cabinet</th>
<th>Magufuli's current cabinet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Southern            | - Hawa Gasia  
- Juma Akukweti  
- Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru | - Kassim Majaliwa  
- Jenista Mhagama |
| 2: Southern Highlands  | - Mark Mwandosya  
- Mizengo Pinda  
- Joseph Mungai  
- David Mwakyusa  
- Peter Msola       | - Harrison Mwakyembe  
- William Lukuvi    
- Isack Kamwelwe     
- Augustine Mahiga   |
| 3. Central             | - John Chiligati                                              | - Mwigulu Nchemba  
- Palamagamba Kabudi|
| 4. West Lake           | - Juma Kapuya  
- Margaret Sitta                                                  | - Hamisi Kigwangalla  
- Rose Ndalichako  
- Philip Mpango                                             |
| 5. Lake Zone           | - Andrew Chenge  
- Nazir Karamagi  
- John Magufuli  
- Anthony Diallo  
- Stephen Wasira | - Luhanga Mpina  
- Medard Kalemani  
- Charles Tizeba  
- Charles Mwijage  
- Angellah Kairuki |
| 6. Eastern/Coastal     | - Sophia Simba  
- Ibrahim Msabaha  
- Shukuru Kawambwa  
- Juma Ngasongwa | - Selemani Jafo |
| 7. Northern            | - Asha-Rose Migiro  
- Philip Marmo  
- Basil Mramba  
- May Nagu  
- Bakari Mwapachu  
- Jumanne Maghembe       | - January Makamba  
- George Mkuchika  
- Ummy Mwalimu |
| 8. Zanzibar            | - Hussein Mwinyi  
- Muhammed Seif Khatib  
- Zakia Meghji | - Hussein Mwinyi  
- Makame Mbarawa |

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1 Our analysis focuses on full cabinet positions and therefore excludes deputy ministers. It was done in November 2017 and it does not take into account several mini cabinet reshuffles since then.
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